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Shadow Banking and Corporate Finance 
Abstract 
This thesis examines how shadow banking activities affect firms’ 
behaviors. We focus on two important representatives of shadow 
banking activities: wealth management products issued by 
commercial banks and finance companies affiliated in business 
groups in China. By observing how corporates’ cash holding 
policies, investment decisions and financing choices response to 
dynamic changes in the shadow banking activities through three 
empirical studies, we find that the wide spread of shadow banking 
activities in China plays an important role in explaining corporate 
behaviors. 
Precisely, the first study in this thesis investigates the relationship 
between shadow banking activities (wealth management products) 
and firms’ investment decision. Wealth management products are 
best described as asset-based investment products that derive returns 
based on the performance of designated pool of underlying assets, 
which contribute to a sizeable fraction of shadow banking activities 
in China while are subject to lightly regulation. In this study, we 
find that firms operating in cities with greater shadow banking 
presence are more responsive to their investment opportunities than 
those operating in cities with less shadow banking presence. This 
effect is stronger for financially constrained firms, suggesting that 
shadow banking activities to some extent reduce firms’ financial 
 
 
vi 
constraints. We find this result is valid and robust in the 
endogeneity tests using instrumental and natural experiment method. 
The results of this study suggest a more careful regulation on 
shadow banking industry taking both the benefit and risk sides into 
consideration. 
The second study investigates the impact of the presence of finance 
companies on firms’ cash policy. Finance company is essential a 
shadow bank involving credit and maturity transformation affiliated 
in a business group. We find a cash hoarding behavior after firms 
having access to finance companies. This result is consistent with 
tunneling theory for cash holdings that the hoarding cash is a result 
of controlling shareholders’ incentives to siphon resources out of the 
firm to increase their own wealth using finance companies as a 
tunneling vehicle. This result survives in a battery of robust tests 
and endogeneity tests. To the best of our knowledge, this study is 
the first to provide systematic evidence that finance companies 
serve controlling shareholders’ tunneling motives rather than firms’ 
investment purposes.  
The third study examines the relationship between the presence of 
finance companies and firms’ reporting behaviors. We show that 
firms are more likely to be engaged in earnings management 
through increasing the use of discretionary accruals after having 
access to finance company. We also find that their earnings 
management behavior is in parallel with an extensive equity 
financing. We argue that controlling shareholders are incentivized to 
manage earnings to raise more capital from equity issuance and 
require firms to deposit the raised capital in finance company for 
their own interest, which is consistent with the tunneling view of 
finance companies in the second study. We highlight the earnings 
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management costs imposed by the presence of finance company in 
China. Both the second and third studies have important 
implications that policy makers need to pay close attention to the 
prevalence of finance companies in the evolution of business groups, 
especially on the cost side of such group-specific banks. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction  
China has been one of the fastest growing economies over last three 
decades. A widely recognized perception in the law, institutions, 
finance, and growth literature is that a country's overall economic 
growth is largely attributable to a well development of financial 
systems (King and Levine, 1993; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Levine, 
et al, 2000; Bekaert et al, 2005; Beck et al, 2005; Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Maksimovic, 1998; Love, 2003; Beck, et al2008; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1998; Wurgler, 2000; Guiso et al, 2004; Schoar, and 
Thesmar, 2007). However, China seems to be a counterexample to 
the findings in these existing literatures because its significant 
economic development is accompanied by poor legal systems and 
underdeveloped financial markets (Allen et al, 2005). On the other 
hand, a growing body of literature has turned to discuss the role of 
informal financial systems playing in developing economies. The 
dominant view is that the informal financial system fills the 
institutional void, serving as a complement of the formal financial 
system in a weak institutional context. At the same time, such 
informal financial system has become increasingly notable because 
it may also bring substantial risks to the economy. This thesis 
focuses on the role of the most important constitution of informal 
financial systems-shadow banking system and pays specific 
attention to the benefits and costs of this unique system, as well as 
how the shadow banking system serves the real economies. This 
thesis aims at providing a more comprehensive landscape of China’s 
shadow banking and investigating its real economic influences by 
establishing a bridge linking shadow banking activities with firms’ 
financial and investment decisions. 
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Shadow banking in China, or credit intermediation involving 
activities outside the traditional banking system, has evolved rapidly 
in terms of its size and dynamics since the globe financial crisis. It 
differs from shadow banking in the United State constituted by 
various securitization and market-based instruments which play 
only a limited role, shadow banking in China is now playing a 
crucial role to the ecosystem of China’s economy which constructs 
connections among thousands of financial institutions with 
companies, local governments and hundreds of millions of 
households. According to Moody's report in June 2017, shadow 
banking assets accounted for 83 per cent of GDP, which is down 
from a peak of 87 percent recorded in 2016. The prevalence of 
shadow banking enriches firms’ financing channels, however, raises 
concerns that it may increase the over fragility and risk of the 
financial system in China due to its opaqueness and complexity 
given that China is an emerging market where financial markets are 
relatively imperfect because of information asymmetry, weak 
corporate governance and poor investor protection. 
To study the real impact of the shadow banking activities in China, 
in this thesis, we examine two major components of China’s shadow 
banking sector-wealth management business conducted by 
commercial banks and business groups’ finance company in China.  
The thesis contains three thorough studies. The first study examines 
the real effect of shadow banking activities (commercial banks’ 
wealth management products) on firm investment. The second study 
investigates the relationship between the presence of finance 
company and firms’ cash holding policy. The third study focus on 
the relationship between the presence of finance company and firms’ 
earnings management behavior.  
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Specifically, the first study investigates the effects of the shadow 
banking activities on firm investments in China. The study answers 
the research question that how shadow banking activities impact 
firm investments through banking lending channel. It has been long 
of concern to the literature that how bank lending behaviors 
influences firms’ investments given the frictions in the economy. 
Most of literature on bank lending channel focus on the availability 
of external financing such as capital markets or banks’ on-balance 
sheet credit, however, how shadow banking credit influences firms’ 
investments has received little attention. Shadow banking in China 
evolves rapidly in response to changes in regulation. It is believed 
that those shadow banking activities may impose a key risk to the 
stability of China’s financial system and economy. To tighten 
shadow banking activities and defusing the financial risks that 
threaten the economy, a recent regulation on shadow banking 
industry in 2018, namely the New Asset Management Rules, was 
introduced, which drives our motivation to conduct this study. The 
regulation largely stands on the risk side of the shadow banking 
activities, however, the real impact of such regulation on shadow 
banking is still unknown due to the lack of systematic evidence on 
how shadow banking affects the real economy. Regulators are still 
ambivalent about how and to what extent to regulate this sector 
(Allen, 2018).  
The thesis aims to provide insights to the heated debate regarding 
the net benefits of shadow banking sector in China. The prevalence 
of shadow banking enriches firms’ financing channels, however, 
raises concerns that it may increase the over fragility and risk of the 
financial system in China due to its opaqueness and complexity. To 
study the net impact of shadow banking in China, we focus on the 
largest component of shadow banking activities in China-wealth 
management products (WMPs) and how bank’s involvement in 
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WMPs affects firms’ investment behavior. We use 363,654 WMPs 
issuance information from WIND terminal from 2009 to 2016 and 
match WMPs data with firm-level data via the WMPs issuers’ 
(commercial banks’) geographical location of headquarter. We find 
that the scale of WMPs is positively related the level of firm 
investment, suggesting that firms operating in cities with greater 
shadow banking presence are more responsive to their investment 
opportunities than those operating in cities with less shadow 
banking presence. We also examine whether differences in firm 
characteristics affect the extent to which shadow banking reduces 
financial constraints. We find that small and private firms subject to 
more information asymmetries invest more if they operate in cities 
with more shadow banking activities presence. Moreover, a 
prevalence shadow banking environment would help firms to reduce 
the reliance of investment on cash flow. Further, firms with greater 
investment opportunities proxies by TobinQ depend more on 
shadow banking credit. These results suggest that shadow banking 
has become an important driving force of firm investment through 
financial constraint channel. We employ the Regulation on Asset 
Management Business of Commercial Bank issued by China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) in 2013 as an exogenous 
supply-side shock to shadow credit and an instrument of WMPs to 
deal with the endogeneity problem in the relationship between the 
scale of shadow banking and firm investment.  
Our results provide robust evidence suggesting that shadow banking 
plays a complementary role that meets the financial demands of 
firms in China. Precisely, shadow banking in China serves an 
important alternative financing channel for firms that have less 
privileged access to formal bank credit in the context of the 
presence of regulatory restriction of the 75% cap on banks’ loan-to-
deposit ratio. Any inappropriate regulation or overregulation could 
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have negative economic effects if firms facing the withdrawal of the 
shadow banking financing cannot frictionlessly switch to an 
alternative financing source. We recommended that when the 
regulators are focusing on systematic risks of shadow banking 
activities, they should also not lose sight of its impact on corporate 
investment of firms; which is the core of the long-term development 
of economies. 
The second study shifts the focus to the prevalence of finance 
company in China’s business groups. Finance company1 is a non-
banking financial institution affiliated with a business group, 
providing the member firms of the business groups with bank-like 
financial services such as deposit taking and loan originating. They 
are essentially shadow banks involving in maturity, credit, and 
liquidity transformation within groups.  
Chinese reformers originally experimented with finance companies 
to enable firms to reduce financial constraints and to better manage 
investments within and outside the group (Keister, 1998). However, 
anecdotes show that the effectiveness and the functioning of finance 
companies may not be efficient as much as it could be. Precisely, 
the nearly 50% loan-to-deposit implies that a large portion of 
deposit generated from member firms are not re-allocated to firms 
 
1 Business Group Finance Company Act (FC Act) is one of the most critical regulations on FC, where terms and conditions 
with regard to entry, establishment and operations are clarified. According to the FC Act, Business group is defined as a 
business consortium that consists of a holding company and a group of subsidiaries and joint stock companies that are 
connected through capital linkage. Business groups applying for establishing finance company should meet the following 
requirements: 1) Registered capital of the holding company should not be lower than Renminbi 800 million one year before 
the application. 2) Consolidated assets of the holding company should not be lower than Renminbi 5 billion and net asset ratio 
should not be lower than 30% one year before application. 3) Two years in row before the applications, consolidated total 
revenue should not be lower than Renminbi 4 billion per year and earning before tax should not be lower than Renminbi 200 
million per year. Besides, the establishment of a finance company is subject to a two-stage approval from the PBOC. 
Specifically, the first stage refers to the approval of preparation where the PBOC will make an announcement of approval for 
qualified Business group to prepare the establishment of a finance company. After a no more than 6 months preparation, the 
Business group is required to submit the application documents for opening. If the application is accepted, the PBOC will 
make a second stage of approval of opening announcement for qualified finance company. 
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within groups. On the other hand, firms increase cash holdings 
dramatically in the following years after having access to finance 
companies, which suggests that the level of financial constraints 
may not be alleviated given member firms tend to save more cash 
after the access to finance companies.  
To better understand the role of finance company in business groups, 
we examine how cash holdings of Chinese firms have evolved in 
parallel with the development of business groups and whether this 
evolution can be explained by the emergence and functioning of 
finance companies. We use hand-collected data 196 finance 
companies’ information with respect to the date of incorporation 
and the ownership structure from CBRC’s official announcements 
from 1987 to 2014. We trace ownership of finance companies of 
any length and match the data with ultimate or direct shareholders 
of firms that list on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges to 
make sure that finance companies and listed firms belong to the 
same business group.  
We find a stark difference between member firms in groups with 
and without finance companies in terms of their cash holdings. We 
find that a member firm which belongs to a business group with a 
finance company holds more cash than a member firm which 
belongs to a business group without a finance company. This result 
is inconsistent with the precautionary theory (Keynes, 1936), which 
predicts a reduced cash holding for member firms when they have 
access to finance company’s funds and reduce their financial 
constraints. The four evidences suggest that the member firms’ 
increase in cash holding after having access to finance companies 
within the business group is because of the incentives for the parent 
company to siphon resources out of the firm to increase their own 
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wealth. First, we find the increase in cash holdings is stronger when 
finance companies are allowed to enter the interbank market in year 
2000 by the government since the finance companies find it even 
easier and more profitable to lend out through the interbank market 
in the presence of dual-track interest system, although interbank 
market focuses mainly on overnight lending between financial 
institutions. Second, consistent with the study proposed by 
Kalcheva and Lins (2007) who argued that firms with a more of 
diverged controlling shareholder’s cash flow rights versus voting 
rights would hold more cash, we expect that this tunneling effect is 
stronger when the control right of the controlling shareholders is 
lower because the controlling shareholders wants to transfer benefits 
from firms where their cash flow right is low to firms where their 
cash flow right is high (Bertrand et al, 2002). Similarly, in the third 
analysis, we would expect the parent company to save more cash 
out of cash flow from equity issuance than other debt financing as 
their main financing choice for each member firm to accumulate 
cash holdings. By diluting the controlling right while remain full 
control, the controlling shareholders could reap more private 
benefits from depositing the accumulated cash from equity issuance 
in their wholly controlled finance companies. And fourth, to 
examine the interbank market is the plausible channel in explaining 
how private benefit is realized in the context of the presence of 
finance companies, we conduct a cash holdings sensitivity test and 
document that the cash holdings of firms with finance companies, in 
compared with firms without finance companies, are more sensitive 
to the variation of interbank rate, namely the SHIBOR rate while 
insensitive to the variation of governmental constrained rate. 
To address the endogeneity problem, we take advantage of the 
Behavioral Guidance for controlling shareholders of listed small- 
and middle-sized enterprises issued by Shenzhen stock exchange in 
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2007 as an exogenous shock to the extent of tunneling effect of a 
parent company with an FC within the business group. The 2007 
Anti-tunneling Guidance restricted possible harmful behaviors of 
controlling shareholders to minority shareholders that negatively 
affects the financial independence of firms, including restriction on 
any listed SME firms to deposit cash in their affiliated FCs. We find 
that the higher level of cash holdings for the treated firms is 
significantly reduced if they are SME firms post-2007 compared to 
control firms, which is in line with the tunneling hypothesis.  
We also consider two alternative explanations. First, the higher level 
of cash holdings for the treated firms could be that it is the 
controlling shareholders’ intention to improve the efficiency of 
resource allocation within groups by channeling cash from firms 
with lower capital efficiency to firms with good investment 
opportunity and hence large cash needs, using finance companies as 
an intermediary. We test the first alternative explanation by 
comparing responses in cash holdings after accessing finance 
companies across state-owned firms and non-state-owned firms. 
Empirical studies show that state-owned firms facing with soft 
budget constraints tend to be more profligate at capital efficiency in 
contrast to non-state-owned firms. However, we did not find state-
owned firms increase more cash holdings after having access to 
finance companies, which is against the first alternative explanation. 
The second alternative explanation lies in that accessing finance 
company possible provides management an avoidance of external 
monitoring by creditors and hence increases the agency cost of 
managerial discretion. The result that the level of bank-dependence 
of firms in the pre-accessing finance company period (proxying the 
level of external monitoring) is irrelevant to firms’ cash policy post-
accessing finance company period rules out this alternative 
explanation.  
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The second study has important implications that policy makers 
need to pay close attention to the role of finance companies in the 
evolution of business groups, especially on the cost side of such 
group-specific bank 
The third study continued to investigate the how firms’ earnings 
management reacts their access to finance company. This study 
answers the question whether the firms’ access to finance company 
enhances the corporate governance or brings unintended 
consequence to the firms. We test two contrary economic 
mechanisms through which finance company affects firms to engage 
in earnings management: corporate governance and agency conflict 
of tunneling. Precisely, if the corporate governance mechanism of 
finance company works, we expect less earnings management 
behavior after firms accessing the finance company. Because access 
to finance company help group members reduce agency cost and 
hence improve the productivity and performance (Keister 1998). 
However, if finance company facilitates controlling shareholder of 
firms with privilege to siphon resources out of firms to increase 
their own wealth, they have incentives to window dress true firm 
performance to obfuscate the market. This insight suggests that 
earnings management is inherently associated with finance 
company-induce tunneling especially in a weak institutional context 
because poor corporate governance prevents such earnings 
manipulation from easily being detected and the benefits of this 
misbehavior are higher (Leuz et al, 2003).  
We find that firms are more likely to be engaged in earnings 
management through increasing the use of discretionary accruals 
after having access to finance company. We also find that their 
earnings management behavior is in parallel with an extensive 
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equity financing. We inferred that finance company can bring 
substantial private benefits to controlling shareholders (also the 
parent of business group and the wholly owner of finance company) 
if large amount of cash holdings is deposited in finance company, 
controlling shareholders are incentivized to manage earnings to raise 
more capital from equity issuance and require firms to deposit the 
raised capital in finance company. By doing so, the controlling 
shareholders can reap most, if not all, the profits from finance 
company. In short, finance company enhances the tunneling motives 
of controlling shareholders, which consequently result in more 
earning management behaviors. We also conduct two cross-
sectional analysis to provide more direct evidence supportive of our 
tunneling explanation. We use the difference between Shibor rate 
(Interbank-market rate) and firms’ last year profitability, and the 
controlling shareholders total share holdings to capture the 
tunneling incentive of firms with access to finance company behind 
their earnings management behavior. First, we find that larger 
difference indicating larger tunneling benefits that finance company 
could supply is associated with greater level of earnings 
management for firms with access to finance company. Second, the 
positive relationship between the presence of finance company and 
earnings management is stronger if controlling shareholders 
exercise full control while holding a relatively smaller portion of 
cash flow rights. Besides, we also use a direct measure of tunneling 
(related party transaction between subsidiary and parent company) 
to reflect the extent of entrenchment of the controlling shareholders 
and find that earnings management is more pronounced at firms 
controlled by more entrenched shareholders after they access the 
finance company.  
Our evidences show that the presence of finance company has a 
strong positive effect on earnings management, which reduces the 
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quality of a firm's accounting information. These results also 
survive in the endogeneity test. We use No.37 Memorandum 
Disclosure Regulation on Related Transaction between Finance 
Companies and Listed Firms issued by Shenzhen stock exchange in 
2011 as an exogenous shock on firms’ earning management 
decision. This regulation indicating a more transparent accounting 
information on the transaction between finance companies and 
affiliated firms supposedly reduced the abuse of finance company in 
tunneling activities by controlling shareholders. As expected, we 
find that earnings management of firms with access to finance 
company significantly reduced in the aftermath of the regulation 
adoption, confirming that a firm’s tunneling rationale to hide 
information on earnings management once they gain the helps from 
finance company. These results also imply that improving 
accounting quality may help to reduce earning managements, which 
is consistent with argument proposed by Biddle et al (2009). 
Because firms may increase reported earnings to achieve various 
incentives other than tunneling incentives. We attempt to rule out 
three alternative explanations for our results. First, it is believed that 
managerial compensation could be the key driver to an increasing 
earnings management after having access to finance company 
(Cheng and Warfield, 2005). It is possible that compensation of 
CEO becomes more dependent on the performance of the firms after 
firms have access to finance company. Finance company might be 
endowed to have responsibility for managing the member firms’ 
budget on behave of the parent company of the group. Therefore, a 
more marketized compensation scheme based on the performance 
could be adopted. Our results show that this alternation explanation 
does not hold since we find that variation of CEO compensation 
including salary and option has no significant influence on the 
relationship between the presence of finance company and the level 
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of earnings management. Second, accessing to finance company 
may bring stronger financing capacity and greater investment 
opportunities to affiliated member firms. Finance company’s 
primary function of funds reallocation within groups may promote 
the liquidity of the member firms, which results in that firms are 
more sensitive to investment opportunities. Managers may use 
discretionary accruals to credibly signal positive prospects to the 
market, enabling it to raise more capital to support the optimal 
investment projects (Linck et al, 2013). In line with this view, we 
would expect that positive effect of finance company on earnings 
management is stronger at firms with great investment opportunities. 
However, we provide evidence against this hypothesis. Third, we 
consider that political issue may both affect firms’ decision to 
access to finance company and earnings management decision. Liu 
et al (2018) find that political connections matter in deciding firms’ 
earnings management. One may argue that firms manage earnings to 
meet objectives set by government agency for quick political 
promotion. Thus, we would expect that state-owned firms should 
responses differently from non-state-owned firms in terms of the 
engagement of earnings management after accessing to finance 
company. Our results fail to support this hypothesis.  
Taken together, the third study highlights the earnings management 
costs imposed by the presence of finance company in China. It has 
an implication for policymakers as we suggest that improving 
transparency of the transactions between finance companies and 
listed firms could help increase the informativeness of firms’ 
reporting. 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. We show all 
the related literature in chapter 2, followed by three chapters 
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presenting the three studies in the relation between shadow banking 
activities and corporate finance. We draw conclusion in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature review 
2.1 Related literature in China’s shadow banking 
Different definitions for shadow banking have been proposed by 
researchers and regulators, Pozsar et al (2012) defined shadow 
banking as financial intermediaries that involves in maturity, credit, 
and liquidity transformation with no backstop of liquidity facilities 
from central bank. According to Financial Stability Board (FSB) 
definition, shadow banking is credit intermediation that conduct 
entities and activities fully or partially outside the regular banking 
system, or non-bank credit intermediation in short (Financial 
Stability Board, 2014).  
It is widely believed that the rapid growth of shadow banking 
activities in China was driven by China’s 4 trillion stimulus plan 
initiated by the Chinese government in response to the global 
financial crisis in 2008. There are several characteristics of shadow 
banking in China. First, commercial banks are the dominant players 
in the shadow banking market, it indeed is “the shadow of banks”. 
Second, shadow banking attaches a close tie with the financial 
system, companies, local governments and hundreds of millions of 
households. Third, shadow banking is becoming more complex with 
more emergence of structured shadow credit intermediation based 
on sophisticated structures of existing shadow banking instruments. 
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The expansion of the literature on shadow banking started from the 
2007-09 Financial Crisis. Researchers begun to rethink the role of 
financial intermediaries in financial system. Recently, the literature 
on China's shadow banking has been growing. Chen et al (2016) and 
Hachem and Song (2016) contend that the stricter liquidity 
regulation was the trigger to the rapid development of shadow 
banking in China. Wang et al (2016) demonstrate that shadow 
banking essentially provides a pragmatic dual-track reform solution 
to interest rate liberalization in China, which led to efficiency gain 
in credit allocation and social surplus. Acharya et al (2016) find that 
small- and median-size banks in China significantly increase the 
participation of shadow banking activity in the form of issuing off-
balance sheet wealth management products, which may induce a 
substantial rollover risk when they mature. Chen et al (2017) argue 
that small- and median-size banks engage more actively in shadow 
banking in the form of channeling risky entrusted loans as a 
response to the deposit shortfalls as well as regulatory prohibition 
on lending to risky industry, which brings the risk of shadow 
banking into their balance sheet. Chen et al (2017) report that the 
rollover pressure of local government from maturing debt financed 
by China’s four-trillion-yuan stimulus package manifest the 
handover effect of the stimulus plan on fostering the rapid growth of 
shadow banking activities. Allen et al (2017) reveal that the pricing 
of affiliated entrusted loans and non-affiliated entrusted loans 
incorporates fundamental and informational risks. 
2.2 Related literature in business group 
Several attempts by academic practitioners have been made to the 
definition of a business group (Granovetter,1985; Keister,1998; He, 
Mao et al.,2013; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; Khanna and Yafeh, 
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2007; Almeida, Kim et al., 2015), however, it still remains 
ambiguous due to the fact that the concept of ‘business group’ 
inclines to an intuition notion rather than a judicial organizational 
form (Khanna and Rivkin 2001). In order to better account for the 
China’s institutional context, we employ the official definition in 
the Registration of Business Groups Regulation (Registration Act, 
1998) by State Administration for Industry & Commerce of the 
People’s Republic of China (SAIC). A business group is a 
federation of legally independent firms, which are bound together 
by ownership ties, operating under the control of a single parent, or 
core firm. 
A large and growing body of literature has paid attention to 
intermediation functions played by business group as efficient 
response to the institutional voids (Leff, 1978). In particular, the 
kernel of institutional void theory is that the business groups can 
achieve internal replication of the functions provided by ambient 
intermediary as in advanced economies given the scale and scope of 
the groups (Gertner et al, 1994, Khanna and Palepu, 2000). 
Especially in emerging markets where financial markets are 
relatively imperfect because of information asymmetry, weak 
corporate governance and poor investor protection, the resultant 
transaction costs are particularly expensive. A business group acts 
as an internal capital market that can allocate resources among 
affiliated firms less costly and thereby can lead to economic benefits 
to affiliated firms. It is widely believed that groups can fill some 
institutional voids through the mechanism of internal capital market 
in less developed financial markets (Khanna and Palepu, 2000, 
Morck et al, 2005).  
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It seems always to be a recurring theme in the research to study the 
benefits and costs of internal capital markets for business groups. In 
general, the internal capital market can be controversially motivated 
by a finance advantage and a tunneling intention. In a financial 
constrained environment where not all positive NPV projects can be 
financed, firms can create value by actively engaging in “winner-
picking” through internal capital markets. The economic rationale 
behind implies that well-informed management in a business group 
reallocate scarce funds from members with low profitability to those 
with high profitability, thereby benefit from firm’s most promising 
growth opportunities which stand-alone firms may not have 
financing capacity to capture (Stein, 1997). Gopalan et al (2007) 
document that Indian business groups transfer cash internally to 
prop up member firms that are close to bankruptcy. More recently, 
Almeida et al (2015) found evidence that chaebols in Korea 
alleviate the negative effects of the Asian crisis through intragroup 
capital reallocation in the circumstance that external finance became 
more expensive. The finding is consistent in the spirt of the work by 
Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2015) who show that the U.S. 
conglomerates’ internal capital efficiency increases during the 
2007–2009 financial crisis. Moreover, business group in a 
pyramidal structure appears to have finance advantages in setting up 
new firms, those with large investment requirements but low 
injectable cash flows, as the group is better able to access a pool of 
internal funds (Almeida and Wolfenzon 2006; Bena et al, 2013). 
Other studies on business group have contented another function of 
internal capital market in risk sharing by funds reallocation (Khanna 
and Yafeh 2005; Gopalan et al, 2007; He et al, 2013). All above 
evidence has sketched a positive picture of internal capital markets, 
suggesting that the presence of internal capital markets embed in 
business groups will improve firm performance. However, a 
growing number of longitudinal studies have paid attention to the 
cost of such affiliation. Business group can be associated with 
agency problems such as expropriation by managers or the 
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controlling shareholders. In such respects, the internal capital 
market acts no longer as efficient complement to the weak external 
markets, but rather as rent-seeking vehicles through which the 
controlling shareholders can exploit benefits from minority 
investors. More importantly, the problems can be exacerbated in 
emerging market where corporate governance and investor 
protection are weak (Johnson et al, 2000; Khanna and Palepu 2000). 
Bertrand et al (2002) discover a significant amount of tunneling 
activities via manipulating nonoperating components of profit in 
Indian business groups. Bae (2002) pointed out that acquisitions 
provide a way for controlling shareholders of Korean business 
groups (chaebols) to increase their wealth. Similar, tunneling 
benefits can be pursued by controlling shareholders of chaebols via 
the use of private securities offerings. 
2.3 Related literature in cash holdings 
Prior empirical literature has paid attention to either financial 
constraints channel or agency channel in explaining firms’ cash 
holdings policies. With regard to the former, the precautionary 
demand of holding cash initially proposed by Keynes (1936) 
suggests that liquid cash prevents firms from underinvesting or even 
forgoing positive NPV projects if adverse cash flow shocks make 
alternative of funds unavailable or excessively costly. This 
conventional wisdom is supported by a number of papers. For 
example, Bates et al (2009) conclude the reason why U.S firms hold 
much more cash than they used to is protect themselves against 
adverse cash flow shocks. Duchin (2010) finds that diversified firms 
hold less cash than stand-alone firms do because diversification 
efficiently reduces firms’ exposure to risk and allows them to hold 
less cash for precautionary reasons. McLean (2011) show that firms 
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with strong precautionary motive to hold cash are increasingly rely 
on share issuance as the source of the cash. In addition to the 
financial constraint channel, as argued by Jensen (1986), excess 
cash holdings may aggravate agency problems since firms’ insiders 
may have incentives to purse their private benefits through a pool of 
accumulated free cash flow. Based on Jensen’s viewpoint, ample 
studies focus on agency conflicts between controlling shareholders 
and minority shareholders and study how the excess cash holding 
relates to the controlling shareholders’ private interests of wealth 
maximization via expropriating resource out of firms, or in other 
words, the controlling shareholders’ engagement in tunneling 
behaviors. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) present that poorly 
governed firms lower increase in firm value corresponding to 1 
dollar increase in cash holdings. In the international study of 45 
counties by Dittmar et al (2003), firms in countries where investor 
protection is weak hold twice as much cash as firms in countries 
with good investor protection. Harford et al (2008) find that firms 
with entrenched managers choose to spend cash quickly on 
investments rather than hoard it. Kalcheva and Lins (2007) discover 
that firm value is lower in countries with weaker external 
shareholder protection, which is consistent with findings by 
Pinkowitz et al (2006). 
2.4 Related literature in evidence of tunneling in China 
A growing stream of empirical literature has shown tunneling 
evidence in China. Chen et al (2012) confirm the existence of 
tunneling in Chinese listed firms and argue that the non-tradeable 
reform can help to mitigate this agency conflicts between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. A group of 
studies show evidence that controlling shareholders of Chinese 
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listed firms use related-party transaction to conduct tunneling 
activities. For example, Jiang et al (2010) find that controlling 
shareholders use intercorporate loans to siphon funds from publicly 
listed firms. Jian and Wong (2010) show evidence of propping up 
by controlling shareholders through related sales and the propping 
up effect is stronger for state-owned firms and firms operating in 
regions with weaker economic institutions. Peng et al (2011) 
confirm this finding by studying connected transaction data among 
firms. Jiang et al (2015) investigates the Non-Operational Fund 
Occupancy (or NOFO) behavior of controlling shareholders, 
providing evidence that such behavior comes from their tunneling 
motives. 
2.5 Related literature in earnings management 
Many studies have defined earnings management. For example, 
Schipper (1989) use "disclosure management" to define "earnings 
management" in the sense that management purposeful intervene 
the external financial reporting process for their personal benefits. A 
more widely used definition by Healy and Wahlen (1999:368) 
concludes the occurrence of earnings management as “when 
managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring 
transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some 
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the 
company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on 
reported accounting practices”. Under generally accepted 
accounting principle (GAAP), firms involve in earnings 
management through manipulating reported accounting numbers to 
obscure true economic performance (Dechow and Skinner, 2000).  
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Institutional factors such as weak corporate governance, investor 
protection and underdeveloped market are considered significant 
determinants of earnings management activity. Xie et al (2003) 
emphasized the importance of the board of directors, the audit 
committee, and the executive committee in preventing earnings 
management. In the multinational comparison across 31 countries, 
Leuz et al (2003) found that countries with developed equity 
markets, dispersed ownership structures, strong investor rights, and 
legal enforcement are less likely to have earnings management 
problem. The introduction of short selling can help improve the 
market efficiency and hence less earnings management (Fang, 2016).  
A substantial body of empirical has focused on the motivation 
behind firms’ earnings management behavior. For example, Gunny 
(2010) examine the relationship between earnings management and 
future performance and suggested that firms are motivated to 
opportunistically manage earnings to meet the earnings benchmark. 
Furthermore, managers manipulate earnings to avoid reporting 
earnings losses and decreases (Dichev, 1997), Du and Shen (2018) 
explored evidence suggests that managers manage earnings to match 
peer performance. Strong evidence is found in support of debt 
covenant hypothesis that managers opportunistically report earnings 
to avoid violations of accounting-based debt covenants (DeFond 
and Jiambalvo, 1994; Dichev and Skinner, 2002). Cheng and 
Warfield (2005) argued that compensation maximization is an 
important driving force shaping managers reporting outcomes. 
Earning overstatements are more frequently to exist in CEOs’ early 
years of service because their attempts to favorably influence the 
market’s perception of their ability (Ali and Zhang, 2005). 
Moreover, managers are engaged in earnings management prior to 
security issuance such as initial public offerings or seasoned equity 
offerings to boost share prices (Teoh et al, 1998a; Teoh et al, 1998b; 
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Rangan, 1998). Similar, Louis and Robinson (2005) that managers 
use discretionary accruals to favorably signal information to the 
market around stock splits announcement. Linck et al (2013) 
suggested that managers strategically use discretionary accruals to 
credibly signal positive prospects to the market, enabling it to raise 
more capital to support the optimal investment projects. Besides, 
matching expected credit rating is another motivation to earnings 
management (Alissa et al, 2013). Liu and Lu (2007) reveals a 
unique setting where Chinese firms are motivated by controlling 
shareholders’ tunneling incentives to engage in earnings 
management activities.  
Earnings management techniques also attract numerous attentions 
by a great volume of literature. A large number of studies focus on 
discretionary accruals management (e.g. Dechow et al, 1995; 
Dechow et al, 2003; Ayers et al, 2006; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). 
However, accrual model received repeated criticism due to that it 
may produce bias and noisy in detecting earnings management 
(Bernard and Skinner, 1996). Stubben (2010) suggests that 
discretionary revenue as an alternative measure of earnings 
management provides more powerful estimation. In addition, 
research also interested in real earnings management. Prior studies 
pay attention to three types of real earnings management. Due to 
that research and development (R&D) must be recorded as incurred 
expense to reflect the uncertainty of future benefits associated with 
R&D expenditure, managers may choose to cut R&D expense to 
boost the earnings. Several studies have found evidence of cutting 
R&D expense to manipulate earnings (Baber et al, 1991; Dechow 
and Sloan, 1991; Bens et al, 2002; Cheng, 2004). The second type 
of real management activities refers to manager’s discretion on the 
timing of asset sales. Examples of research focusing on timing of 
asset sales include Bartov (1993) and Herrmann et al (2003). 
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Alternative, sales manipulation such as overproduction to report 
lower cost of goods sold also provide a way to manage reported 
earnings. Example of research providing evidence consistent with 
managers overproducing to decrease reported include Gunny (2010), 
Thomas and Zhang (2002) and Roychowdhury (2006). Furthermore, 
Farrell et al (2014) document that the use of share repurchases 
offers a prevalent mechanism to manage earnings per share. 
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Chapter 3 
Shadow Banking Financing and Firm Investment 
3.1 Introduction 
Given the fiction in banking industry in China where banks are 
forced to involve in shadow banking activities such as absorbing 
quasi-deposits to satisfy the loan growth, firms in China are 
financial constrained that they have to rely on informal financing 
such as shadow banking financing to support their investment 
demands. In this context, shadow banking seems to play an 
important role in capital intermediary. If the capital intermediary 
mechanism works in China, we would expect the more the quasi-
deposits are absorbed by banks, the more investment that firms 
would have because they are less financially constrained. To test 
this hypothesis, we use novel data of the major component of 
China’s Shadow banking activities-wealth management products 
(WMPs) issued by banks, we find that firms operating in cities with 
greater shadow banking presence are more responsive to their 
investment opportunities than those operating in cities with lesser 
shadow banking presence. This effect is stronger for small and more 
constrained firms. We deal with the endogeneity problem in the 
relationship between scale of shadow banking and firm investment 
by using the Regulation on Asset Management Business of 
Commercial Bank issued by China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC) in 2013 as an exogenous supply-side shock to 
shadow credit. We discovered an unintended consequence of the 
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regulation on firm investment, that is, firms with prevalent shadow 
banking environment reduced their investment in the aftermath of 
the regulation on shadow credit supply. Our findings are consistent 
with the hypothesis that the shadow banking activities in China 
serves as a complement for financial markets, helping firms to 
overcome financial constraints. We recommended that when the 
regulators are focusing on systematic risks of shadow banking 
activities, they should also not lose sight of its impact on corporate 
investment of firms; which is the core of the long-term development 
of economies. 
Shadow banking in China, or credit intermediation involving 
activities outside the traditional banking system, has evolved rapidly 
in terms of its size and dynamics since the globe financial crisis. It 
differs from shadow banking in the United State constituted by 
various securitization and market-based instruments which play 
only a limited role, shadow banking in China is now playing a 
crucial role to the ecosystem of China’s economy which constructs 
connections among thousands of financial institutions with 
companies, local governments and hundreds of millions of 
households. Moreover, another defining feature is that shadow 
banking in China is mainly driven by commercial banks who have 
been able to keep shadow banking assets beyond the balance sheet 
to sidestep regulatory constraints on lending. The prevalence of 
shadow banking enriches firms’ financing channels, however, raises 
concerns that it may increase the over fragility and risk of the 
financial system in China due to its opaqueness and complexity. The 
burst of the stock market bubble during 2015 has been attributable 
to that shadow banking provides much leveraged capital to the stock 
market that fuels the vulnerability of the market. This led to the 
introduction of the recent regulation on shadow banking industry in 
2018, namely the New Asset Management Rules, aimed at 
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tightening shadow banking activities and defusing the financial risks 
that threaten the economy. However, due to the lack of systematic 
evidence on how shadow banking affects the real economy, such 
regulation could have negative economic effects if firms facing the 
withdrawal of the shadow banking financing cannot frictionlessly 
switch to an alternative financing source.  
On the other hand, it has been long of concern to the literature that 
how bank lending behaviors influences firms’ investments given the 
frictions in the economy. Modigliani and Miller (1958) provide a 
theoretical foundation in corporate finance that firms’ investment 
decision is irrelevant to its financing decisions in perfect capital and 
credit markets. However, firms in an institutional context where 
capital markets are insufficient to support their optional investment 
may face adverse selection and moral hazard frictions that restricts 
their ability to access external financing or substitution of private 
sources of capital, if their main capital providers experience shocks 
(Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). As a result, firms that extensively 
rely on them may have to choose suboptimal investment that limits 
firms’ growth and profitability. Recent studies that work on this 
bank lending channel focus on the availability of external financing 
such as capital markets or banks’ on-balance sheet credit, however, 
how shadow banking credit influences firms’ investments has 
received little attention. Most of the existing theoretical and 
empirical literature on shadow banking deals with the risk side, 
focusing on how much risk shadow banking adds to the real 
economy, while there is little evidence on the price or the 
importance of such shadow credit (Allen et al, 2019). If shadow 
banking does have complementary effect to the existing financial 
market or lending market, any over-regulation on shadow banking 
activities need to be re-evaluated since shocks to such markets could 
have negative impact on firms that dependent on shadow credit. 
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This study aims to contribute to the unresolved debate regarding the 
role of shadow banking in China. 
China seems to a natural candidate for investigating the real impact 
of shadow banking on the border economy for three reasons. First, 
China’s capital markets are relatively underdeveloped with weak 
shareholder protection (Ljungqvist et al, 2015, Allen et al, 2005). In 
such context, firms subject to moral hazard and adverse selection 
friction due to information asymmetries are more likely to be 
financially constrained when they invest (Beck et al, 2005). Second, 
the enforcement of the 75% cap on banks’ loan-to-deposit ratio may 
create distortions in bank lending market. Lenders will have 
incentives to seek regulatory arbitrage opportunities to avoid 75% 
loan-to deposit restriction. One the other hand, borrowers will have 
incentives to explore alternative financing channel outside the 
traditional banking system to fill the gap in loan supply. Third, the 
imperfection in capital market and lending market is in parallel with 
an exponentially booming shadow banking market2, which creates a 
puzzling whether the growing shadow banking activities fill the gap 
in financing to the real economy. Therefore, it is important to 
develop a more comprehensive picture about shadow banking in 
China, with particular focus on the role of commercial banks and 
how it serves the real economy.  
In this study, we attempt to answer this question empirically by 
focusing on the largest component of shadow banking activities in 
China-wealth management products (WMPs). We obtain 363,654 
WMPs issuance information from WIND terminal from 2009 to 
2016. We create a new proxy taking the maturity differences of 
 
2 According to Moody's report in June 2017, shadow banking assets accounted for 
83 per cent of GDP, which is down from a peak of 87 percent recorded in 2016. 
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WMPs into account to make the scale of each bank’s WMPs 
comparable. We match our WMPs proxy with firm-level data via 
the WMPs issuers’ (commercial banks’) geographical location of 
headquarter. We provide evidence that the rise of WMPs was a 
response to the regulatory restriction on banks’ loan-to-deposit ratio 
as well as a slowdown in loan growth. Furthermore, we provide new 
evidence on the relationship between shadow banking activities and 
firms’ investments. We find that the scale of WMPs is positively 
related the level of firm investment, suggesting that firms operating 
in cities with greater shadow banking presence are more responsive 
to their investment opportunities than those operating in cities with 
lesser shadow banking presence. 
Our explanation lies on that shadow banking plays a complementary 
role that meets the financial demands of firms in China. We 
conclude that shadow banking in China serves an important 
alternative financing channel for firms that have less privileged 
access to formal bank credit in the context of the presence of 
regulatory restriction of the 75% cap on banks’ loan-to-deposit ratio. 
Next, we examine cross-sectional variation in the relation between 
shadow banking and firm investment sensitivities. We examine 
whether differences in firm characteristics affect the extent to which 
shadow banking reduces financial constraints. We find that small 
and private firms subject to more information asymmetries invest 
more if they operate in cities with more shadow banking activities 
presence. We also find that a prevalence shadow banking 
environment would help firms to reduce the reliance of investment 
on cash flow. Further, firms with greater investment opportunities 
proxies by TobinQ depend more on shadow banking credit. These 
results suggest that shadow banking has become an important 
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driving force of firm investment through financial constraint 
channel.  
Due to that our shadow banking proxy is based on city-level, it is 
possible that shadow banking activities in a city might be correlated 
with city-wide factors that are not captured our firm-specific proxies 
for growth opportunities. We adopt two approaches to deal with this 
potential endogeneity problem. First, we use the income structure of 
banks as an instrument for our shadow banking proxy. Our results 
survive in this instrumental variable test. Second, we take advantage 
of Regulation on Asset Management Business of Commercial Bank 
issued by China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) in 2013 
as an exogenous supply-side shock to shadow credit. The regulation 
aimed at curbing the development of shadow banking the by setting 
the ceiling that WMPs money can be channeled to borrowers. Given 
this adverse shock to the supply of shadow credit, we find that firms 
operating in the cities with shadow banking presence significantly 
reduce their investment in the aftermath of the regulation compared 
to firms operating in the cities with absence of shadow banking 
throughout our sample period. Our results reinforce the 
complementary effect of the shadow banking on capital and credit 
markets. 
Our study contributes to the line of research on bank lending 
channel. The bank lending channel literature has investigated the 
real effect of shocks to banks on investment. For example, Chava 
and Purnanandam (2011) use Russian crisis of Fall 1998 as the 
supply-side shock on bank credit to demonstrate that U.S bank-
dependent borrowers’ performance was negatively affected by the 
adverse shocks to banks. Paravisini (2008) argue that financial 
constraints by banks lead to underinvestment to profitable lending. 
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More recently, Gilje et al (2016) find that banks exposed to deposit 
windfalls increase their lending to segments subject to greater 
contracting frictions. Cingano et al (2016) find that the credit crunch 
in interbank during financial crisis have a series of negative 
economic consequences in the period of 2007 to 2010. Similar 
conclusion can also be found in a large literature that discuss the 
bank-borrower relationship and how bank healthy affects 
borrower’s performance (Slovin et al, 1993; Peek and Rosengren, 
1997; Peek and Rosengren, 2000; Khwaja and Mian, 2008; Kang 
and Stulz, 2000). Our study contributes to these literatures by 
raising a novel aspect of supply-side shadow credit and discuss the 
real effect of changes in shadow credit on the border economy. 
Our study relates to a growing body of literature on shadow banking 
in China. It is believed that tightening monetary policy was the 
trigger of rapid rise of shadow banking in China, giving banks a 
stronger incentive to exploit regulatory arbitrage (Chen et al, 2016; 
Hachem and Song, 2016). Wang et al (2016) proposed that shadow 
banking provides an a dual-track reform mechanism to gradual 
interest rate liberalization in China where interest rate is controlled 
by means of binding deposit rate ceiling and bank loan quota. The 
closest to our study is Acharya et al (2016), who study off-balance 
sheet wealth management products, find that small- and median-size 
banks in China engage in more shadow banking activities in 
response to on-balance-sheet financial constraint and competition 
from big banks. They also argue that the booming WMPs market 
will induce a substantial rollover risk to banking systems. While 
existing studies focus on another important component of shadow 
banking activities in China-entrusted loans. By using the entrusted 
loan data, Allen et al (2019) presents evidence on the asset side of 
shadow banking activities, emphasizing on the fundamental and 
informational risks incorporated in pricing of affiliated entrusted 
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loans and non-affiliated entrusted loans. He et al (2016) measure the 
impact of the announcements of entrusted loans. They find that the 
lender firms of the entrusted loans experienced a negative abnormal 
return due to a lack of worthy projects, while the receipt firms of the 
entrusted loans generate a positive abnormal return that indicates a 
type of certification. Our study contributes to the emerging literature 
by providing a linkage between shadow banking and firm 
investment, aiming at study the real effect of shadow banking 
activities on the economy.  
Finally, this study extends several strands in the literature on firm 
investment in china. Firth et al (2008) discover a negative 
relationship between leverage and investment in China where the 
banks and other debt-holders perform a beneficial monitoring and 
disciplinary role that reduce overinvestment problem induced by 
agency problem. He et al (2013) find that business group plays an 
important role in determining firm investment. Cull and Xu (2005) 
suggest that the extent of private ownership matters for Chinese 
firm investment decision. Chen et al (2011) attribute the distortion 
firms' investment behavior and investment inefficiency to 
government intervention. Wang et al (2009) argue that the stock 
market price is informative in reflecting firm investment efficiency. 
Our study indicates a novel dimension in the determinants of firm 
investment in China, the shadow banking environment surrounded 
by firms. We suggest that a more active shadow banking 
environment could help to fill the gaps in capital and traditional 
banking credit markets. Firms operating in such environment are 
less financially constrained and hence make more investments. 
Our results also have implications for the effect of the recent 
regulation of the New Asset Management Rules on shadow banking 
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industry. Given the institutional context of China’s capital and 
credit markets, firms that depend more on shadow credit would have 
been more adversely affected by potential over-regulation on 
shadow banking activities. Policy makers are suggested to be 
carefully in drawing conclusion about shadow banking to avoid 
unintended consequence in the implementation of the regulation 
since function and real impact of shadow banking can vary 
according different economic conditions. 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Section 3.3 
introduces an overview of institutional background in China 
including regulation on credit market and details of wealth 
management products. Section 3.4 describes the data and sample. 
Empirical results and endogenous tests are presented in Section 3.5. 
Section 3.6 presents conclusions. 
3.2 Intuitional background 
3.2.1 Fiction in banking industry in China 
Financial sector in China is dominated by banks. Four types of 
banks constitute the banking system. This first type is policy banks3, 
whose main objective is to issue loans to sectors that conduct non-
profit businesses in accordance with governmental economic 
policies. These banks are not commercial banks which is not the 
 
3 They are China EXIM Bank, China Development Bank and Agriculture 
Development Bank of China. 
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interest of this study. The second type is the five state-owned banks4. 
They are the predominant players in China’s commercial loan and 
deposit market. The third type is twelve joint-stock banks. The 
fourth type is urban and rural commercial banks. They are small 
banks whose controlling shareholders are local or province 
government. All banks are supervised by supervision of the People's 
Bank of China (PBOC) and China Banking Regulatory Commission 
(CBRC). Fictions in credit market stems from the different 
objectives and incentive structures of banks. State-owned banks are 
less market-originated banks which tend to allocate and price loans 
based on governmental preferences but not on commercial judgment 
(Bailey et al, 2011), while other non-state-owned banks are small 
and financially constrained banks that serve small and private firms 
which have limited credit histories and collateral. Generally 
speaking, bank credit most likely flows to state-owned or big private 
firm but are discriminative against small and private firms (Firth et 
al, 2008), which is partially responsible for the market fiction.  
Moreover, China has been implementing tightly regulated interest 
rate system. Precisely, PBOC sets the benchmark interest rate with 
ceiling and floor bounds for different maturities over business 
cycles and has only began to liberalize since 2015. Further, banks 
must comply with the regulatory enforcement of the 75% loan-to-
deposit ratio (LTR) restriction. In other words, banks can only 
allocate loans equal to less than 75% of the deposits they generated5. 
In 2015, the LTR regulation was formally removed by the CBRC, 
however, the LTD ratio is still one of the key ratios that banks are 
 
4 They are Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank, 
Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China and Communications Bank of China. 
5 In 1995, the regulation of the loan-to-deposit ratio was written into the law on 
commercial banking. It was not until 2008 that the LTR regulation was fully 
enforced. In the following three year after the enforcement, CBRC amend the 
frequency of LTR monitoring requirements. Recently, regulators began to allow 
non-traditional deposit such as inter-bank deposit to be counted as denominator 
and certain types of loans were included as the numerator in the LTR calculation. 
 
 
34 
required to report to CBRC. The rationale of the LTR regulation is 
to ensure the liquidity of the deposit funds not invested in loans. 
Under an environment with the presence of these regulations, banks 
are experiencing difficulties in raising cheap deposits to sustain their 
loan growth while meeting the 75% LTR cap. As a result of the 
joint forces of these regulation and government intervention, banks 
are seeking ways to circumvent regulation through absorb quasi-
deposits to satisfy the loan growth. Depositors are attracted by 
quasi-deposit products such as WMPs because it offers higher yields. 
It is the complexity of the banking regulation that induce the rapid 
growth in the shadow banking activities. 
3.2.2 Key characteristics of shadow banking in China 
It is widely believed that the rapid growth of shadow banking 
activities in China was driven by China’s 4 trillion stimulus plan 
initiated by the Chinese government in response to the global 
financial crisis in 2008. There are several characteristics of shadow 
banking in China. First, commercial banks are the dominant players 
in the shadow banking market, it indeed is “the shadow of banks”. 
Second, shadow banking attaches a close tie with the financial 
system, companies, local governments and hundreds of millions of 
households. Third, shadow banking is becoming more complex with 
more emergence of structured shadow credit intermediation based 
on sophisticated structures of existing shadow banking instruments. 
3.2.3 Wealth management products (WMPs) 
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WMPs are quasi-deposits products provided by banks. It differs 
with other deposit products in three aspects. First, unlike traditional 
bank product—deposits, WMPs are best described as asset-based 
investment products that derive returns based on the performance of 
designated pool of underlying assets. Second, WMPs are off-
balance sheet activity which do not account for liabilities in banks’ 
balance sheet. Third, it is banks who have the discretion to set the 
rate of return of WMPs for investors. However, banks have no 
discretion to set the interest rate of deposits for savers because 
saving rate of deposits can only be set by the central bank of China. 
The first WMP emerged in 2005, when the deregulation of 
expanding commercial banks’ range of financial business was 
introduced by the Chinese regulator. In principle, WMPs are issued 
by commercial banks and are sold at traditional banks counters. 
Although other non-banking financial institutions such as securities 
companies, mutual funds, trust companies and insurance companies 
with asset management license offer similar investment products 
under different names, WMPs have its unique feature that investors 
would consider them as a substitute for bank deposits due to banks 
are the issuers of WMPs. This led to a misunderstanding by the 
WMP investors that they strongly believe the target returns of 
WMPs is effectively guaranteed by the bank. In practice, although 
there is little evidence due to the lack of transparency, WMPs barely 
incur loss because the issuer banks often rescue the failed WMPs. 
Technically speaking, there are two types of WMPS. Principal-
guaranteed WMPs (the yield could be either guaranteed or floating) 
are often recorded on the balance sheet asset as required by the 
CBRC. Because they are deposit-like on-balance-sheet liabilities, 
banks must pay deposit reserves which cause a lower yield than 
non-principal-guaranteed WMPs. Non-principal-guaranteed with 
floating yield WMPs are off-balance-sheet activities with no 
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disclose requirements, often providing higher yield than banks are 
allowed to offer on formal deposits or Principal-guaranteed WMPs. 
Unguaranteed WMPs constitute a majority share of the WMP 
market. Typically, the underlying assets consist of a single loan or a 
pool of loan, debt instruments, money market instruments and small 
portion of equity assets.  
WMP seems to be a good candidate to study shadow banking in 
China. WMPs are quasi-deposits issued by commercial banks that 
contribute to the largest fraction of shadow banking activities while 
are subject to lightly regulation. It essentially constitutes a dual-
track mechanism to the existing constrained banking credit system 
given the restricted interest rate. Due to that there is no regulatory 
ceiling on the interest rate that WMPs could offer, WMPs became 
appealing to the depositors especially when the regulated deposit 
rate is very much below the WMPs yield. On the other hand, banks 
want to benefit from the raise off-balance sheet funding via WMPs 
and channel these funds to borrowers to circumvent regulation of 
on-balance sheet lending by capital ratio and LDR. 
3.2.4 Regulation on asset management business of commercial 
bank in 2013 
Regulation on Asset Management Business of Commercial Bank 
issued by China Banking Regulatory (hereafter, WMPs regulation) 
Commission (CBRC) in 2013 is considered as a milestone in the 
history of shadow banking regulation. This regulation specifically 
applies to wealth management products issued by commercial banks. 
It was the first time that the assets that a WMP could invest was 
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clarified. According to the WMPs regulation, investible assets can 
be categorized in two types: non-standard debt assets and standard 
assets. Non-standard debt assets refer to assets not traded on the 
inter-bank bond market or stock exchanges, including credit assets, 
trust loans, entrusted loans, acceptance bills, letters of credit, and 
account receivables. Standard assets are those traded on the inter-
bank bond market or stock exchanges. The key element of banking 
regulation this study focuses is the rule that WMPs invested in non-
standard debt assets should not exceed 35% of a bank’s total WMPs 
or 4% a bank’s total assets. This regulation to a certain extent 
restricts banks’ ability to channel credit to borrowers through 
issuance of WMPs, representing a supply-side shock to borrowers 
who are dependent on shadow banking credits. 
3.3 Data and Sample 
3.3.1 Firm-level data and bank-level data 
Our sample consists of all non-financial firms listed on the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2007 to 2016. We obtain 
accounting data and stock price data from China Securities Market 
and Accounting Research database (CSMAR). We retrieve 
accounting data of all banks in China from and WIND Financial 
Terminal. Due to that WMPs channels funds from investors to 
borrowers, funds generated from WMPs issuance are normally 
pooled in a specific bank headquarter and will be lend to firms 
operating in the same city as where the bank headquarter operates. 
Therefore, city could be the link to match the two datasets. We 
match firm-level data with WMPs data by geographical location of 
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firms and banks headquarter in city-level. Our final bank sample 
consists of 2,368 bank year observations and 390 unique banks 
including 5 State-own banks, 12 Joint-stock banks and 373 
City/rural/foreign banks. 
3.3.2 WMPs data 
We obtain 363,654 WMPs data from WIND Financial Terminal6. 
WIND provides a comprehensive data of WMPs including name of 
issuers, valid date, maturity date, yield and estimated volume. To 
reflect the extent that banks involve in WMPs, we borrow ideas of 
measure used in mutual funds literature. To be more precise, we 
introduce the proxy of average daily assets under management 
(ADAUM) to take the maturity differences into account. For 
example, bank A issues a 1-year WMP from the beginning of the 
year to the end of the year, attracting 10 billion funds from investors. 
This gives bank A an ADAUM of 10 billion (10*365/365). Bank B 
issues a 1-month WMP from 1/1/2016 to 1/31/2016 (30 days of 
maturity) with a volume of 80 billion, the ADAUM equals to 6.58 
billion (80*30/365). This proxy allows us to compare the extent that 
a bank has involved in WMPs in a calendar year.  
We calculate the shadow banking proxy as follows: 
 
6 WIND Financial Terminal is a computer software system that provides access to 
financial data, companies, securities, fundamentals, news, research and analytics 
in the Chinese markets. The recent study by Acharya et al (2016) also used this 
data source. 
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𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑤_𝑋𝑖,𝑗 = ∑
(𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 ∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑘,𝑗)
365
 
Where 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑤_𝑋𝑖,𝑗 refers to aggregated average daily assets under 
management of Banks i in year j. X refers to all WMPs, non-
principle guarantee WMPs and principle guarantee WMPs, 
respectively. 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑘,𝑗  is the estimated volume of 
funds that the kth WMP issued by bank i would receive in year j. 
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑘,𝑗  is the effective days of maturity of the kth WMP 
issued by bank i in year j. We scale our shadow banking proxies by 
bank capital. 
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Table 3.1: Definition of variables 
Variable Definition 
Penal A: Bank Characteristics (Bank-Year Variation) 
Shadow_ALL The average daily asset under management of all WMPs as percentage of bank capital 
Shadow_NG The average daily asset under management of non-principle guarantee WMPs as percentage of bank capital 
Shadow_G The average daily asset under management of principle guarantee WMPs as percentage of bank capital 
Deposit to asset Ratio of total deposit to total assets 
Loan to asset Ratio of total loan to total assets 
Log (total assets) Logarithm of total asset 
Capital to asset Ratio of capital to total assets 
Loan growth The percentage change in loan from year t-1 to year t  
Deposit growth The percentage change in deposit from year t-1 to year t  
Loan to deposit Ratio of total loan to total deposit 
Non-interest to interest Ratio of non-interest income to interest income 
Penal B: Firm Characteristics (Firm-Year Variation) 
CAPEX Capital expenditures scaled by capital stock 
Firm size Logarithm of total asset 
Leverage Ratio of total liabilities to total assets 
Cashflow Ratio of operating cash flow to capital stock 
Sale Ratio of total operating revenue to capital stock 
TobinQ Market value of equity plus book value of total liabilities, scaled by book value of total assets 
Ownership Indicator variable that equals one if controlling shareholders is a government agency 
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics of bank-level variables 
This table presents descriptive statistics for all bank-level variables used in this study during the period of 2007 to 2016. Shadow_ALL, 
Shadow_NG and Shadow_G are the variables of interest in this study. The rest of variables are control variables used in regressions in this study. 
Banks are categorized into three types. There are 5 State-own banks, 12 Joint-stock banks and 373 City/rural/foreign banks. All variables are 
calculated for each bank-year.  
variable 
All banks State-own banks Joint-stock banks City/rural/foreign banks 
N mean sd N mean sd N mean sd N mean sd 
Shadow_ALL 2368 0.2335 0.6509 50 0.6563 0.8874 120 0.5869 0.9107 2198 0.2046 0.6183 
Shadow_NG 2368 0.1789 0.5503 50 0.5338 0.7878 120 0.4488 0.7353 2198 0.1561 0.5251 
Shadow_G 2368 0.0515 0.159 50 0.1174 0.1549 120 0.1311 0.2584 2198 0.0456 0.1503 
Deposit to asset 2296 0.7352 0.1355 50 0.7648 0.0665 117 0.665 0.098 2129 0.7383 0.1373 
Loan to asset 2298 0.4698 0.1095 50 0.5058 0.0339 117 0.4748 0.0859 2131 0.4687 0.1117 
Log (total assets) 2368 22.3134 1.7628 50 27.5045 0.4298 120 25.5387 1.085 2198 22.0192 1.4184 
Capital to asset 2368 0.0877 0.059 50 0.0652 0.0108 120 0.0541 0.0144 2198 0.09 0.0605 
Loan growth 1901 0.2073 0.1718 45 0.152 0.0842 105 0.2259 0.145 1751 0.2076 0.1747 
Deposit growth 1899 0.2336 0.2224 45 0.1255 0.0659 105 0.2259 0.1748 1749 0.2369 0.2268 
Loan to deposit 2290 0.648 0.1729 50 0.6673 0.089 117 0.7121 0.0657 2123 0.644 0.1777 
Non-interest to interest 2350 0.0449 0.0491 50 0.1443 0.0315 120 0.1073 0.0632 2180 0.0392 0.0434 
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3.3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.1 provides the variable definition. Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 
reports the summary statistics of our banking variables from 2007 to 
2016. As can be seen from Table 2, the focus of our dataset, the 
variables (shadow_ALL, shadow_NG and shadow_G), indicates the 
extent that a bank has involved in all WMPs, non-principle 
guaranteed WMPs and principle guaranteed WMPs, respectively. 
The mean of the shadow ratio for all WMPs including principle 
guaranteed WMPs and non-principle guaranteed WMPs equals to 
0.2335. Not surprisingly, non-principle guaranteed WMPs are far 
more popular with banks than principle guaranteed WMPs because 
non-principle guaranteed WMPs provides banks a promising 
mechanism to keep their business off balance sheet for 
circumventing on-balance-sheet regulation. Five state-owned banks 
engage in more shadow banking activities than joint-stock banks do. 
Chinese banks have an average deposit to asset ratio of 0.7352, 
which is much lower than that reported in American banks (e.g. 
0.827, Gilje et al, 2016). However, banks in China have a higher 
speed of deposit growth rate (0.2336) than American banks do 
(0.085). On average, Chinese banks have a loan-to-deposit ratio of 
0.648. Table 3 shows a description of our shadow banking proxies 
over the period of 2007–2016. Banks have become more involved in 
WMPs business given that the ADAUM of WMPs has reached to 
more than 35% of banks’ capital in 2016. This number was only 
1.22% in 2007. Table 3.4 provides summary statistics of the firm-
level variables.   
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Table 3.3: The mean of shadow banking proxies by year 
This table presents descriptive statistics for Shadow_ALL, Shadow_NG and Shadow_G used in this study across the sample years from 2007 to 2016. 
Banks are categorized into three types. There are 5 State-own banks, 12 Joint-stock banks and 373 City/rural/foreign banks. All variables are calculated for 
each bank-year.  
year 
ALL State-own banks Joint-stock banks City/rural/foreign banks 
obs ALL NG G obs ALL NG G obs ALL NG G obs ALL NG G 
2007 95 0.0122 0.0115 0.0007 5 0.045 0.0402 0.0048 12 0.053 0.0513 0.0017 78 0.0038 0.0036 0.0002 
2008 119 0.0517 0.0351 0.0166 5 0.0921 0.0682 0.0239 12 0.1825 0.1728 0.0097 102 0.0343 0.0172 0.017 
2009 154 0.0519 0.0378 0.0141 5 0.1751 0.151 0.0241 12 0.1096 0.0949 0.0147 137 0.0423 0.0287 0.0137 
2010 179 0.0631 0.0486 0.0145 5 0.3142 0.2981 0.0161 12 0.1212 0.0941 0.0271 162 0.051 0.0376 0.0135 
2011 208 0.1003 0.0766 0.0237 5 0.807 0.749 0.0579 12 0.2708 0.1798 0.091 191 0.0711 0.0525 0.0186 
2012 258 0.1977 0.1354 0.0457 5 0.6902 0.5144 0.1758 12 0.5219 0.2994 0.1852 241 0.1713 0.1194 0.0361 
2013 319 0.2406 0.1833 0.0544 5 0.8098 0.5173 0.2925 12 0.9566 0.6927 0.2393 302 0.2028 0.1575 0.0431 
2014 333 0.3744 0.2864 0.0829 5 1.199 0.8574 0.3416 12 1.5118 1.2489 0.262 316 0.3182 0.2408 0.072 
2015 357 0.3686 0.2863 0.0811 5 1.3069 1.1398 0.1586 12 1.3006 1.0794 0.2703 340 0.3219 0.2458 0.0733 
2016 346 0.3509 0.2802 0.0707 5 1.1237 1.0028 0.0789 12 0.8408 0.5743 0.21 329 0.3213 0.2585 0.0655 
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Table 3.4: Summary statistics of firm-level variables 
Penal A of this table presents the descriptive statistics for all firm-level 
variables used in this study during the period of 2007 to 2016. Penal B shows 
the descriptive statistics of firm expenditures across years. CAPEX is the 
dependent variable calculated as capital expenditures scaled by capital stock. 
Firm size is the logarithm of total asset. Leverage refers to the ratio of total 
liabilities to total assets. Cashflow is the ratio of operating cash flow to 
capital stock. Sales is the ratio of total operating revenue to capital stock. 
TobinQ is calculated as the market value of equity plus book value of total 
liabilities, scaled by book value of total assets. Ownership is an indicator 
variable that equals one if controlling shareholders is a government agency. 
All variables are calculated for each firm-year. 
Penal A: Summary statistics of firm-characteristics 
variable N mean median SD 
CAPEX 23998 0.495 0.2852 0.6077 
Firm size 24013 21.7268 21.6024 1.3503 
Leverage 24013 0.4514 0.4447 0.2258 
Cashflow 24009 0.3947 0.3009 0.8005 
Sales 24009 6.0186 3.8724 6.8918 
TobinQ 21915 2.7541 2.1406 1.9794 
Penal B: Descriptive statistics of firm investment variables across years 
year N mean median SD 
2007 1564 0.4975 0.2746 0.6186 
2008 1719 0.5067 0.2798 0.6289 
2009 2061 0.4754 0.2633 0.6223 
2010 2297 0.5757 0.3494 0.6756 
2011 2422 0.6362 0.3986 0.7034 
2012 2466 0.5726 0.3585 0.6557 
2013 2581 0.5141 0.3152 0.5905 
2014 2776 0.4583 0.2739 0.5491 
2015 3064 0.4011 0.2204 0.5247 
2016 3048 0.3763 0.1965 0.4958 
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3.4 Empirical results 
3.4.1 Bank level determinants of WMP issuance 
The main hypothesis of this study is that the rise of WMP market is 
a response to regulatory constraints on interest rate and on-balance 
sheet lending in banking sector, as WMP provides banks a new 
model of off-balance sheet credit intermediary that fills the gaps in 
underdeveloped capital markets and insufficient credit market. 
Hence, we believe that the slowdown of loan supply and the 75% 
loan-to-deposit restrictions are the main forces driving the WMP 
issuance. 
Hypothesis (1). Banks facing with a slowdown of loan supply are 
more likely to issue WMPs. 
Hypothesis (2). Banks with higher loan-to-deposit ratio are more 
likely to issue WMPs. 
To test these hypotheses, we rely on OLS regression to estimate the 
bank-level determinants of WMP issuance. We estimate the 
following model: 
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𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛾𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜌𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
Where dependent variable 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑡  is the average daily asset 
under management of all WMPs, non-principle guarantee WMPs 
and principle guarantee WMPs issued by bank i as percentage of 
capital in year t. 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 is calculated as the logarithm 
of total asset of bank i in year t. Loan growth (Deposit growth) is 
the growth rate of bank i’s loan (deposit) in year t. LTD is the loan-
to-deposit ratio of bank i in year t. We include bank fixed effects 
and time fixed effects in our regression. All standard errors are 
clustered at bank-year level.  
Table 3.5 reposts the results of OLS estimation and Table 3.6 
presents the correlation matrix of the variables used in this OLS 
estimation. We find a positive relationship between loan-to-deposit 
ratio and all our three WMP proxies, which confirms our hypothesis 
(1) that banks with higher loan-to-deposit ratio are more likely to 
issue WMPs because these banks are facing more restriction given 
the 75% regulatory cap on loan-to-deposit ratio. It provides 
evidence that the regulatory restriction on loan-to-deposit ratio is 
one of the key determinants for banks to conduct shadow banking 
activities through WMP issuance. This result is consistent with 
Chen et al (2016) and Hachem and Song (2016) who contend that 
the stricter liquidity regulation was the trigger to the rapid 
development of shadow banking in China. In column (1) and (2), 
the estimates of coefficients on loan growth are significantly 
negative at 1% level for proxies of all WMPs and non-principle 
guarantee WMPs. However, the coefficient on loan growth is 
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insignificantly correlated with principle guarantee WMPs. The 
negative coefficients on loan growth provide evidence supporting 
our hypothesis (1) that Banks facing with a slowdown of loan 
supply are more likely to issue WMPs because these banks are more 
likely under pressure to expand their lending business. This result 
implies that off-balance sheet WMP issuance is the key battlefield 
for banks to fight against the slowdown in loan supply induced by 
regulatory constraints. Even though bank can issue principle 
guarantee WMPs to raise on-balance sheet funds, these funds are 
most likely invested in assets with good liquidity and low risk due 
to the principle guarantee commitment, and apparently, bank loans 
do not belong to this asset category. Therefore, we argue that 
principle guarantee WMPs may not be treated as a good substitution 
of deposit funds that enables banks to invest longer-term and 
illiquid assets such as loans. While due to the lack of regulation and 
transparency on off-balance sheet activities, non-principle guarantee 
WMPs may offer banks a suitable source of funding to conduct 
maturity mismatch in meeting risker borrowers’ long-term credit 
demand. 
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Table 3.5: The determinants of WMPs issuance 
This table reports panel regression results of the determinants of shadow banking activities in the sample period of 
2007 to 2016. The dependent variables Shadow_ALL, Shadow_NG and Shadow_G are bank-level proxies for 
shadow banking activities calculated by the average daily asset under management of all WMPs, non-principle 
guarantee WMPs and principle guarantee WMPs divided by bank’s capital, respectively. Log (total assets) is 
logarithm of total bank asset. Capital to asset is the capital to asset ratio. Loan growth is the percentage change 
in deposit from year t-1 to year t. Deposit growth is the percentage change in deposit from year t-1 to year t. Loan 
to deposit refers to loan to total deposit ratio. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. In 
all columns, Bank-fixed and year-fixed effects are further controlled. The standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level and are shown in parentheses, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3)    
  All WMPs Non-Guarantee WMPs Guarantee WMPs 
Log (total assets) 0.1239 0.0979 0.0351    
 (1.27) (1.18) (1.50)    
Capital to asset -0.4308 -0.5403 0.0882    
 (-0.53) (-0.75) (0.56)    
Loan growth -0.2883*** -0.2244*** -0.0420    
 (-2.86) (-2.68) (-1.62)    
Deposit growth 0.1035 0.0855 0.0149    
 (1.48) (1.41) (0.88)    
Loan to deposit 0.7727*** 0.5659*** 0.1765*** 
 (4.10) (3.69) (3.63)    
Constant -3.4310 -2.6790 -0.9323*   
 (-1.61) (-1.48) (-1.81)    
Year fixed effect yes yes yes 
Bank fixed effect yes yes yes 
N 1893 1893 1893    
adj. R-sq 0.2174 0.1879 0.1497    
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Table 3.6: Correlation matrix 
This table reports correlation matrix of the bank-level determinants of WMPs. The dependent variables Shadow_ALL, Shadow_NG and Shadow_G are bank-level proxies for shadow banking 
activities calculated by the average daily asset under management of all WMPs, non-principle guarantee WMPs and principle guarantee WMPs divided by bank’s capital, respectively. Log (total 
assets) is logarithm of total bank asset. Capital to asset is the capital to asset ratio. Loan growth is the percentage change in deposit from year t-1 to year t. Deposit growth is the percentage 
change in deposit from year t-1 to year t. Loan to deposit refers to loan to total deposit ratio. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. In all columns, Bank-fixed and 
year-fixed effects are further controlled. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are shown in parentheses, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
  shadow_ALL shadow_NG shadow_G Log (total assets) Deposit to asset Loan to asset Capital to asset Loan to deposit Deposit growth Loan to deposit 
shadow_ALL 1          
shadow_NG 0.9635 1         
shadow_G 0.662 0.4701 1        
Log (total assets) 0.3701 0.3482 0.3068 1       
Deposit to asset -0.1937 -0.1785 -0.1717 -0.1875 1      
Loan to asset -0.1454 -0.1364 -0.1267 -0.2219 0.4598 1     
Capital to asset -0.1356 -0.1276 -0.1063 -0.4446 -0.2967 0.0076 1    
Loan to deposit -0.057 -0.0515 -0.0424 -0.0882 -0.0813 -0.093 0.0223 1   
Deposit growth -0.1232 -0.109 -0.1129 -0.1704 -0.1131 -0.1516 0.1538 0.5029 1  
Loan to deposit -0.0094 -0.011 -0.0063 -0.1013 -0.2207 0.6514 0.2334 -0.0191 -0.0266 1 
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3.4.2 The impact of WMP issuance on firm investment 
We now consider the impact of banks engaging in WMP business 
on a border economy. We pay attention to investment behavior of 
firms operating in an environment with prevalent shadow banking 
activities. We hypothesize that the rising of WMPs essentially 
constitute a complementary mechanism to the regulated banking 
system. It provides an important alternative financing channel to 
firms that have limited opportunities for obtaining funds in the 
formal market due to the regulatory constraints in the banking sector.  
Hypothesis 3. Firms operating in cities with more prevalent shadow 
banking activities are less likely to face financial constraints and 
hence conduct more investments. 
To test this hypothesis, we examine whether greater WMPs 
presence in a city can increase the firms' investment. Following the 
literature by Aivazian et al (2005) and Firth et al (2008), we employ 
an investment equation to explore the impacts of WMPs presence 
on firm investment. Specifically, the model is shown as follows. 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜃𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛿𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜌𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡 +
𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (2) 
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Where the dependent variable 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡  is the capital 
expenditure of firm i to capital stock in year t. 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the 
logarithm of the firm’s total assets in year t. 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 is the net 
cash flow generated from operating activities. 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡  is the total 
operating revenue scaled by capital stock. 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑖,𝑡 is calculated as 
the ratio of sum of market value of equity and book value of 
liabilities to book value of assets. 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡  is a dummy 
variable that equals to 1 if firm i is owned by government agency 
and 0 for otherwise. We use non-principle guarantee WMPs as the 
only proxy of shadow banking activities because we only consider 
the economic impact of off-balance sheet source of funding. The 
key coefficient of interest is 𝛽 which captures the responsiveness of 
firms' investment to the shadow banking environment. 
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Table 3.7: Main results 
Column (1) and (2) in this table reports the results of the relationship between the 
prevalence of shadow banking and firm investment during the sample period of 
2007 to 2016. Column (3) reports the results of the difference-in-differences 
analysis. CAPEX is the dependent variable calculated as capital expenditures 
scaled by capital stock. Firm size is the logarithm of total asset. Leverage refers to 
the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Cashflow is the ratio of operating cash 
flow to capital stock. Sales is the ratio of total operating revenue to capital stock. 
TobinQ is calculated as the market value of equity plus book value of total 
liabilities, scaled by book value of total assets. Ownership is an indicator variable 
that equals one if controlling shareholders is a government agency. Shadow_NG is 
the city aggregated average daily asset under management of non-principle 
guarantee WMPs as percentage of city aggregated bank capital. Shadow_ID is an 
indicator which equals to 1 if firm operates in a city where banks have issued 
WMPs and 0 for firm operating in a city where no banks has ever issued WMPs in 
the sample period of 2009 to 2016. Post is a time dummy equals to 1 for period 
between 2013 to 2016 and 0 for period between 2009 to 2012. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. In all columns, Bank-fixed and 
year-fixed effects are further controlled. The standard errors are clustered at the 
firm level and are shown in parentheses, *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2)    (2)    
  CAPEX CAPEX    CAPEX    
Shadow_NG 0.0363*** 0.0329***  
 (3.28) (3.39)     
Shadow_ID*Post   -0.0749*** 
   (-2.76)    
Firm size  0.0980*** 0.0951*** 
  (10.32)    (10.13)    
Leverage  -0.0732*   -0.0587    
  (-1.81)    (-1.51)    
Cashflow  0.1511*** 0.1504*** 
  (10.55)    (9.89)    
Sales  0.0157*** 0.0154*** 
  (8.66)    (8.54)    
TobinQ  -0.0020    -0.0038    
  (-0.70)    (-1.29)    
SOE  -0.0890*** -0.0976*** 
  (-6.11)    (-6.21)    
Constant 0.4701*** -1.7557*** -1.6586*** 
 (83.37) (-8.25)    (-7.91)    
Year fixed effect yes yes yes 
City fixed effect yes yes yes 
N 20270 18382    18813    
adj. R-sq 0.0566 0.2202    0.2432    
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The results of this estimation are presented in Table 3.7. In column 
(1), the coefficient for the Shadow_NG is 3.63% with a t-value of 
3.28, indicating that firms operating in cities with more shadow 
banking activities taken place on average have more investments. 
This result is robust when city fixed effected is included. This 
positive relationship confirms our argument that shadow banking in 
China serves important economic functions in the form of providing 
alternative credit to firms, which provides evidence supporting our 
hypothesis (3). In summary, firms in an environment with more 
prevalent shadow banking activities are more easily to access 
alternative financing channel to obtain funds for their investments. 
3.4.3 Cross-sectional variation in the impact of shadow banking 
on firm investment 
In this section, we focus on how variation in firm-characteristics 
affects the impact of shadow banking on firm investment. As we 
discussed earlier, shadow banking can affect firm investment 
through a direct financial constraint channel, by intermediating 
credit to financially constrained borrowers who have less privileged 
access to formal bank credit. To further explore the validity of this 
channel, we use the following model with interaction terms to 
capture this effect. 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑤_𝑁𝐺𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜃𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛿𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜌𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜔(𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑤_𝑁𝐺𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝑍𝑖,𝑡) + 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (3) 
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where 𝑍𝑖,𝑡  refers to a series of variables that capture financial 
constraints for firm i in a specific year. 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 includes Firmsize, cash 
flow, TobinQ and Ownership. Our emphasis is on the coefficient 𝜔 
for the interaction variable. 
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Table 3.8: Cross-sectional variation tests 
This table reports the results of the impact Cross-sectional variation of firm 
characteristics on relationship between the prevalence of shadow banking and firm 
investment during the sample period of 2007 to 2016. Shadow_NG is the city 
aggregated average daily asset under management of non-principle guarantee WMPs 
as percentage of city aggregated bank capital stock. CAPEX is the dependent variable 
calculated as capital expenditures scaled by capital stock. Firm size is the logarithm of 
total asset. Leverage refers to the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Cashflow is 
the ratio of operating cash flow to capital stock. Sales is the ratio of total operating 
revenue to capital stock. TobinQ is calculated as the market value of equity plus book 
value of total liabilities, scaled by book value of total assets. Ownership is an 
indicator variable that equals one if controlling shareholders is a government agency. 
Post is a time dummy equals to 1 for period between 2003 to 2016 and 0 for period 
between 2009 to 2012. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
level. In all columns, Bank-fixed and year-fixed effects are further controlled. The 
standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are shown in parentheses, *, ** and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  CAPEX CAPEX CAPEX CAPEX 
Shadow_NG 0.4794*** 0.0414*** 0.0029 0.0457*** 
 (4.51) (4.74) (0.26) (3.63)    
Shadow_NG*Firm size -0.0201***                
 (-4.08)                
Shadow_NG*Cashflow  -0.0206***               
  (-3.22)               
Shadow_NG*TobinQ   0.0097***              
   (4.80)              
Shadow_NG*SOE    -0.0351*** 
    (-3.47)    
Firm size 0.1084*** 0.0977*** 0.0974*** 0.0978*** 
 (10.52) (10.33) (10.21) (10.29)    
Leverage -0.0700* -0.0716* -0.0714* -0.0722*   
 (-1.75) (-1.78) (-1.78) (-1.78)    
Cashflow 0.1510*** 0.1643*** 0.1513*** 0.1510*** 
 (10.47) (11.20) (10.53) (10.51)    
Sales 0.0157*** 0.0156*** 0.0157*** 0.0157*** 
 (8.55) (8.62) (8.59) (8.62)    
TobinQ -0.0029 -0.0022 -0.0086** -0.0026    
 (-1.03) (-0.78) (-2.58) (-0.93)    
SOE -0.0888*** -0.0892*** -0.0879*** -0.0711*** 
 (-6.07) (-6.17) (-6.01) (-3.90)    
Constant -1.9820*** -1.7540*** -1.7248*** -1.7564*** 
 (-8.66) (-8.29) (-8.06) (-8.26)    
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
City fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
N 18382 18382 18382 18382    
adj. R-sq 0.2214 0.2211 0.2210 0.2207    
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The results are presented in Column (1) to (4) in Table 3.8. In 
column (1), the coefficient of the interaction term between Firmsize 
and Shadow_NG is significantly negative at 1% level. This result is 
consistent a 2003 survey study on firm financing choice by 
Ayyagari et al (2010), we find that small firms operating in a city 
with more shadow banking credit have more investment than larger 
firms, which implies that small firms rely more on shadow financing 
due to their limited ability of accessing formal bank credit. Column 
(3) studies the investment-cash flow sensitivity following the model 
that was widely used in corporate finance literature (love, 2003; 
Almeida and Campello, 2007; Denis and Sibilkov, 2009). In the 
specification, the positive and statistically significant coefficient on 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 suggest that firms are financially constrained because 
their investment is strongly sensitive to internal capital. Our 
attention is on the direction and significance of the coefficient of the 
interaction term cash flow * Shadow_NG. As expected, we find a 
significantly negative coefficient on the interaction term that 
indicates that greater availability of shadow banking credit reduces 
firms’ financial constraints. Next, we examine whether greater 
prevalence of shadow banking activities in a city can increase the 
responsiveness of firms' investment to investment opportunities. To 
test this hypothesis, we rely on the interaction of TobinQ * 
Shadow_NG. The positive coefficient on the interaction term 1.17% 
with a t-statistic of 4.57 reveals that firms in cities with greater 
shadow banking prevalence are more responsive to their investment 
opportunities. We further consider the role of ownership structure of 
the firms in the relationship between the shadow banking 
environment and firm investment. The intuition is that China’s 
banks are more likely to discriminate against private firms in their 
lending decisions (Firth et al, 2008). In contrast, state-owned firms 
are less financially constrained because banks treat them more 
favorably in their politically determined lending decisions. 
Therefore, we suggest that shadow banking alleviates private firms’ 
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financial constraints induced by distortion in banking lending 
practice if the interaction term of Ownership * Shadow_NG is 
positive. We find exactly what we suggested.  
Taken together, we find cross-sectional evidence suggesting that 
financially constrained firms can benefit from shadow banking 
activities as it has the potential to alleviate a legacy of government 
distortions in corporate financing.   
3.5 Endogeneity 
We find that firms operating in cities with more shadow banking 
activities tend to invest more than those operating in cities where 
shadow banking activities are less prevalent. Our explanation lies on 
that shadow banking plays a complementary role to formal financial 
system by providing an important alternative financing channel to 
firms. However, it is plausible that shadow banking prevalence is 
correlated with geographical growth opportunities, as changes in 
shadow banking prevalence may be determined by unobservable 
factors which also change local firms' ability in accessing capital in 
formal financial market to fund growth. It is possible that cities with 
greater growth opportunities may have more bank headquarters and 
hence more WMPs issuance while firms operating in cities with 
greater growth opportunities are prone to have more investments. 
Thus, greater shadow banking prevalence may be associated with 
greater investment opportunities and hence greater investment. To 
disentangle the potential endogeneity concern, we conduct two tests. 
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3.5.1 Instrumental variable 
Given that our shadow banking proxies could be endogenous, we 
use instrumental variable approach as one of the identification 
strategies. We need to use an instrumental variable that is assumed 
not to have any direct effect on the firm investment but influence 
only the selection into the treatment condition. We adapt a two-
stage-least-squares (2SLS) estimation and instrument for shadow 
banking prevalence using variable of bank’s income structure. We 
use bank’s income structure (non-interest income divided by interest 
income) as a proxy for their ability of and attitude towards 
diversification through creating additional profit opportunities. It is 
widely recognized that banks are shifting away from traditional 
sources of revenue like loan making and toward non-traditional 
activities that generate non-interest income such as fee income and 
revenue from trading activities (Stiroh, 2004). The increasing 
reliance on noninterest income protects banks from adverse shocks 
on traditional banking business led by overall business conditions. 
Engaging in shadow banking activities such as WMPs issuance can 
not only help banks to meet the need of regulation circumvention 
but also to bring in considerable non-interest income. Based on 
these reasons, we argue that banks with greater reliance on 
noninterest income are more likely to conduct shadow banking 
activities but the reliance on noninterest income does not directly 
affect the growth opportunities of firms, thus meeting the 
requirements for a valid instrument. 
Equation for first stage: 
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𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑤_𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜃𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜗𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜌𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡(4) 
Equation for second stage: 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐼𝑛𝑡_𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑤_𝑁𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛿𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜗𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜌𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜇𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝜀𝑖,𝑡(5) 
where 𝐼𝑛𝑡_𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑤_𝑁𝐺𝑖,𝑡  refers to the estimated 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑤_𝑁𝐺 
using non-interest to interest as the instrument. Our emphasis is on 
the coefficient 𝛽 for the 𝐼𝑛𝑡_𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑤_𝑁𝐺𝑖,𝑡. 
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Table 3.9: The results of instrumental variable regressions 
This table reports the results of the instrumental analysis. Column (l)/(2) 
presents the results from estimating the first-stage (second-stage) regressions. 
Shadow_NG is the city aggregated average daily asset under management of 
non-principle guarantee WMPs as percentage of city aggregated bank capital. 
We instrument for Shadow_NG using non-interest income to interest income.  
Non-interest to interest is the city aggregated bank non-interest income 
divided by interest income. Int_Shadow_NG is the estimated Shadow_NG 
using non-interest to interest as the instrument. CAPEX is the dependent 
variable calculated as capital expenditures scaled by capital stock. Firm size is 
the logarithm of total asset. Leverage refers to the ratio of total liabilities to 
total assets. Cashflow is the ratio of operating cash flow to capital stock. Sales 
is the ratio of total operating revenue to capital stock. TobinQ is calculated as 
the market value of equity plus book value of total liabilities, scaled by book 
value of total assets. Ownership is an indicator variable that equals one if 
controlling shareholders is a government agency. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. In all columns, Bank-fixed and year-fixed 
effects are further controlled. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level 
and are shown in parentheses, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  First-stage Second-stage 
  (1) (2)    
  Shadow_NG CAPEX   
Non-interest to interest 2.6650**               
 (2.08)               
Int_Shadow_NG  0.2679*** 
  (3.57)    
Firm size 0.0040 0.0971*** 
 (0.88) (10.17)    
Leverage -0.0018 -0.0735*   
 (-0.10) (-1.81)    
Cashflow 0.0044 0.1498*** 
 (0.58) (10.48)    
Sales 0.0001 0.0156*** 
 (0.09) (8.71)    
TobinQ 0.0024 -0.0026    
 (0.67) (-0.92)    
SOE -0.0117 -0.0858*** 
 (-1.09) (-5.90)    
Constant 0.2316 -1.8562*** 
 (1.44) (-8.67)    
Year fixed effect yes yes 
City fixed effect yes yes 
N 18373 18367    
adj. R-sq 0.5617 0.2203    
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Table 3.9 reports our results of 2SLS regressions. Column (1) shows 
the results from the first-stage regression, where the dependent 
variable is the endogenous variable of Shadow_NG. We believe 
banks that have a large portion of non-interest income are more 
proactive to issue WMPs, because expanding product lines through 
involving in WMPs issuance associated with growing noninterest 
income may offer these banks traditional diversification benefits. 
Consistent with these arguments, we find non-interest to interest is 
positively related to Shadow_NG, which suggests that income 
structure is an important determinant of WMPs issuance. The result 
of second-stage regression is in Column (2), we find that the 
coefficient for Int_Shadow_NG is positively and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Consistent with the results documented 
in earlier table, this result indicates that an environment with more 
prevalent shadow banking activities drive firms’ increase in 
investment. 
3.5.2 Difference-in-differences approach 
The second approach that this study uses to address the endogeneity 
concern is the difference-in-differences approach. In 2013, China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) released the Regulation 
on Asset Management Business of Commercial Bank. As we have 
mentioned in background section, the regulation aimed at limiting 
the shadow banking lending where credit is channeled off-balance 
sheet to borrowers through issuance of WMPs.  
We consider the regulation is a natural experiment that allows us to 
investigate the effect of adverse shocks to shadow banking credit 
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supply on their borrowers’ performance in a setting that is not 
contaminated by the borrowers’ demand-side considerations. To 
estimate this effect, we proceed with a difference-in-difference 
analysis, where the two differences are: firms operating in cities 
with shadow banking prevalence vs. firms operating in cities with 
no shadow banking prevalence at all throughout the whole sample 
period; years before the adaption of the regulation and years after 
the adaption of the regulation. In general, we estimate the following 
model. 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑤_𝐼𝐷 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝜃𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛿𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜌𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡 +
𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (4) 
Where Shadow_ID is an indicator which equals to 1 if firm i 
operates in a city where banks have issued WMPs and 0 for firm i 
operating in a city where no banks has ever issued WMPs in the 
sample period of 2009 to 2016. Post is a time dummy equals to 1 for 
period between 2013 to 2016 and 0 for period between 2009 to 2012. 
A negative coefficient on the interaction term of Shadow_ID*Post 
suggests evidence that restriction on shadow banking activities may 
have unintended consequence on real economy. 
The results are provided in Column (3) of Table 3.7. We obtain a 
negative and significant coefficient on the interaction term of 
Shadow_ID*Post. After the adaption of the WMPs regulation, firms 
exposed to an environment where shadow banking activities are 
more prevalent in local banks decreased their investment by 7.49%. 
We attribute this decrease to that the regulatory intention to cap 
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risks associated with the growing WMPs market unintendedly create 
disturbance to firm financing because the reliance of firm 
investment on shadow credit was underestimated. We argue that 
shadow financing dominated by banks is an important constituent of 
bank lending.  
3.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
China has undergone a significant economic growth over the past 
three decades, enabling it to achieve the second largest economy in 
the world. However, such rapid growth in economy is associated 
with financial markets dominated by a large but underdeveloped 
banking system and capital markets with weak investor protection, 
which challenges the traditional beliefs that a country's overall 
economic growth is a result of the development of a financial 
system that includes a stock market and intermediation. China 
seems to be a counterexample to the existing literature on formal 
financial and law systems7  since the Chinese firms may rely on 
alternative financing channels such as relationships and reputation 
rather than formal external finance (Allen et al, 2005).  
Existing literature on firm financing patterns are based on 
conventional definition of external financing such as bank loan, 
equity and debt, and they do not consider the possibility that firms 
could rely on other substitute forms of financing, such as shadow 
banking financing. Our study stands on the wide use of financing 
channels other than formal bank lending, equity or debt financing 
 
7 See literature by La Porta et al (1997), La Porta et al (1998); Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1998); Rajan and Zingales (1998); Wurgler (2000); Love (2003); 
King and Levine (1993); Levine and Zervos (1998); Beck et a (2000) 
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and fills the void in literature by looking at the relation between 
shadow banking prevalence and firm investment among China's 
listed firms.  
We focus on WMPs provided by commercial banks in China. The 
WMPs are a pool of asset-back investments that produce return 
based on the performance of the underlying assets. Such product is 
essentially shadow banking activity that has no regulatory 
requirement of transparency. Banks offer WMPs as an alternative 
saving instruments to keep money within banking system off-
balance sheet and intermediate money to borrowers to evade 
banking regulation of on-balance sheet lending by capital ratio and 
75% loan to deposit restriction. To test the economic function of 
such activity, we proxied the level of shadow banking based on the 
issuance information of 363,654 bank WMPs. We match our 
shadow banking proxy with firm-level financial data via their 
geographical location of headquarter, aiming to examine whether 
firm investment is conditional on their shadow banking environment. 
Our results suggest a positive relationship between shadow banking 
prevalence and firm investment. Moreover, this positive relationship 
is stronger for firms with small size, high-growth, more reliance on 
cash flow and no state ownership. We argue that shadow banking 
serves a complementary role to the formal financial system where 
financially constrained firms have less privileged credit access, 
which shed light on the importance of shadow banking in in 
sustaining economic growth. 
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Understanding the economic functions and dynamics of shadow 
banking activities is particularly important for regulators. Any 
efforts made on controlling the risks of shadow banking should be 
based on a thorough understanding of whether shadow banking has 
made the Chinese economy more or less efficient. Further research 
on the net impact of shadow banking activities would provide more 
insight on how such activities should be encouraged under a more 
efficient monitoring and regulation system. 
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Chapter 4 
Finance Company and Cash Holding 
4.1 Abstract 
In China, firms within a business group may be able to access funds 
provided by a parent-owned finance company within the business 
group. Finance companies essentially are intra-group banks that 
collect and redistribute funds within the group.  However, anecdotes 
show that the effectiveness and the functioning of finance 
companies to a business group is questionable. The average cash 
holdings of Chinese group member firms increased significantly 
after they gain access to finance companies. We provide direct 
evidence of ‘tunneling’: where the parent of the business group 
requires member firms to increase their cash holdings through 
deposits in the group’s finance company and invest the collected 
deposits in the interbank market or other financial institutions, 
instead of lending to business group members. The parent of the 
business group reaps most, if not all, the profits from the finance 
company, at the expense of member firms’ increased holding in 
cash. We use the Shenzhen 2007 Anti-tunneling Guidance as the 
exogenous shock to identify the main results. Our results cannot be 
explained by the alternative hypotheses that member firms hold 
more cash holdings as a result of reduced bank monitoring or the 
parent’s incentive to reallocate capital more efficiently 
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4.1 Introduction 
In the late 1980s, China’s government has experimented a series of 
reforms aimed at improving financial performance and productivity 
of firms. It started from encouraging the alliance of firms in the 
form of business group, followed by giving access to some business 
groups with additional financing through finance companies 
(hereafter, FCs), a specialized financial institution that collected and 
redistributed funds within the group 8 . These FCs share some 
similarities with banks but differ in a way where FCs are not 
allowed to collect deposits from or originate loans to non-group-
member firms. Chinese reformers originally experimented with FCs 
in attempt to enable firms to reduce financial constraints and to 
better manage investments within and outside the group (Keister 
1998). 
However, this group-specific bank may not be costless. Business 
group with a finance company in China is akin to Japanese Keiretsu 
where corporations in multiple industries are tied under a “main 
bank” system. Researchers have revealed the cost of bank-centered 
financial system in Japan that firms with the main bank relations 
were expropriated by the main bank through the mechanisms of 
providing financial services to those firms (Weinstein and Yafeh 
1998). 
 
8 See the definition proposed by People’s Bank of China (PBOC) on July 13, 
2000 in the Business Group Finance Company Act. In December of 2006, China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) issued the Amendment of Business 
Group Finance Company Regulation. 
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Anecdotes show that the effectiveness and the functioning of FCs to 
a business group is questionable. From 2014 to 2016, more than half 
of the asset of finance companies are composed of deposits due 
from central or other financial institutions or investments rather than 
loans to member firms. Such low loan to deposit ratio suggests that 
finance companies may not be efficient as much as it could be. On 
the other hand, firms increase cash holdings dramatically in the 
following years after having access to finance companies, which 
suggests that the level of financial constraints may not be alleviated 
given firms tend to save more cash after the access to finance 
companies is available.  
Moreover, China has a different institutional context, an 
institutional context where capital markets are relatively inadequate 
at allocating funds and the investor protection is weak (Allen et al, 
2005), Chinese firms are prone to rely heavily on internal financing. 
In this study, we ask whether FCs can help to fill the institutional 
void of inefficient capital markets as Chinese reformers expected, or, 
produce an unintended market fiction such as the lesson learned 
from main banks in Japan. 
To answer this empirical question, we examine that how cash 
holdings of Chinese firms have evolved in parallel with the 
development of business groups and whether this evolution can be 
explained by the emergence and functioning of finance companies. 
We hand-collected data 196 finance companies’ information with 
respect to the date of incorporation and the ownership structure from 
CBRC’s official announcements from 1987 to 2014 9 . We trace 
 
9 The incorporation of a finance company is subject to a two-stage approval from 
the PBOC. Specifically, the first stage refers to the approval of preparation where 
the PBOC will make an announcement of approval for qualified business group to 
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ownership of finance companies of any length and match the data 
with ultimate or direct shareholders of firms that list on Shanghai 
and Shenzhen stock exchanges to make sure that finance companies 
and listed firms belong to the same business group. We collect firm-
level data from CSMAR and WIND. 
We focus on firm’s cash policy because cash holdings provide a 
mechanism to identify whether finance companies devote to a 
reduction in financial constraints or a market fiction of rent 
extraction by controlling shareholders that have the largest voting 
right of these firms because of their dominated shareholdings. 
Precisely, finance companies, of which lending practice is 
supervised by banking regulators, represent a visible internal capital 
market which may alleviate the level of financial constraints of 
fellow group members. A reduction in financial constraints protect 
firms from holding cash as a buffer to cope with the adverse shocks 
especially when external financing is expensive (Bates et al, 2009). 
Therefore, we would expect a lower cash ratio for firms with 
finance companies compared to those without finance companies. In 
contrast, cash holdings also represent a promising proxy to 
investigate the agency conflicts between controlling shareholders 
and minority shareholders because cash holdings attach a cheaper 
private benefit option than other assets (Opler et al, 1999). 
Additionally, finance companies offered an ideal setting to study 
this agency problem where the primary function of finance 
companies is to manage cash on behave of the business group with a 
pyramidal ownership structure. Hence, we would expect that firms 
 
prepare for the establishment of a finance company. After a no more than 6 
months’ preparation, the business group is required to submit the application 
documents for opening. If the application is accepted, the PBOC will make a 
second stage of approval of opening announcement for qualified finance company. 
In this paper, we obtain information of finance companies according to the 
approval of opening announcement. 
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with finance companies would overinvest cash holdings for 
tunneling incentives by controlling shareholders. 
Surprisingly, we find a stark difference between member firms in 
groups with and without finance companies in terms of their cash 
holdings. We find that a member firm which belongs to a business 
group with an FC (treated firms) holds 2.49% more cash than a 
member firm which belongs to a business group without an FC 
(control firms). This result is inconsistent with the precautionary 
theory (Keynes, 1936), which predicts a reduced cash holding for 
member firms when they have access to FC’s funds and reduce their 
financial constraints. This result is consistent with the tunneling 
theory that parent company direct recourses from member firms to 
the FC, which is solely owned by the parent company of the 
business group and consequently reap all the FC’s profits of lending 
to the member firms. 
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to provide 
systematically consistent evidence that the member firms’ increase 
in cash holding after having access to FC within the business group. 
It can be at least partially explained by the tunneling effect where 
the controlling parent company of the business group extract 
benefits from minority shareholders of member firms. Once FCs 
receive the cash deposit from member firms, they can either lend it 
to other member firms within the business group, or lend it to other 
financial institutions, e.g., commercial banks, in the form of 
deposits. By encouraging and requiring member firms to increase 
cash holdings in the form of deposit in the FC, the parent company 
of the business group, who is the sole owner of the FC, can reap 
most of, if not all, the profits from the FC’s lending. 
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Four pieces of evidence suggest that the member firms’ increase in 
cash holding after having access to FCs within the business group is 
because of the incentives for the parent company to siphon 
resources out of the firm to increase their own wealth. First, we find 
the increase in cash holdings is stronger when FCs are allowed to 
enter the interbank market in year 200010 by the government since 
the FCs find it even easier and more profitable to lend out through 
the interbank market in the presence of dual-track interest system11, 
although interbank market focuses mainly on overnight lending 
between financial institutions. Second, consistent with the study 
proposed by Kalcheva and Lins (2007) who argued that firms with a 
more of diverged controlling shareholder’s cash flow rights versus 
voting rights would hold more cash, we expect that this tunneling 
effect is stronger when the control right of the controlling 
shareholders is lower because the controlling shareholders wants to 
transfer benefits from firms where their cash flow right is low to 
firms where their cash flow right is high (Bertrand et al, 2002). 
Similarly, in the third analysis, we would expect the parent 
company to save more cash out of cash flow from equity issuance 
than other debt financing as their main financing choice for each 
member firm to accumulate cash holdings. By diluting the 
controlling right while remain full control, the controlling 
shareholders could reap more private benefits from depositing the 
accumulated cash from equity issuance in their wholly controlled 
finance companies. Similar pattern was found in the work by 
McLean (2011) while our inference stands for the tunneling view 
 
10 The interbank bond market and lending market (Interbank Markets) are the 
most important money markets in China established in 1996. It was not until the 
Finance Company Entry Regulation of the Interbank Bond Market and Lending 
Market Act (FC Entry Act 2000) released by PBOC that a FC, as an independent 
legal treasure entity affiliated with a business group, were eligible to apply for the 
membership of the Interbank Markets after making three consecutive years of 
positive profits 
11  China has been implementing a co-existed interest rate system, that is, a 
constrained interest rate system for non-financial institutions with floors and 
ceilings based on the PBOC benchmark rate and a liberalized interest rate system 
that is negotiable among financial institutions benchmarked by Shanghai 
Interbank Offered Rate (hereafter, the SHIBOR rate). The entry to the interbank 
market implies a realizable arbitrage from the imparity of the two interest systems. 
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instead of his precautionary view for the increase in share issuance-
cash savings given our China setting. And fourth, to examine the 
interbank market is the plausible channel in explaining how private 
benefit is realized in the context of the presence of finance 
companies, we conduct a cash holdings sensitivity test and 
document that the cash holdings of firms with finance companies, in 
compared with firms without finance companies, are more sensitive 
to the variation of interbank rate, namely the SHIBOR rate while 
insensitive to the variation of governmental constrained rate. 
We attempt to rule out two alternative explanations. First, due to 
that our sample is not randomly assigned, it is possible that our 
treated firms in our sample have lower capital efficiency before they 
have access to finance companies. Therefore, the higher level of 
cash holdings for the treated firms could be that it is the controlling 
shareholders’ intention to improve the efficiency of resource 
allocation within groups by channeling cash from firms with lower 
capital efficiency to firms with good investment opportunity and 
hence large cash needs, using finance companies as an intermediary. 
If this alternative explanation holds, we would expect that that the 
member firms’ cash holding increase is more prevalent for firms 
with poorer capital efficiency. Our empirical evidences fail to 
support this hypothesis, which suggests that the member firms’ cash 
holding increase is most likely driven by the tunneling incentives of 
parent company. Specifically, we do not find that the cash holding 
increase effect is stronger for state-owned firms compared to non-
state-owned firms, despite the fact that state-owned firms face soft 
budget constraints and hence use capital less efficiently in contrast 
to non-state-owned firms (Chen et al, 2017, Kornai et al, 2003). 
Second, firm’s cash holdings may be less affected by controlling 
shareholders’ tunneling motive but more affected by managerial 
entrenchment due to the weaker external monitoring from banks 
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after firms accessing FC credit as a replacement of bank credit. In 
other words, the switch from bank-dependence to FC-dependence 
enables entrenched managers to avoid the discipline of external 
debtholders (e.g. bank credit, in this case) and therefore 
management may hold more cash to pursue their own objectives. 
However, our test shows no significant differences in proxies of 
bank-dependence across treatment and control firms. This is against 
the hypothesis that an increased managerial agency problem induced 
by the laxer external monitoring may explain the firms’ cash 
hoarding after they gain access to FCs. 
To shed light on the impact of the presence of finance companies, 
we track member firms’ financial outcomes, investors’ valuation on 
corporate cash holdings and dividend policy between treated and 
control firms. According to our tunneling explanation, the treated 
firms’ (firms with accessing to finance companies) financial 
performance should be poorer than the control firms (firms without 
accessing to finance companies). A different result would invalidate 
our tunneling explanation. Our results confirm this explanation. We 
find that treated firms have poor financial profitability, as measured 
as ROA and ROE, than control firms. We further find that treated 
firms reduce their financing investment, as measured by cash paid 
for equity and debt investments, and do not increase their fixed 
investments, as measured by cash paid to acquire and construct 
fixed assets, intangible assets and other long-term assets, compared 
to control firms. We find no reliable evidence of differences in 
dividend payout between two groups of firms, suggesting that richer 
cash holdings do not drive an increase in a higher dividend payout. 
In consequence, minority shareholders are harmed given that an 
incremental increase in cash holdings would have a lower increase 
in firm value, as measured by Tobin Q ratio. This pattern is 
consistent with the tunneling view from literature on both financing 
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choice, investment decision and dividend policy (Baek et al, 2006; 
Johnson et al, 2000; Kalcheva and Lins 2007; Pinkowitz et al, 2006). 
Our evidence suggests that the informational and financial 
advantage of the group-specific bank does not result in a more 
efficient internal capital market therefore a reduced financial 
constraint and an increase in firm investment. Instead, we find that 
the existence of finance companies in business groups yields a 
severe agency problem between controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders as well as a significant market friction that 
reduces the efficiency of capital markets. We find limited consistent 
evidence supportive of the claim proposed by Keister (1998) that 
firms in groups with finance companies should be superior to firms 
without finance companies. 
Selection and unobserved heterogeneity in observational data is 
inevitable owing to the lack of randomization process in allocating 
the treatment. Although the decision to establish a FC for a parent 
company within the business group is a plausible exogenous 
decision to each member firm since the formation of the finance 
company in parent’s level does not require approvals from general 
meeting of all shareholders in subsidiary’s level, we take steps to 
address the potential endogeneity issue where whether a member 
firm belongs to a business group with or without an FC is 
determined by a confounding factor that also determines member 
firms’ cash holdings. We take advantage of the Behavioral 
Guidance for controlling shareholders of listed small- and middle-
sized enterprises issued by Shenzhen stock exchange in 2007 
(hereafter, the 2007 Anti-tunneling Guidance) as an exogenous 
shock to the extent of tunneling effect of a parent company with an 
FC within the business group. The 2007 Anti-tunneling Guidance 
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restricted possible harmful behaviors of controlling shareholders to 
minority shareholders that negatively affects the financial 
independence of firms, including restriction on any listed SME 
firms to deposit cash in their affiliated FCs12 . We find that the 
higher level of cash holdings for the treated firms is significantly 
reduced if they are SME firms post-2007 compared to control firms. 
Our results highlight that government needs to pay close attention to 
the request to establish an FC by a business group. In general, an FC 
within the business group will have positive impact on improving 
the efficiency of the internal capital market and reduce member 
firms’ financial constraints. However, if the regulation and 
supervision of FCs are not adequate, tunnelling incentives may arise 
from the parent company, which is the sole owner of the FCs, which, 
in turn, can have detrimental effects on member firms’ financial 
performance and investment. These effects can further have 
negative impact on the real economy in general. 
Our study provides the first evidence of the role of FCs within a 
business group in China. Our findings contrast to the previous belief 
that these FCs may facilitate the internal capital market within the 
business group, and instead find strong tunnelling effects where 
controlling shareholders of the parent company direct resources 
from minority shareholders of member firms for the parent’s private 
benefits. These results are consistent to the empirical evidence from 
the main bank model in Japan, where Japanese firms' high level of 
cash holdings are found to be consistent with rent extraction by 
main banks (Pinkowitz and Williamson,2001). 
 
12  The Behavioral Guidance for controlling shareholders of listed small- and 
middle-sized enterprises, Rule No.20 restricts firms listed in SME board to deposit 
cash in the controlling shareholders owned finance companies. 
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Our study belongs to the board literature on business groups and 
contributes specifically to literature on internal capital markets. In 
general, the internal capital market can be controversially motivated 
by a financing advantage and a tunneling intention. In a financial 
constrained environment where not all positive NPV projects can be 
financed, firms can create value by actively engaging in “winner-
picking” through internal capital markets. The economic rationale 
behind implies that well-informed management in a business group 
reallocate scarce funds from members with low profitability to those 
with high profitability, thereby benefit from firm’s most promising 
growth opportunities which stand-alone firms may not have 
financing capacity to capture (Stein,1997). Several studies have 
shown evidence supportive of this hypothesis in different 
institutional and economic context such as India (Gopalan et al,  
2007), Korea (Almeida et al, 2015), China (Chen et al, 2017) and 
the U.S. (Kuppuswamy and Villalonga 2016). Moreover, business 
groups in a pyramidal ownership structure appear to have financing 
advantages for firms with large investment requirements but low 
injectable cash flows, as business group is better able to access a 
pool of internal funds (Almeida and Wolfenzon 2006, Bena and 
Ortiz-Molina 2013). He et al (2013) show evidence that Chinese 
business groups act as internal capital market mitigate financial 
constraints confronted by group-affiliated firms. Other studies on 
business groups have contented the function of internal capital 
market in risk sharing by funds reallocation (Gopalan et al, 2007;  
He et al, 2013; Hoshi et al, 1991; Khanna & Yafeh 2005). All above 
evidence has sketched a positive picture of internal capital markets, 
suggesting that the presence of internal capital markets embed in 
business groups will improve firm performance. However, a 
growing number of longitudinal studies have paid attention to the 
cost of such affiliation. Business groups can be associated with 
agency problems such as expropriation by managers or the 
controlling shareholders. In such respect, the internal capital market 
acts no longer as efficient complement to the weak external markets, 
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but rather as rent-seeking vehicles through which the controlling 
shareholders can exploit benefits from minority investors. More 
importantly, the problems can be exacerbated in emerging market 
where corporate governance and investor protection are weak 
(Johnson et al, 2000, Khanna and Palepu 2000). Our study 
complements these literature by providing the first empirical 
comparison of an explicit and visible internal capital market (group 
member firms with finance companies) and an implicit and invisible 
internal capital market (group member firms without finance 
companies), attempting to examine the extent to which firm 
behaviors can be explained by the organizational and functional 
difference of two internal capital markets and the underlying 
motives of the controlling shareholder in a pyramidal structure. 
Our study also belongs to a voluminous literature on cash holdings 
and contributes by highlighting a novel facet of cash holding 
determinants for China’s group affiliates, namely the presence of 
finance companies, which goes beyond the existing literature. Prior 
empirical literature has paid attention to either financial constraints 
channel or agency channel in explaining firms’ cash holdings 
policies. With regard to the former, the precautionary demand of 
holding cash initially proposed by Keynes (1936) suggests that 
liquid cash prevents firms from underinvesting or even forgoing 
positive NPV projects if adverse cash flow shocks make alternative 
of funds unavailable or excessively costly. This conventional 
wisdom is supported by a number of papers (Bates et al, 2009;  
Duchin, 2010; Gao et al, 2013). In addition to the financial 
constraint channel, as argued by Jensen (1986), excess cash 
holdings may aggravate agency problems since firms’ insiders may 
have incentives to purse their private benefits through a pool of 
accumulated free cash flow. Based on Jensen’s viewpoint, ample 
studies focus on agency conflicts between controlling shareholders 
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and minority shareholders and study how the excess cash holding 
relates to the controlling shareholders’ private interests of wealth 
maximization via expropriating resource out of firms, or in other 
words, the controlling shareholders’ engagement in tunneling 
behaviors (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2007; Dittmar et al, 2003, 
Harford et al, 2008; Johnson et al, 2000; Kalcheva and Lins 2007; 
Pinkowitz et al, 2006).  
Besides, our study extends the literature on the raising concerns of 
tunnelling effects found in Chinese listed firms. Previous evidence 
of tunnelling by the controlling shareholders has relied on different 
types of related-party transaction including inter-corporate loans 
(Jiang et al, 2010), abnormal related sales (Jian and Wong, 2010) 
and other related-party transaction (Peng et al, 2011). Chen et al, 
(2012) study the impact of the non-tradeable reform as an 
exogenous shock to Chinese listed firms’ cash policies and conclude 
that the reform significantly reduces firms’ cash holdings, 
suggesting the existence of cash tunnelling prior to the reform. Our 
study takes a further step on these literatures and discover a new 
type of cash tunnelling, that is, through group affiliated FCs. 
Moreover, by investigating how controlling shareholders react to the 
deregulation and regulation on the ease of cash tunnelling, our 
setting can reflect a time dependent feature of controlling 
shareholders’ tunnelling motivations in response to a changing 
institutional context, whereas existing works primarily focus at one 
point in time.  
Our study is the first to explore a plausible setting in which cash 
holdings represent a contemporary proxy instead of a future option 
that benefit controlling shareholders personally, however, at the 
expense of minority shareholders. This contributes to existing 
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literature on tunnelling via cash holdings (Chen et al, 2012; Dittmar 
and Mahrt-Smith 2007; Kalcheva and Lins, 2007).  
Finally, our study contributes to the growing literature on shadow 
banking in China by providing a unique aspect to examine how 
controlling shareholders in business groups make use of group 
shadow banks as a vehicle of cash tunnelling13. Chen et al (2016) 
and Hachem and Song (2016) contend that the stricter liquidity 
regulation was the trigger to the rapid development of shadow 
banking in China. Wang et al (2016) demonstrate that shadow 
banking essentially provides a pragmatic dual-track reform solution 
to interest rate liberalization in China, which led to efficiency gain 
in credit allocation and social surplus. Acharya et al (2016) find that 
small- and median-size banks in China significantly increase the 
participation of shadow banking activity in the form of issuing off-
balance sheet wealth management products, which may induce a 
substantial rollover risk when they mature. Chen et al (2017) argue 
that small- and median-size banks engage more actively in shadow 
banking in the form of channelling risky entrusted loans as a 
response to the deposit shortfalls as well as regulatory prohibition 
on lending to risky industry, which brings the risk of shadow 
banking into their balance sheet. Chen et al (2017) report that the 
rollover pressure of local government from maturing debt financed 
by China’s four-trillion-yuan stimulus package manifest the 
handover effect of the stimulus plan on fostering the rapid growth of 
shadow banking activities. Allen et al (2017) reveal that the pricing 
of affiliated entrusted loans and non-affiliated entrusted loans 
incorporates fundamental and informational risks.  
 
13 We adopt the definition of shadow banks proposed by Pozsar et al, (2010) 
Shadow banking. Federal Reserve Bank of New York. that shadow banks are 
financial intermediaries that conduct maturity, credit, and liquidity transformation 
not backstopped by central bank liquidity facilities. The focus of this paper, 
finance company, is one of the examples of shadow banks listed in their work.  
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The reminder of this study proceeds as follows. In section 4.3, we 
briefly overview the institutional details that constitute the setting 
for our analysis and develop our hypotheses. We describe our data 
and sample in Section 4.4. In section 4.5, we report our main 
empirical results, our identification strategies. In 4.6, we present 
robust checks. We conclude in section 4.7. 
4.3 Institutional background 
4.3.1 Finance companies in business group 
We employ the official definition in the Registration of Business 
Groups Regulation (Registration Act, 1998) by State Administration 
for Industry & Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (SAIC). 
A business group is a federation of legally independent firms, or 
namely member firms, which are bound together by ownership ties, 
operating under the control of a single parent, or core firm. 
Generally, there are two types of finance companies in China. The 
first type of finance companies includes a diverse group of non-
depository financial institutions such as leasing companies and 
automobile finance companies involved primarily in extending 
credit to businesses and consumer. In principle, these non-
depository finance companies are funded through commercial paper 
and medium-term notes because they do not collect deposits 
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although subject to by bank regulations14. Moreover, they are not 
necessary to be affiliated within a business group. The second type 
of finance companies are captive financing subsidiaries of business 
groups providing financial services only to group-affiliates. Unlike 
the first type of finance companies, they are depository financial 
institutional of which prime funds consist of group-affiliates’ 
deposits and are supervised by bank regulations. In this study, we 
focus on the second type of finance companies. 
In China, the first finance company was established in 1987. 
Initially, the finance companies were not regulated. As the activities 
of the finance companies expanded, the first regulation on finance 
companies, namely the Business Group Finance Company 
Regulation (hereafter, the FC act) was implemented in 1996, where 
the definition of finance company was officially clarified, and its 
terms and conditions with respect to entry, establishment and 
operation were firstly justified15. By the end of year 2014, there 
were 196 finance companies with an aggregated on- and off-balance 
sheet total asset of 5.53 trillion RMB that provided financial 
services to more than 45000 group-affiliates16.  
 
14  Unlike the finance companies discussed by Carey et al, (1998), finance 
companies such as leasing companies and automobile finance companies are 
subject to the banking regulations in China. 
15  The Business Group Finance Company Regulation clarified the terms and 
conditions of entry, establishment and operations for finance companies. The FC 
act was initially issued in 1996 and was amended in 2000 and 2006. The FC act 
also provide a definition for business group. According to the FC act, a business 
group is defined as business group as a business consortium that consists of one 
holding company as the business group parent and a group of subsidiaries and 
joint stock companies that are connected through equity ties. Finance companies 
could only provide limit financial services authorized by PBOC (before 2006) and 
CBRC (after 2006) to business group member firms. 
16  See China Banking Regulatory Commission 2014 Annual Report on 
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/ 
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Figure 4.1: An overview of finance company industry 
  2014 2015 2016 
Asset                                                                     billions 
Total Asset 3170.34 4072.63 4760.39 
Including： 
Cash and Due from Central Bank 305.46 223.66 306.78 
Due from Banks and Other Financial Institutions 1185.18 1753.45 1967.70 
Loans 1325.18 1688.15 2078.79 
Investments 208.47 291.14 289.76 
Liabilities                                                               billions 
Total Liabilities 2717.37 3501.73 4086.96 
Including： 
Inter-bank borrowings 90.62 98.52 91.66 
Deposits 2423.12 3234.02 3743.39 
Equity                                                                  billions 
Total shareholders’ Equity 452.97 570.90 673.43 
Profitability                                                              billions、% 
Total Profit 69.65 75.78 79.56 
Net Profit 53.62 58.41 61.99 
ROA 1.69% 1.58% 1.39% 
ROE 11.84% 10.96% 9.83% 
Other ratio                                                                 billions、% 
NPL 0.11% 0.05% 0.03% 
capital adequacy ratio 21.22% 21.19% 21.25% 
LLP 1215.88% 2763.30% 3303.79% 
Liquidity ratio 62.34% 71.87% 64.79% 
Inter-bank borrowings to equity 21.79% 22.04% 28.40% 
Investment to total asset 6.58% 49.82% 30.24% 
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Figure 4.1 provides an overview of finance company industry from 
2014 to 2016. By the end of 2016, the on-balance-sheet total asset 
of finance companies had reached to 4760.39 billion with a dramatic 
increase of 50.15% since 2014. Strikingly, nearly half of the total 
assets is made up of investments and interbank assets. On the 
liabilities side, deposits from group-affiliates constitutes over 90% 
of the total liabilities, while interbank borrowing only weights a 
small portion. Not surprisingly, as an insider lender, the lower risk 
level reflected by the extremely low non-performing loans ratio and 
high capital adequacy ratio implies that finance companies may 
have informational advantages in financial contracting within 
business groups. 
4.3.2 Dual-track interest system and Inter-bank market 
During the past two decades, China has made substantial efforts on 
interest rate liberalization. More precisely, China embarked on its 
long-expected steps toward interest rate liberalization since 1996, 
beginning with the establishment of the National Interbank Funding 
Centre (NIFC) as well as the abolishment of the ceilings on 
interbank lending and borrowing rates. The remainder of 1990s had 
witnessed a series of interest rate liberalization in terms of interbank 
repo rates and bond rates, which implies the full liberalization of 
interbank rates. In 2005, the deposit rates due from financial 
institutions has achieved fully liberalized, followed by the 
foundation of SHIBOR (Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate)17 in 2006 
 
17  The price quotation group of SHIBOR comprises 18 commercial banks: 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of 
China, China Construction Bank, Bank of Communications, China Merchants 
Bank, China CITIC Bank, China Everbright Bank, Industrial Bank Co. Ltd., 
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, Bank of Beijing, Bank of Shanghai, HSBC, 
Huxia Bank, Guangdong Development Bank, Postal Savings Bank of China, 
China Development Bank, China Minsheng Banking Co Ltd. All above banks are 
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as an interbank benchmark reference rate gauging the liquidity and 
cost of funds for financial institutions. Similar to LIBOR (London 
Interbank Offered Rate) except that the market is based on the 
National Interbank Funding Centre (NIFC) in Shanghai. On the 
other hand, China has been implementing a controlled loans and 
deposits interest rate system for non-financial firms, where the rates 
are capped by ceilings and floors on deposit and loan rates.  
Due to a battery of financial reforms in liberating interest rate, two 
interest rate systems of deposits and loans have co-existed 
prospectively: a restricted interest rate system for non-financial 
institutions with floors and ceilings based on the PBOC benchmark 
rate and a liberalized interest rate system that is negotiable among 
financial institutions benchmarked by interbank rate.  
On the other hand, the 2000 FC Entry Act allows the business group 
owned finance company to enter the interbank bond market and 
lending market where surplus fund is invested and short-term fund 
is raised, aiming to improve the efficiency of cash management 
conductive to member firms via finance companies. Given the 
context that China has been implementing a co-existed interest rate 
system, the 2000 FC Entry Act specified an increased return on cash 
holdings achieved by which finance companies could lend the cash 
collected from member firms to the interbank market with higher 
negotiable interest return than otherwise member firms deposit their 
cash in other banks with constrained interest return. Therefore, we 
 
primary dealers of open market operation or market makers in the foreign 
exchange market, actively participating in money market with sound information 
disclosure. The rate is arithmetically averaged after eliminating the top 2 and 
bottom 2 quotes. Currently, the SHIBOR is composed of eight maturities: 
overnight, 1-week, 2-week, 1-month, 3-month, 6-month, 9-month and 1-year, 
quoted in annualized rate using 360 days per year.  Retrieved from: 
www.shibor.org 
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would expect an unintended consequence of the 2000 FC Entry Act 
that cash holdings for firms with finance company would increase 
after the 2000 FC Entry Act as the tunnelling incentive increased 
driven by the arbitrage opportunity between two interest rate 
systems. We provide evidence supportive of this prediction. To the 
best of our knowledge, our study is the first to discuss the impact of 
dual-track interest rate system on corporate finance. 
Consequently, from a perspective of stand-alone non-financial 
affiliated subsidiaries, it makes no substantial difference in terms of 
the interest return generated from depositing in either non-affiliated 
depository institutions or affiliated finance company given the fact 
that any depository institutions could only offer constrained interest 
return on non-financial firms’ cash deposit according to the laws18. 
This indifference makes the cash tunneling undetectable for 
minority shareholders of these stand-alone firms. However, from a 
perspective of business groups’ parent, through depositing their 
non-financial subsidiaries’ cash in their wholly controlled finance 
companies and lending it in the interbank market, group parents 
could achieve a higher interest return on cash as long as the 
interbank rate on cash is higher than the constrained interest rate 
which seems always the case. Besides, the interest rate return 
finance companies generate from lending to the interbank market 
constitutes the profits that mainly belong to the group parent only. 
In sum, this contextual setting intuitively makes it possible for 
controlling shareholders to control the listed company’s cash and, to 
divert the cash to their own interest by channeling the cash in the 
form of deposit in finance companies. 
 
18 According to the Law of Penalties for Illegal Financial Activities No.260 issued 
by China State Council in 1999, it is illegal for financial intuitions to solicit 
deposit with interest rates higher than the statutory deposit rates. 
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4.3.3 The 2007 anti-tunneling shock 
The Shenzhen stock exchange issued the Anti-tunneling Guidance 
in 2007. The Anti-tunneling Guidance emphasizes on the 
prohibition of any possible tunneling behaviors by the ultimate 
controlling shareholders of firms listed on Small- and Medium size 
Enterprise Board (SME board) that harm the minority shareholders. 
Prior among the anti-tunneling rules mentioned in the Guidance, it 
is worth noting that the Anti-tunneling Guidance restricted firms of 
business groups listed on SME board to deposit their cash holdings 
in group affiliated finance companies because of the suspicion that 
such behavior may affect the financial independence of firms and 
correspondingly may induce tunneling. This exogenous shock 
allows us to study the differential cash policies between firms with 
and without finance companies and to what extent this difference 
can be explained by the specialization of finance companies.  
4.4 Data and sample 
Our sample consists of all non-financial firms publicly listed on 
either the Shanghai or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in China from 
1998 to 2014. We confine our sample period to start from 1998, the 
first year that comprehensive cash flow information of Chinese 
listed firms was available, because our analysis relies on cash flow 
information. We retrieve accounting and ownership data from the 
CSMAR and the WIND Financial Terminal, two standard databases 
on Chinese capital markets, to formulate controls variables for firm 
characteristics in the regression. 
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4.4.1 Finance company data 
We manually obtain finance company ownership data by reviewing 
the CBRC’s official announcements. Whenever the application for 
the incorporation of finance company is approved, the CBRC will 
post an announcement for approval on its official website which 
discloses the information in terms of ownership, management 
committee, the amount of capital stock and authorized line of 
business. 
4.4.2 Group identification 
Because firms associated with finance companies simultaneously 
belong to business groups given the fact that finance company must 
be affiliated with business groups according to finance company 
regulations, we only consider listed firms that belong to business 
groups to avoid confounding explanation that it is the organizational 
difference between group affiliation and non-group affiliation rather 
than the presence of finance companies that contributes to the 
difference motives behind the cash policies. 
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Figure 4.2: The classic structure of a business group affiliated with a finance company after 2000 
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A typical Chinese business group is characterized as an unlisted 
parent controlling group member firms through direct equity ties or 
via a pyramidal structure (Chen et al,  2017, Fan et al, 2013). Based 
on the ownership dataset from CSMAR, we identify all listed firms 
that have the same ultimate controlling shareholder and so belong to 
the same business group. Particularly, we manually trace ownership 
of pyramids of any length via the National Enterprise Credit 
Information Publicity System19. We label that the firm is controlled 
by a business group in accordance with the procedure employed by 
Faccio and Lang (2002) and Faccio et al (2011), that is, whenever 
the direct shareholder of a firm is another firm, we identify its 
owners, the owners of its owners, and so on until we find an owner 
whose legal registered name contains “Group”, “Holding” or “State 
Asset Management” alone the chain20. Next, we match ownership 
dataset of finance company with that of listed firm to make sure that 
finance companies and listed firms belong to the same business 
group. For the remainder of the study, we refer to “listed group-
affiliated firms” as “firms”. 
Our final sample covers 21,584 firm-year observations representing 
1830 unique firms. Of these, 468 unique firms were associated with 
180 finance companies during 1998 to 2014. The rest 16 finance 
companies were either affiliated with business groups that do not 
have listed subsidiaries or owned by foreign business groups such as 
Hitachi, Panasonic and GE. 
 
19 See http://www.gsxt.gov.cn/index.html. 
20 We identify State Asset Management Agencies as business groups due to that 
State Asset Management Agencies sits at the top of the pyramidal structure as the 
ultimate owner in China. This is consistent with Fan, J. P. H., Wong, T. J. and 
Zhang, T. Y. (2013) Institutions and organizational structure: The case of state-
owned corporate pyramids. Journal of Law Economics & Organization, 29, 1217-
1252. who discussed the state asset management system in detail. Moreover, State 
Asset Management Agencies are officially recognized as parents of business 
groups since many of finance companies are directly owned by State Asset 
Management Agencies. 
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Table 4.1: The importance of finance companies in China 
Penal A in this table presents the number of FCs and the size and number of public firms that are affiliated with FCs from 1998 to 2014. Penal B shows the size and number of all 
public firms listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Our sample consists of 21,584 firm-year observations representing 1,830 unique firms, among which 468 firms were 
associated with 180 FCs during 1998 to 2014. There are 196 FCs by the year of 2014, among which 16 FCs were either affiliated with business groups that do not have listed 
subsidiaries or owned by foreign business groups such as Hitachi, Panasonic and GE. These 16 FCs are not included in our sample. 
  Penal A: Number of firms   Panel B: Total asset 
year 
No. of 
FC 
No. of listed 
firms with 
FC 
 No. of listed 
firms without 
FC 
 No. of all 
listed firms 
% of No. of listed 
firms with FC as total 
No. of all listed firms 
 
Total asset of listed 
firm with FC 
(in billions) 
Total asset of listed 
firms without FC 
(in billions) 
Total asset of 
listed firms 
(in billions) 
% of total asset of listed 
firms with FC as total 
asset of all listed firms 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (6) = (2) / (4)  (7) (8) (9) (10) = (7) / (9) 
1998 40 48 647 695 6.91%  168.76 812.53 981.28 17.20% 
1999 40 63 813 876 7.19%  251.35 1132.23 1383.58 18.17% 
2000 43 80 941 1021 7.84%  320.47 1506.21 1826.68 17.54% 
2001 45 90 976 1066 8.44%  770.73 1724.15 2494.88 30.89% 
2002 50 98 1019 1117 8.77%  826.94 2146.65 2973.59 27.81% 
2003 51 108 1052 1160 9.31%  991.82 2488.94 3480.77 28.49% 
2004 57 130 1094 1224 10.62%  1291.34 2822.15 4113.48 31.39% 
2005 59 132 1091 1223 10.79%  1586.80 3003.01 4589.81 34.57% 
2006 64 148 1119 1267 11.68%  2174.53 3546.22 5720.76 38.01% 
2007 73 182 1132 1314 13.85%  4268.90 5002.84 9271.73 46.04% 
2008 81 208 1137 1345 15.46%  5115.37 6002.64 11118.01 46.01% 
2009 90 234 1149 1383 16.92%  6778.61 7421.62 14200.23 47.74% 
2010 104 259 1239 1498 17.29%  8734.09 8922.04 17656.13 49.47% 
2011 125 297 1262 1559 19.05%  11071.33 10573.01 21644.35 51.15% 
2012 149 349 1242 1591 21.94%  13673.15 10987.25 24660.40 55.45% 
2013 175 399 1204 1603 24.89%  16554.14 11141.87 27696.01 59.77% 
2014 196 429 1213 1642 26.13%   19647.71 11494.11 31141.82 63.09% 
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Table 4.1 illustrates the distribution of the finance companies and 
their affiliated listed firms in the same group over time. Column 1 in 
penal A shows the total number of finance companies increased 
from 40 in 1998 to 196 in 2014. Column 2, 3 and 4 shows that only 
small portion (6.91%) of all firms in 1998 received financial 
services from finance companies. However, this ratio increased by 
almost 20% over 16 years, indicating that more than a quarter of all 
firms had access to finance company’s services by the end of 2014. 
Likewise, as shown in penal B column 10, finance companies dealt 
with 17.20% (168.76 billions) of all firms’ total assets in 1998 and 
this ratio raised remarkably to 63.09% (19,647.71 billions) in 2014. 
The tremendous increases in these numbers shed light on the fact 
that finance companies have been playing an increasingly important 
role in China’s economy, however, barely received attentions from 
scholars. 
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Table 4.2: Definition of variables 
This table provides definition for all variables used in this study during the period of 1998 to 2014. Cash, △cash, Excash and Equity financing are dependent variables which are the interest of 
this study. The rest of variables are control variables used in regressions in this study.  
Variable Definition 
Cash Cash and cash equivalents scaled by noncash total assets 
△cash Net change in cash and cash equivalents, scaled by noncash total assets 
Excash Industry-adjust cash. Difference between individual firm's cash level and average cash in the same industry, scaled by noncash total assets 
Equity financing Cash proceeds from equity issuance, scaled by noncash total assets 
ROA Net profit scaled by noncash total assets 
ROE Net profit scaled by total shareholders' equity 
Tobin Q Market value of equity plus book value of total liabilities, scaled by book value of total assets 
Market to book Market value of equity to book value of equity 
Leverage Ratio of total liabilities to total noncash assets 
Finance expense   Ratio of finance expense to total noncash assets 
CAPEX on fixed assets Capital expenditures scaled by noncash total assets 
CAPEX on investment Equity investments and debt investments, scaled by noncash total assets 
Log (total assets) Logarithm of total asset 
AGE The number of years since the firm's incorporation 
IPO The number of years since the firm was listed on the exchange 
Net working capital Difference between current noncash assets and current liabilities, scaled by noncash total assets 
Ownership Indicator variable that equals one if controlling shareholders is a government agency 
Control right Total shares as a percentage of total shares outstanding held by controlling shareholders 
Payout ratio Dividend payments scaled by earnings 
Dividend Indicator variable that equals one if firm i paid cash dividends in year t 
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Table 4.3: Summary statistics of all variables 
This table presents descriptive statistics for all variables used in this study during the period of 1998 to 2014. 
Cash, △cash, Excash and Equity financing are dependent variables. The rest of variables are control variables 
used in regressions in this study. All variables are calculated for each firm-year. Cash is cash and cash 
equivalents scaled by noncash total assets. The dependent variable △cash is net change in cash ratio scaled by 
noncash total assets. Excash is difference between individual firm's cash level and average cash in the same 
industry scaled by noncash total assets. Equity financing refers to the cash flow from equity financing. Log 
(total assets) is Logarithm of total asset. Market to book is market value of equity to book value of equity. 
Leverage is total liabilities divided by total noncash assets. Operating cashflow refers to the cash flow from 
operating activities. CAPEX on fixed assets is the capital expenditures scaled by noncash total assets. CAPEX 
on investment is equity investments and debt investments, scaled by noncash total assets. AGE is the number of 
years since the firm's incorporation. Net working capital is the difference between current noncash assets and 
current liabilities, scaled by noncash total assets. Finance expense is the ratio of finance expense to total noncash 
assets. Control right is the total shares as a percentage of total shares outstanding held by controlling 
shareholders. Payout ratio is the dividend payments scaled by earnings. Dividend is the indicator variable that 
equals one if firm i paid cash dividends in year t. 
Penal A: All variables summary statistics from 1998 to 2014 
variable N mean sd 5% 25% 50% 74% 95% 
Cash 21581 0.2293 0.252 0.0221 0.0809 0.1497 0.2748 0.7405 
△cash 21547 0.0319 0.1576 0.1464 -0.031 0.0065 0.0568 0.2836 
Excash 21581 0.0114 0.2471 0.2453 0.1509 0.0784 0.0399 0.4809 
Equity financing 16205 0.0672 0.1847 0 0 0.0008 0.0152 0.4352 
ROA 21581 0.0409 0.0846 0.0963 0.0131 0.0395 0.075 0.1624 
ROE 21582 0.0529 0.2047 0.1822 0.0267 0.0692 0.1156 0.2332 
Tobin Q 21386 2.3202 1.4014 1.0132 1.3859 1.8957 2.7705 5.0723 
Market to book 21384 3.5971 3.315 0.9297 1.8118 2.7744 4.3231 8.8975 
Log (total assets) 21584 21.5862 1.2467 19.8184 20.7163 21.4427 22.2758 23.9466 
Leverage 21581 0.598 0.2614 0.2105 0.4226 0.5842 0.7441 1.0018 
Finance expense   21579 0.0129 0.0146 0.0077 0.0033 0.0115 0.0207 0.0377 
CAPEX on fixed assets 21495 0.0711 0.0713 0.0015 0.0179 0.0491 0.1006 0.2208 
CAPEX on investment 18576 0.0504 0.1183 0 0 0.007 0.0428 0.2431 
AGE 20934 12.1322 5.7847 3 8 12 16 22 
IPO 20934 8.1153 5.3612 0 4 8 12 18 
Net working capital 21581 -0.0513 0.2703 0.4925 0.1955 0.0366 0.1237 0.358 
Ownership 21584 0.7182 0.4499 0 0 1 1 1 
Control right 21584 0.407 0.1646 0.1637 0.2752 0.3952 0.5309 0.697 
Payout ratio 20901 0.2398 0.3235 0 0 0.1316 0.3726 0.8329 
Dividend 20901 0.5721 0.4948 0 0 1 1 1 
(Continued) 
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Table 4.3 – Summary statistics (Continued) 
Penal B: Summary Statistics of cash holdings by year 
year N mean sd 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 
1998 695 0.1418 0.1571 0.0118 0.0485 0.0955 0.1843 0.4281 
1999 876 0.1694 0.1788 0.0127 0.059 0.1177 0.2149 0.5084 
2000 1021 0.2386 0.2719 0.0143 0.0762 0.1478 0.2797 0.8268 
2001 1066 0.2507 0.2503 0.0204 0.0932 0.1684 0.3166 0.7812 
2002 1117 0.2309 0.2377 0.0213 0.086 0.1583 0.2942 0.6897 
2003 1160 0.2218 0.2248 0.0251 0.0856 0.151 0.2743 0.6648 
2004 1224 0.213 0.2284 0.0204 0.0776 0.144 0.2658 0.6393 
2005 1223 0.19 0.207 0.0173 0.0657 0.1295 0.2338 0.586 
2006 1267 0.19 0.2113 0.0124 0.0669 0.13 0.2329 0.5741 
2007 1314 0.2054 0.2181 0.0164 0.0739 0.1387 0.2537 0.6242 
2008 1344 0.2076 0.2218 0.0199 0.078 0.1429 0.2578 0.6043 
2009 1383 0.2614 0.2837 0.027 0.0924 0.1719 0.3082 0.9022 
2010 1496 0.31 0.3453 0.032 0.1 0.187 0.3624 1.2198 
2011 1559 0.2838 0.3091 0.0327 0.097 0.1764 0.3284 0.9977 
2012 1591 0.2632 0.2811 0.0331 0.0924 0.166 0.3109 0.9086 
2013 1603 0.2235 0.2283 0.0312 0.0882 0.151 0.2712 0.6577 
2014 1642 0.2119 0.2209 0.0324 0.083 0.1412 0.2511 0.6571 
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Table 4.2 provides variable definitions and Table 4.3 presents 
summary statistic for our sample. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at 1% and 99%. Following the previous literature on 
cash holdings, we scaled all continuous variables by total assets 
minus cash. We use three proxies to capture the level of firms’ cash 
holdings in observation years. Cashi,t is measured as the amount of 
cash and cash equivalents as a percentage of firm i s’ total noncash 
assets in year t. △cashi,t, reflects the net increase in cash holdings of 
firm i in year t. To mitigate the concern that the difference in cash 
holdings is driven by the different industry factor across firms in our 
sample, we also included Excashi,t which is the industry-adjust cash 
holdings computed as the difference between individual firm cash 
holdings and its industry mean. In addition, we decomposed the 
components of cash holdings and paid specific attention to net cash 
proceeding from equity issuance, as proxied by Equity financingi,t. 
In table 3 penal A, we show that the mean (median) sample cash to 
noncash ratio is 22.93% (14.97%). Penal B tabulates the calendar 
time evolution in cash holdings during our sample period. At the 
beginning of the sample period, the mean (median) cash to noncash 
asset ratio is 14.15% (9.55%). The year of 2000 witnessed a 
dramatically increase by 6.92% (3.01%) in the cash ratio to reach 
23.86% (14.78%) in 2000. Starting from 2001, the ratio falls 
steadily from 25.07% (16.84%) in 2001 to reach 19.00% (13.00%) 
in 2007, before increase afterward. It peaks in 2010 at 31.00% 
(18.70%), which is more than double that of in the beginning of the 
sample period. 
4.5 Main results 
4.5.1 The average effect of having access to finance companies 
on cash holdings 
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Basically, firms can be affiliated with a finance company either in 
the form of establishment of a new finance company by their 
affiliated business parent, or, through being acquired by a business 
group that has already owned a finance company. Because in both 
cases, firms had access to finance companies at different calendar 
years, we are able to adapt a continuous difference-in-differences 
method to investigate the effect of having access to finance 
companies on cash holdings. Particularly, in a given year, some 
sample firms have been affiliated with finance companies and other 
sample firms have not. By observing the differences in cash 
holdings between two sample groups, we could estimate the average 
effect of having access to finance companies on cash holdings.  
Hypothesis (1). Member firms in business groups are more likely to 
increase their cash holdings after they have access to finance 
companies. 
Moreover, we suspect that the controlling shareholders will dilute 
the controlling right while remain full control to raise more cash via 
equity financing. By doing so, the controlling shareholders could 
reap more private benefits from depositing the more raised cash 
from equity issuance in their wholly controlled finance companies. 
Hypothesis (2). Member firms in business groups are more likely to 
issue more equity to raise cash after they have access to finance 
companies.  
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We also included these firms that have no access to finance 
companies during the entire sample period to increase the precision 
of the estimates of the normal level of cash holdings but excluded 
the firm-year observations representing the afterward period that 
firms were disaffiliated from a business group that had owned a 
finance company to reduce the sample noises. We estimate the 
following regression for each measure of cash holdings.   
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
Where dependent variables consist of the level of cash holdings 
proxied as Cashi,t, net increase in cash holdings from time t-1 to t 
proxied as △cashi,t, the industry-adjust cash holdings proxied as 
Excashi,t and, the cash that proceeds from equity issuance proxied as 
Equity financingi,t. FCi,t is an indicator variable which equals to one 
if firm i has affiliated with a finance company by year t. Xi,t control 
for a set of firm-specific characteristics that determine the level of 
cash holdings, including Log (total assets)i,t (logarithm of total 
asset), Market to booki,t (market value to book value of equity), 
Leveragei,t (ratio of total liabilities to total noncash assets), 
Operating cashflowi,t (net cash flow from operating activities scaled 
by noncash assets), CAPEX on fixed assetsi,t (capital expenditures 
scaled by noncash total assets, CAPEX on investmenti,t (equity 
investments and debt investments, scaled by noncash total assets), 
AGEi,t (number of years since the firm's incorporation), Net working 
capitali,t (net working capital defined as the difference between 
current noncash assets and current liabilities, scaled by noncash total 
assets), SOEi,t (an indicator variable that equals one if controlling 
shareholders is a government agency), Finance expensei,t (ratio of 
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finance expense to total noncash assets), Control righti,t (shares held 
by controlling shareholders as a percentage of total shares 
outstanding) and, Dividendi,t (indicator variable that equals one if 
firm i pays cash dividends in year t). In addition, to control for 
variables that are constant across firms but vary over time and are 
time-invariant but vary from firm to firm, year fixed effects and firm 
fixed effects are included in the regression. We cluster all standard 
errors at firm level. 
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Table 4.4: Correlation matrix 
This table reports correlation matrix of all variables. The dependent variable Cash is the cash and cash equivalents scaled by noncash total assets. The dependent variable △cash is the net 
change in cash ratio scaled by noncash total assets. The dependent variable Excash is the difference between individual firm's cash level and average cash in the same industry scaled by 
noncash total assets. The dependent variable Equity financing refers to the cash flow from equity financing. FC is an indicator variable which equals to one if a firm has affiliated with a 
FC. All other variables are defined in Table 2. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. In all columns, firm-fixed and year-fixed effects are further controlled. The 
standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are shown in parentheses, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 FC Cash 
△
cash 
Excash 
Equity 
financing 
ROA ROE 
Tobin 
Q 
Market 
to 
book 
Leverage 
Finance 
expense 
CAPEX 
on 
fixed 
assets 
CAPEX 
on 
investment 
Log 
(total 
assets) 
AGE 
Net 
working 
capital 
SOE 
Control 
right 
Payout 
ratio 
FC 1.00                   
Cash -0.02 1.00                  
△cash -0.03 0.57 1.00                 
Excash -0.03 0.97 0.56 1.00                
Equity 
financing 
-0.06 0.48 0.74 0.48 1.00               
ROA -0.03 0.41 0.27 0.39 0.22 1.00              
ROE -0.01 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.37 1.00             
Tobin Q -0.11 0.20 0.13 0.18 0.14 0.18 0.06 1.00            
Market to 
book 
-0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02 -0.18 0.37 1.00           
Leverage 0.10 0.01 0.06 0.01 -0.14 -0.30 -0.07 -0.16 0.05 1.00          
Finance 
expense   
0.00 -0.41 -0.09 -0.40 -0.12 -0.43 -0.21 -0.12 0.03 0.34 1.00         
CAPEX on 
fixed assets 
0.00 0.10 0.04 0.09 0.19 0.19 0.10 0.02 -0.04 -0.16 -0.10 1.00        
CAPEX on 
investment 
-0.07 0.12 -0.01 0.13 0.06 0.15 0.06 0.08 0.00 -0.17 -0.19 -0.03 1.00       
Log (total 
assets) 
0.30 -0.13 -0.07 -0.14 -0.13 0.05 0.11 -0.34 -0.38 0.25 0.02 0.02 -0.06 1.00      
AGE 0.06 -0.11 -0.14 -0.16 -0.23 -0.10 -0.02 -0.08 -0.01 0.15 0.08 -0.21 -0.03 0.14 1.00     
Net working 
capital 
-0.08 0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.15 0.25 0.12 0.06 -0.06 -0.41 -0.43 -0.09 0.14 -0.08 -0.08 1.00    
SOE 0.22 -0.09 -0.03 -0.09 -0.07 -0.07 -0.04 -0.14 -0.08 0.06 0.00 -0.02 -0.06 0.18 -0.11 -0.12 1.00   
Control right 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.15 0.09 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.15 0.06 0.01 0.21 -0.31 0.08 0.15 1.00  
Payout ratio 0.00 0.14 0.07 0.15 0.12 0.18 0.10 -0.05 -0.12 -0.17 -0.19 0.10 0.07 0.06 -0.14 0.10 0.02 0.16 1.00 
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Table 4.5: The results of the baseline regressions 
This table reports panel regression results of the impact of the presence of FC on firm cash holdings in the sample period 1998 to 2014. The 
dependent variable Cash is the cash and cash equivalents scaled by noncash total assets. The dependent variable △cash is the net change in 
cash ratio scaled by noncash total assets. The dependent variable Excash is the difference between individual firm's cash level and average cash 
in the same industry scaled by noncash total assets. The dependent variable Equity financing refers to the cash flow from equity financing. FC 
is an indicator variable which equals to one if a firm has affiliated with a FC. Beforek (afterk) indicates the k years before (after) the year when 
the firm has access to FCs. All other variables are defined in Table 2. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. In all 
columns, firm-fixed and year-fixed effects are further controlled. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are shown in 
parentheses, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Cash holding △cash Excash Equity financing 
FC 0.0249**  0.0170***  0.0281***  0.0375***  
 (2.35)  (3.31)  (2.66)  (5.01)     
Log (total assets) -0.0411*** -0.0413*** -0.0129*** -0.0117*** -0.0391*** -0.0394*** -0.0180*** -0.0158*** 
 (-6.80) (-6.31) (-4.15) (-3.30) (-6.55) (-6.09) (-4.91)    (-4.02)    
Market to book -0.0025** -0.0022** -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0023** -0.0022** -0.0028*** -0.0026*** 
 (-2.42) (-2.10) (-1.38) (-0.87) (-2.33) (-2.12) (-4.81)    (-4.07)    
Leverage 0.3978*** 0.3799*** 0.2334*** 0.2375*** 0.3936*** 0.3765*** 0.0514*** 0.0378**  
 (15.97) (14.53) (16.86) (15.47) (15.86) (14.40) (3.04)    (2.05)    
Operating cashflow 0.4507*** 0.4315*** 0.4645*** 0.4609*** 0.4484*** 0.4276*** 0.0376*   0.0368    
 (17.93) (16.47) (23.26) (22.02) (18.06) (16.43) (1.68)    (1.58)    
CAPEX on fixed assets 0.0526 0.0607* -0.1535*** -0.1468*** 0.0397 0.0492 0.3349*** 0.3391*** 
 (1.58) (1.73) (-5.88) (-5.19) (1.20) (1.41) (9.25)    (8.57)    
CAPEX on investment 0.0872*** 0.0779*** -0.0875*** -0.0927*** 0.0821*** 0.0731*** 0.0267    0.0207    
 (3.24) (2.74) (-5.11) (-5.07) (3.14) (2.66) (1.27)    (0.92)    
AGE -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0039*** -0.0037*** -0.0074*** -0.0070*** -0.0107*** -0.0110*** 
 (-0.35) (0.13) (-6.74) (-5.80) (-8.25) (-7.31) (-11.43)    (-10.85)    
Net working capital -0.0210 -0.0018 0.0604*** 0.0709*** -0.0208 -0.0018 0.0967*** 0.0965*** 
 (-1.01) (-0.08) (5.27) (5.58) (-1.00) (-0.08) (6.11)    (5.59)    
SOE -0.0214* -0.0134 -0.0094 -0.0091 -0.0244** -0.0174 -0.0141    -0.0152    
 (-1.68) (-1.06) (-1.49) (-1.43) (-2.00) (-1.42) (-1.52)    (-1.56)    
Finance expense   -5.9800*** -5.6262*** -0.8697*** -0.7127*** -5.9735*** -5.6076*** 0.6260*** 0.8703*** 
 (-18.09) (-16.31) (-4.98) (-3.69) (-18.22) (-16.46) (2.80)    (3.42)    
Control right -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002    -0.0000    
 (-0.24) (-0.28) (-0.99) (-0.63) (-0.56) (-0.52) (-0.73)    (-0.19)    
Dividend 0.0346*** 0.0343*** 0.0269*** 0.0304*** 0.0332*** 0.0333*** 0.0315*** 0.0340*** 
 (8.94) (8.10) (9.12) (9.23) (8.50) (7.79) (8.39)    (8.31)    
before5  0.0181  0.0030  0.0163  0.0131    
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  (1.16)  (0.23)  (1.05)  (0.83)    
before4  0.0258  0.0186  0.0253  0.0117    
  (1.64)  (1.40)  (1.63)  (0.81)    
before3  0.0128  0.0088  0.0135  0.0145    
  (0.99)  (0.73)  (1.04)  (1.00)    
before2  0.0108  -0.0018  0.0111  0.0026    
  (0.87)  (-0.15)  (0.88)  (0.21)    
before1  -0.0005  -0.0083  0.0001  -0.0068    
  (-0.05)  (-0.77)  (0.01)  (-0.71)    
after1  0.0454***  0.0525***  0.0471***  0.0724*** 
  (4.23)  (4.03)  (4.40)  (5.24)    
after2  0.0288***  0.0019  0.0313***  0.0235**  
  (2.72)  (0.19)  (2.92)  (2.21)    
after3  0.0130  -0.0016  0.0140  0.0203*   
  (1.13)  (-0.16)  (1.21)  (1.84)    
after4  0.0050  -0.0028  0.0072  0.0112    
  (0.39)  (-0.26)  (0.56)  (0.97)    
after5  0.0180  0.0152  0.0206  0.0326**  
  (1.26)  (1.38)  (1.45)  (2.24)    
Constant 0.9040*** 0.8986*** 0.2142*** 0.1769** 0.7548*** 0.7521*** 0.5514*** 0.5069*** 
 (7.47) (6.84) (3.50) (2.55) (6.33) (5.81) (7.55)    (6.48)    
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
N 17805 15679 17803 15677 17805 15679 14673    13023    
adj. R-sq 0.2368 0.2159 0.1482 0.1464 0.2357 0.2110 0.1298    0.1271    
 
 
102 
Table 4.5 column (1), (3), (5) and (7) tabulate the main results. The 
coefficient for the FC indicator is 0.0249 with a t-value of 2.35, 
suggesting that having access to finance companies results in greater 
difference in cash holdings between our treatment group and control 
group, after controlling for a host of cash holding determinants. In 
simple words, firms tend to hold more cash after they have access to 
finance companies. In terms of the economic magnitude of this 
effect, the coefficient of 0.0249 indicates an economically 
significant increase of 10.90% (=2.49/22.85) from the average cash 
holdings before having access to finance companies. Besides, we 
also find that the correlation coefficients between the FC indicator 
and other measures of cash holdings, in Column (3) and (5), are 
indeed significantly positive at better than 1% level, suggesting that, 
relative to the controlled firms that have no access to finance 
companies, the treated firms increase not only the level of cash 
holdings but also the net change in cash holdings in a specific year 
(with the coefficient of 0.0170), as well as the amount of cash that 
exceeds the industry average (with the coefficient of 0.0281) after 
they have access to finance companies. Moreover, the coefficient 
between cash generating from equity issuance and the FC indicator 
provides a statistically reliable (at better than 1% level) and 
economically significant evidence that the effect of having access to 
finance companies increases cash proceeding from equity issuance 
by 47.77% (=3.75/7.85) for treated firms. The controlling 
shareholders may consider raising more cash to achieve more 
private benefit, one way to fulfill this ambition is to issue more 
equity to collect cash. Although equity issuance may cause 
controlling right dilution, as long as the controlling shareholders 
remain control those listed subsidiaries, they have incentive to issue 
more equity to raise cash because they can request those subsidiaries 
to deposit more cash in the finance companies to extract more rents. 
Collectively, these results confirm our tunneling prediction that 
firms are more likely to hoard cash accumulated from equity 
issuance after they have access to finance companies because 
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finance companies facilitate group business parents with 
convenience for rent extraction through cash holdings. 
While estimates in Column (1), (3), (5) and (7) only provide an 
average effect of having access to finance companies on cash 
holdings, to investigate the dynamics pattern of firms’ cash holdings 
around their first access to finance companies, we adapt a regression 
of the following specification: 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 +
∑ 𝛿𝑘𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡
𝑘 +
5
𝑘=1
∑ 𝜃𝑘𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑘 +
5
𝑘=1
𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 +
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (2) 
Where Dependenti,t is the focus of interest (Cashi,t, △cashi,t, 
Excashi,t and Equity financingi,t). Xi,t is a set of control variables. 
𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡
𝑘
 (𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑘 ) indicates the k years before (after) the year 
when the firm has access to FCs. We use the controlled firms that 
remained no connection with FCs throughout our sample period as a 
benchmark and thus the 𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡
𝑘
 and 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑘  for those firms are 
always zero. We omit the year prior to the first year that firms were 
affiliated with FCs as the reference category, or, base year. This 
specification allows us to analyze the dynamic patterns of cash 
policies of treated firms that have access to FCs, which is captured 
by the coefficient 𝛿𝑘 and 𝜃𝑘 . Because our sample of the first year 
that firms have access to FCs vary over time, one may argue that the 
variations over time associated with market factors may influence 
the establishment of FCs or the decision of business groups with 
FCs on acquisition, such as the clustering of establishing FCs or 
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M&A waves, we therefore include year fixed effects to account for 
such variations in this specification. 
Table 4.5 Column (2), (4), (6) and (8) report the results of 
regressions. The coefficients reflect the change in the differences 
between firms with FC access and firms without FC access over the 
five years before and the five years after the base year which is one 
year prior to firms being tied with finance companies. Compared 
with base year, the coefficients for all four dependent variables of 
interest on all the 𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡
𝑘  dummies are statistically insignificant, 
whereas the coefficients on 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑘  exhibit some variation with 
regard to their level of statistical significance. Specifically, the cash 
ratio of firms having access to finance companies significantly 
increase 4.54% (2.88%) more than firms having no such access 
from year -1 to 0 (year -1 to 1) at the 1% level. As for the net cash 
ratio and excess cash ratio, we can also observe a similar short-term 
increasing trend, with the coefficients of net cash ratio on After1 
(5.25%) being significantly positive, and the coefficients of excess 
cash ratio on After1 (4.71%) and After2 (3.13%) being significantly 
positive. Similarly, the coefficients of cash proceeds from equity 
issuance on After1, After2, After3 and After5 are positive and 
significant at the 1% level, implying that the increase in cash 
proceeds from equity issuance is greater compared with those for 
firms remaining no access to finance companies throughout. 
4.5.2 Sensitivity to endogeneity: Difference-in-difference-in-
differences results 
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A key assumption behind our difference-in-differences baseline 
regression is that having access to FCs is exogenous to each 
member firm. While this assumption may be plausible because the 
establishment of FCs at parent level does not require approval at a 
general meeting of all shareholders at the subsidiary’s level, we may 
still face an endogeneity challenge where whether a member firm 
belongs to a business group with or without an FC is determined by 
confounding factors that also determine member firms’ cash 
holdings. For example, the business group parent might prefer to 
acquire firms with higher levels of cash or to spin off member firms 
with lower levels of cash. To address this concern, we tested the 
impact of the 2007 Anti-tunneling Guidance as an exogenous shock 
to the parent firm’s incentive to tunnel. The Guidance emphasized 
the prohibition of any possible tunnelling behaviors by the ultimate 
controlling shareholders of firms listed on the SME Board that 
might harm the minority shareholders21. It does not allow firms in 
business groups listed on the SME Board to deposit their cash in 
group-affiliated FCs because of the suspicion that such behavior 
might affect the financial independence of firms and, 
correspondingly, might induce tunnelling22. This exogenous shock 
allowed us to study the difference in cash policies between firms 
with and without FCs and the extent to which this difference could 
be explained by the specialization of FCs. We hypothesize that the 
shock should reduce parent firms’ tunnelling behaviours induced by 
FCs.  
To test this hypothesis, we employed a difference-in-difference-in-
differences approach. The three differences are SME firms vs. non-
 
21 There are two main stock exchanges and three listed boards in the Chinese 
stock market. The Main Board is in both Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange. The Small- and Medium size Enterprise Board (SME board) in 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange exists to help SMEs that otherwise find it difficult to 
get listed on the Main Board; the Growth Enterprises Market Board (GEM board) 
is a NASDAQ-like board that supports start-up and high-tech enterprise. 
22 2007 Anti-tunneling Guidance, Rule No. 20. 
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SME firms, pre-2007 period vs. post-2007 period and firms with 
FCs vs. firms without FCs. In the presence of the firm- and year-
fixed effects, the interaction of the FC dummy variable with the 
other two terms in the specification yields a regression framework 
of difference-in-difference-in-differences, which allowed us to 
identify a causal relation between the presence of FCs and cash 
tunnelling. If the premise that firms having access to FCs are more 
likely to adopt tunnelling behaviours is plausible, we should expect 
the coefficient on the three-way interaction term to be negative, 
which would imply that the tunnelling effect for firms listed on the 
SME Board gaining access to FCs should be smaller after the 2007 
Anti-tunneling Regulation than for those that are not listed on the 
SME Board. These correspond to estimation of the following 
specifications: 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2007𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜗𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2007𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2007𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜌𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜎𝑆𝑀𝐸𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2007𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡+𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (3) 
where Dependenti,t and FCi,t are defined as in specification (2). 
Post2007i,t is the time dummy which is equal to 1 for the period 
between 2008 and 2011 and 0 for the period between 2004 and 2007. 
SMEi,t is an indicator which equals 1 for firms listed on the SME 
Board and 0 for other firms. In the first regression, the key 
coefficient of interest is 𝜗, whereas the key coefficient of interest in 
the second regression is 𝜎. 
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Table 4.6: The impact of 2007 anti-tunneling shock on cash holdings 
This table reports panel regression results of the impact of 2007 Anti-tunneling Guidance as an exogenous shock on 
firms’ cash holdings by using a difference-in-difference-in-differences approach. Column (1), (2) and (3) report the 
results of difference-in-difference-in-differences. The dependent variable Cash is cash and cash equivalents scaled by 
noncash total assets. The dependent variable △cash is net change in cash ratio scaled by noncash total assets. The 
dependent variable Excash is difference between individual firm's cash level and average cash in the same industry 
scaled by noncash total assets. FC is an indicator variable which equals to one if a firm has affiliated with a FC. We only 
considered firms with constant access to FCs throughout the whole sample period, or no access at all throughout. 
Post2007 is the time dummy which is equal to 1 for period between 2008 to 2011 and 0 for period between 2004 to 
2007. SME is an indicator which equals to 1 for firms listed in SME board and 0 for otherwise. Controls include all 
variables controlled in the baseline regression. All other variables are defined in Table 2. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. In all columns, firm-fixed and year-fixed effects are further controlled. The 
standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are shown in parentheses, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Cash holding △cash Excash 
FC*post2007 –0.0065 –0.0114 –0.0084 
 (–0.66) (–1.35) (–0.83) 
SME*post2007 –0.0993*** –0.0429** –0.1050*** 
 (–3.74) (–1.99) (–3.91) 
FC*SME*post2007 –0.1664** –0.2201** –0.1585** 
 (–2.17) (–2.23) (–2.13) 
Log (total asset) –0.0097 0.0134* –0.0069 
 (–1.08) -1.86 (–0.78) 
Market to book –0.0013 0.0002 –0.0013 
 (–1.24) -0.29 (–1.25) 
Leverage 0.3428*** 0.2274*** 0.3396*** 
 -10.09 -9.31 -10.02 
Operating cashflow 0.3458*** 0.4249*** 0.3309*** 
 -10.99 -11.74 -10.95 
CAPEX on fixed assets –0.0852* –0.2311*** –0.0974** 
 (–1.91) (–5.35) (–2.18) 
CAPEX on investment 0.0854** –0.1230*** 0.0741** 
 -2.23 (–3.78) -1.96 
AGE –0.0035** –0.0088*** –0.0146*** 
 (–2.10) (–5.76) (–8.67) 
Net working capital –0.0526* 0.0429** –0.0488* 
 (–1.91) -2.13 (–1.77) 
SOE –0.0239* –0.0086 –0.0280** 
 (–1.94) (–0.93) (–2.25) 
Finance expense  –4.3638*** 0.3721 –4.2813*** 
 (–10.79) -1.12 (–10.57) 
Control right –0.0003 –0.0001 –0.0002 
 (–0.73) (–0.49) (–0.55) 
Dividend 0.0263*** 0.0260*** 0.0265*** 
 -5.17 -4.91 -5.2 
Constant 0.3500** –0.3040** 0.1768 
 -2.04 (–2.24) -1.04 
Year-fixed effect yes yes yes 
Firm-fixed effect yes yes yes 
N 7,722 7,722 7,722 
adj. R-sq 0.2329 0.1875 0.2744 
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In Table 4.6 we found significant and negative three-way interaction, 
strong evidence corroborating the hypothesis that, for firms listed on 
the SME Board with access to FCs, the tunnelling effect should be 
smaller after the 2007 Anti-tunneling Regulation than the effect 
found for firms that are not listed on the SME Board. Having access 
to FCs resulted in SME firms’ cash holdings reducing by 16.64% 
percentage points more than the cash holdings of non-SME firms. 
This effect is consistent and robust to all other ways we tested for 
measuring cash holdings, with a statistical significance level of 5%. 
4.5.3 The effect of FCs’ entering to inter-bank market on firms’ 
cash holdings 
In this section, we study the effect of allowing finance companies to 
participate in interbank activities on firms’ cash holdings. 
Specifically, we investigate changes in cash holdings among firms 
that had access to finance companies relative to firms that had no 
such access before and after the privilege of finance companies 
change. As we have introduced in the institutional background 
section, the 2000 entry shock provided not only the liquidity 
injection but also the opportunity to arbitrage from the imparity of 
the two interest rate systems. If firms with finance companies 
essentially were more likely to engage in cash tunneling, then the 
arbitrage opportunity attached by the 2000 entry shock would 
induce greater tunneling incentives because the tunneling benefits 
were enlarged. As a result, we would expect that firms with finance 
companies should hold more cash relative to the pre-shock period 
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and relative to those firms without access to finance companies as 
their controlling shareholders had incentives to divert cash for their 
own interest in the form of deposit in parent-wholly-owned finance 
companies. To test this conjecture, we employ a difference-in-
differences design with the controls for determinants that could 
influence firms’ cash holdings. To do so, we regress the following 
model 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2000𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2000𝑖,𝑡+𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (5) 
Where Dependenti,t is the focus of interest (Cashi,t, △cashi,t, 
Excashi,t and Equity financingi,t). FCi,t equals to 1 if a firm is 
affiliated with a finance companies and 0 otherwise. Note that the 
FC indicator in this specification is different from the one in 
specification (1) since we only include the year-firm observation 
within the period that firms have access to finance companies. In 
other words, the treatment effect of having access to finance 
companies is consistent throughout our sample period. We conduct 
a balanced sample pre- and post-period from 1998 to 2003 given the 
shock year is 2000. Post2000i,t is the time dummy which is equal to 
1 in the time period after 2000 and 0 otherwise. A positive 
coefficient on the interaction term suggests evidence in support of 
tunneling behavior. All other control variables are defined as above. 
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Table 4.7: The impact of entering interbank market on cash holdings 
This table reports the effect of allowing FCs to participate in interbank activities in 2000 on firms’ cash holdings during the sample period of 1998 to 2014. The dependent variable Cash is cash and cash 
equivalents scaled by noncash total assets. The dependent variable △cash is net change in cash ratio scaled by noncash total assets. The dependent variable Excash is difference between individual firm's 
cash level and average cash in the same industry scaled by noncash total assets. The dependent variable Equity financing refers to the cash flow from equity financing. FC is an indicator variable which 
equals to one if a firm has affiliated with a FC. We only considered firms with constant access to FCs throughout the whole sample period, or no access at all throughout. Post2000 is the time dummy 
which is equal to 1 in the period after 2000 and 0 otherwise. Yeark is an indicator that equals to 1 if the year equals to k and 0 otherwise. Controls include all control variables in baseline regression. All 
other variables are defined in Table 2. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. In all columns, firm-fixed and year-fixed effects are further controlled. The standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level and are shown in parentheses, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Cash holding  △cash Excash Equity financing 
FC*post2000 0.0441***  0.0671***  0.0440***  0.1384***  
 (2.84)  (3.81)  (2.80)  (4.16)     
FC*year1998  -0.0008  0.0320  -0.0006  0.0097    
  (-0.04)  (0.97)  (-0.03)  (0.22)    
FC*year1999  0.0230  0.0396  0.0224  0.0062    
  (1.30)  (1.48)  (1.24)  (0.09)    
FC*year2001  0.0191  0.0772***  0.0192  0.1064**  
  (1.12)  (3.07)  (1.12)  (2.54)    
FC*year2002  0.0573**  0.1006***  0.0575**  0.1982*** 
  (2.46)  (3.52)  (2.47)  (3.96)    
FC*year2003  0.0832***  0.0802***  0.0817***  0.1372**  
  (2.94)  (2.77)  (2.86)  (2.53)    
Constant 1.3752*** 1.3998*** 0.7724** 0.7717** 1.3198*** 1.3437*** 1.7548*** 1.7555*** 
 (3.00) (3.05) (2.29) (2.29) (2.92) (2.97) (3.01)    (3.00)    
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
N 3141 3141 3139 3139 3141 3141 1647    1647    
adj. R-sq 0.2186 0.2197 0.2054 0.2051 0.2117 0.2128 0.2601    0.2601    
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The results are reported in Table 4.7. As tabulated in Column (1), 
(3), (5) and (7), the coefficients on the interaction between Post2000 
and FC are positive and statistically significant (at a level of 1%) for 
cash holding, net cash, excess cash and cash proceeds from equity 
issuance. These evidences suggest that the difference between 
average cash holdings of firms with finance companies and without 
finance companies was substantially expanded after 2000, which 
was likely due to that the permission to access the interbank market 
enhance the tunneling incentive of business parents because the 
interbank market would provide higher interest return on each ￥1 
deposit in finance company and so the tunneling benefit was dilated. 
Consequently, it is possible that firms are under greater pressure 
from their group parent to accumulate more cash even through 
expensive equity financing as long as the parent can keep the 
controlling stake of the firms.  
We next examine the dynamic pattern of cash holdings, △cash, 
excess cash and cash proceeds from equity issuance around the 2000 
entry regulation in Column (2), (4), (6) and (8) by using a similar 
specification as equation (3). The results again depict that the 
coefficients in all years after the 2000 entry shock for net cash and 
cash proceeds from equity issuance are positive and significant. 
This confirms our previous findings that the increase in cash were 
partially attributable to the excessive engagement in equity issuance, 
especially in the post-2000 period, the period in which group 
parents were able to generate higher private benefits. For cash 
holdings and excess cash holdings, we can observe a gradually 
increasing pattern throughout the years around the 2000 entry shock, 
with all coefficients on After dummies other than the year 
immediately after the 2000 entry shock are positive and significant. 
This growing pattern in cash holdings is not surprisingly as we 
argued that firms with finance companies are prone to hold more 
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cash for tunneling motive which seemed to be magnified once 
finance companies were allowed to access interbank activates. 
4.5.4 Cross-sectional variation of control right in the effects of 
the presence of finance companies on cash holdings 
As discussed earlier, the increase in cash holdings by firms with 
finance companies is suggestive of potential expropriation by their 
controlling shareholder. However, the incentives of controlling 
shareholders to expropriate minority investors may vary with 
corporate governance quality. To test whether corporate governance 
quality can affect cash holdings through an agency conflict channel, 
we conduct regressions in which the level of cash is a function of a 
proxy measure for governance quality, and an interaction between 
this governance measure and the FC indictor dummy. We expect the 
net effect of the interaction between the governance measure and the 
presence of finance companies to be negative with respect to cash. 
In this study, we focus on the equity ownership as a proxy of 
governance quality. The reason is that in a weak institutional 
context, ownership concentration in publicly traded firms can be 
recognized as the substitution of legal investor protections in 
providing the function of corporate governance (La Porta et al,  
1998). In other words, ownership concentration by the controlling 
shareholders would shape corporate governance and hence reduce 
the power as well as the incentives of the controlling shareholders to 
expropriate minority shareholders (La Porta et al, 2002). These 
arguments are consistent with the spirit of the work developed by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) who focused on the agency problem 
that arises from the separation of ownership and control. Build on 
their agency framework, a number of empirical studies link 
tunneling incentives attached to cash with equity ownership by 
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controlling shareholders and find a negative relationship between 
the level of cash and ownership concentration (Chen et al, 2012, 
Kalcheva and Lins, 2007).  
On the other hand, in the presence of finance companies, controlling 
shareholders’ endeavor to dilute control of the firm while retain 
relative control, which consequently reduce ownership 
concentration, would still bring them considerable private benefits if 
the cash accumulating from control dilution through extensive 
equity issuance comprise a major source of firms’ savings and the 
cash is deposited in their wholly owned finance companies. In such 
context, it creates another type of equity tunneling which differs 
from the prior tunneling models in a way that the extractions are not 
merely achieved through discriminative equity offering price in 
financial transactions (Baek et al, 2006), instead, the cash that 
proceeds from equity issuance essentially represents a promising 
expropriation rent for controlling shareholders who own finance 
companies. 
Taken together, we hypothesize that the presence of finance 
companies exacerbates controlling shareholders incentives to extract 
private benefits from minority shareholders when their ownership 
concentration ratio is lower. We modified our baseline model to 
include ownership variable that captures agency problem.  
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿(𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (6) 
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Where Control righti,t refers to shares held by controlling 
shareholders as a percentage of total shares outstanding. Our 
emphasis is on the coefficient 𝛿 for the interaction variable (FCi,t* 
Control righti,t). A significantly negative coefficient would provide 
evidence in support of our hypothesis. 
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Table 4.8: Cross-sectional analysis: Control right 
This table reports the variation of control right in the effects of the presence of finance companies on 
cash holdings during the sample period of 1998 to 2014. The dependent variable Cash is cash and cash 
equivalents scaled by noncash total assets. The dependent variable △cash is net change in cash ratio 
scaled by noncash total assets. The dependent variable Excash is difference between individual firm's 
cash level and average cash in the same industry scaled by noncash total assets. The dependent variable 
Equity financing refers to the cash flow from equity financing. FC is an indicator variable which 
equals to one if a firm has affiliated with a FC. Control Right refers to shares held by controlling 
shareholders as a percentage of total shares outstanding. All other variables are defined in Table 2. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. In all columns, firm-fixed and year-fixed 
effects are further controlled. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are shown in 
parentheses, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Cash holding △cash Excash Equity financing 
FC 0.0612** 0.0218** 0.0653*** 0.0506*** 
 (2.56) (2.06) (2.77) (3.24)    
FC*Control right -0.0012** -0.0003 -0.0012** -0.0007**  
 (-2.34) (-1.40) (-2.41) (-2.06)    
Log (total assets) -0.0405*** -0.0126*** -0.0386*** -0.0176*** 
 (-6.74) (-4.05) (-6.49) (-4.81)    
Market to book -0.0025** -0.0008 -0.0023** -0.0028*** 
 (-2.42) (-1.36) (-2.32) (-4.81)    
Leverage 0.3970*** 0.2332*** 0.3928*** 0.0512*** 
 (16.00) (16.82) (15.88) (3.03)    
Operating 
cashflow 
0.4495*** 0.4639*** 0.4472*** 0.0364    
 (17.92) (23.22) (18.05) (1.63)    
CAPEX on fixed 
assets 
0.0517 -0.1534*** 0.0388 0.3355*** 
 (1.54) (-5.87) (1.17) (9.24)    
CAPEX on 
investment 
0.0867*** -0.0879*** 0.0816*** 0.0261    
 (3.23) (-5.14) (3.12) (1.23)    
AGE -0.0001 -0.0038*** -0.0072*** -0.0105*** 
 (-0.15) (-6.58) (-8.04) (-11.27)    
Net working 
capital 
-0.0214 0.0602*** -0.0211 0.0963*** 
 (-1.03) (5.26) (-1.02) (6.08)    
SOE -0.0207 -0.0090 -0.0238* -0.0132    
 (-1.64) (-1.42) (-1.96) (-1.42)    
Finance expense   -5.9575*** -0.8610*** -5.9509*** 0.6434*** 
 (-18.08) (-4.93) (-18.21) (2.87)    
Control right 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0000    
 (0.31) (-0.66) (0.01) (-0.21)    
Dividend 0.0344*** 0.0268*** 0.0331*** 0.0315*** 
 (8.89) (9.11) (8.46) (8.40)    
Constant 0.8853*** 0.2056*** 0.7361*** 0.5367*** 
 (7.40) (3.36) (6.24) (7.37)    
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
N 17805 17803 17805 14673    
adj. R-sq 0.2368 0.1479 0.2357 0.1289    
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The results are presented in Column (1) to (4) in Table 4.8. The 
coefficients on FCi,t* Control righti,t are significantly negative in 
regressions on Cash, △cash, Excash and Equity Financing as 
dependent variables at the level of 5%, suggesting that poorly 
governed firms with a dispersed ownership structure exhibit a 
greater increase in cash holdings than control firms after they have 
access to finance companies. 
4.5.5 The effects of the presence of finance companies on cash-
to-cash-flow sensitivity 
We further explore the impact of having access to finance 
companies on firm behavior with regard to the manner in which 
firms perform cash management. Specifically, we decompose cash 
flows into three components: net cash generated from operational 
activities, net cash generated from investment activities and net cash 
generated from financing activities and implement a cash-to-cash-
flow sensitivity analysis developed by Almeida et al (2004) to 
examine the firms’ propensity to accumulate cash generated by each 
components of cash flows. The purpose of this test is to validate the 
channel through which cash holdings can be affected by having 
access to finance companies. If finance companies indeed mitigate 
financial constraints of treat firms by providing additional source of 
financing as well as a more efficient cash management, we expect 
that firms that have access to finance companies should rely less on 
operational cash flows but more on financing cash flows. 
Meanwhile, these firms should increase their investment cash 
outflows and hence a negative cash flow sensitivity of cash 
generated from investment activities is expected. To test this, we 
estimate the following regression. 
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∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑍𝑖,𝑡+𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (7) 
Our tests concern the change in cash holdings as the dependent 
variable in response to the change in each components of cash flows. 
Z refers to the three components of cash flows including operating 
cash flows (OPCFi,t), financing cash flows (FICFi,t) and investment 
cash flows (IVCFi,t). Size is the natural log of total assets. TobinQi,t-1 
is calculated as sum of market value of equity plus book value of 
liabilities divided by book value of assets. We include Size and 
Tobin Q to control for economies of scale in cash management and 
growth opportunity, respectively. 
Alternatively, consistent with Almeida, Campello and Weisbach 
(2004), we also employ an advance model in which we control for 
not only the sources but also the uses of funds, which is shown as 
follows. 
∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑍𝑖,𝑡+𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +  𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋_𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋_𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + ∆𝑁𝑊𝐶𝑖,𝑡 +
∆𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (8) 
Where CAPEX_fixi,t and CAPEX_fini,t are the capital expenditures 
on fixed assets and financial investment, respectively. We add the 
change in working capital proxied by △NWCi,t and change in short-
term debt proxied by △SHORT DEBTi,t because these two variables 
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can be substitutes for cash. In both specifications, 𝜃>0 (𝜃<0) would 
indicate that having access to FCs increases (reduces) the propensity 
to save cash out of each specific components of cash flows. 
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Table 4.9: Cash-cashflow sensitivity: Components of cash flows 
This table reports the results of the effects of the presence of finance companies on cash-to-cash-flow sensitivity during the sample period of 1998 to 2014. We decompose cash flows into 
three components: net cash generated from operational activities, net cash generated from investment activities and net cash generated from financing activities, in order to investigate the 
attribution of the net change in cash. Penal A reports the results of cash-cashflow sensitivity-components of cash flows. In Penal B, we conduct a subsample analysis where we partition firms 
by whether the controlling shareholders hold above sample-mean shares. The dependent variable △cash is net change in cash ratio scaled by noncash total assets. Financing cash flow refers 
to the cash flow from financing activities. Operating cash flow refers to the cash flow from operating activities. Investing cash flow refers to the cash flow from investment activities. 
Controls include all control variables mentioned in specification (6). All other variables are defined in Table 2. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. In all 
columns, firm-fixed and year-fixed effects are further controlled. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are shown in parentheses, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  Penal A   Penal B 
    Control right above mean   Control right below mean 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
  △cash △cash △cash  △cash △cash △cash  △cash △cash △cash 
FC -0.0069 -0.0026 -0.0073     -0.0195*** -0.0128 -0.0150  -0.0000 -0.0073 -0.0125    
 (-1.55) (-0.49) (-1.29)     (-2.97) (-1.57) (-1.60)  (-0.00) (-1.00) (-1.62)    
Financing cash flow 0.4655***                0.5767***    0.5501***               
(25.20)                (23.61)    (23.89)               
FC*Financing cash flow 0.0095***                -0.0393    0.0088***               
(11.49)                (-0.85)    (11.81)               
Operating cash flow  0.4670***                0.5008***    0.4847***              
 (25.66)                (14.12)    (17.28)              
FC*Operating cash flow  0.0837                0.1046    0.1321              
 (1.34)                (1.10)    (1.42)              
Investing cash flow   0.5477***    0.5096***    0.5158*** 
  (25.94)       (12.80)    (17.47)    
FC*Investing cash flow   -0.0290       0.0168    -0.0737    
  (-0.62)       (0.20)    (-1.43)    
Constant 0.3999*** 0.2193*** 0.1325**   0.1761** -0.2909*** -0.3096***  0.4037*** -0.0046 -0.2214**  
 (7.45) (4.26) (2.56)     (2.41) (-4.40) (-4.16)  (4.63) (-0.05) (-2.50)    
Controls yes yes yes  yes yes yes  yes yes yes 
Year fixed effect yes yes yes  yes yes yes  yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effect yes yes yes  yes yes yes  yes yes yes 
N 16855 16881 16881     7599 7609 7609  9239 9255 9255    
adj. R-sq 0.2520 0.2025 0.1823     0.3231 0.2309 0.1659  0.2836 0.1532 0.1280    
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The results from specification (5) and (6) are presented in Table 4.9. 
Surprisingly, we find the change in cash holdings is only positively 
sensitive to net cash generated from financing activities. This result 
is robust in both specification at a significant level of 1%. While no 
systematic distinction between treated firms and control firms in 
terms of the propensity to save cash out of operating activities and 
investment activities was found after the treated firms access the 
finance companies. Our results show that having access to finance 
companies has no significant effect on loosening financial 
constraints and stimulating investments, while such access did 
increase the firms’ propensity to save cash out of financing activities, 
which is inconsistent with our financial constraint hypothesis. Our 
inference is that the attractiveness of having finance companies for 
controlling shareholders lies in that it facilities the benefit of self-
serving actions rather than its advantageous function on loosening 
member firms’ financial constraints, as our primary agency 
hypothesis suggested. To test the validity of this inference, we 
further spilt our sample based on the controlling shareholders’ 
percentage ownership. We partition firms by whether the controlling 
shareholders hold above sample-mean shares. Results are shown In 
Column (7) to (12) of Penal B. The coefficient estimates for the 
interaction term of FC*FICF is significant and positive for firms in 
which controlling shareholders own above sample average shares, 
suggesting that the increasing propensity to save cash out of 
financing activities is mostly driven by firms with more agency 
conflicts after they have access to finance companies. Again, no 
mitigation effect of finance companies on financial constraints was 
found in both sub-groups since the coefficients on FC*OPCF and 
FC*IVCF are statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
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Table 4.10: Cash-cashflow sensitivity: Components of financing cash flows  
This table reports the results of the effects of the presence of finance companies on cash-to-cash-flow sensitivity during the sample period of 1998 to 2014. We further decompose financing 
cash flows into three components: net cash generated from equity financing, net cash generated from debt financing and net cash borrowed from banks, in order to investigate the attribution 
of the net change in cash. Penal A reports the results of cash-cashflow sensitivity-components of financing cash flows. In Penal B, we conduct a subsample analysis where we partition firms 
by whether the controlling shareholders hold above sample-mean shares. The dependent variable △cash is net change in cash ratio scaled by noncash total assets. Equity financing refers to 
the cash flow from equity financing. Debt financing refers to the cash flow from debt financing. Borrowing refers to the cash borrowed from banks. Controls include all control variables 
mentioned in specification (6). All other variables are defined in Table 2. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. In all columns, firm-fixed and year-fixed effects 
are further controlled. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are shown in parentheses, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  Penal A   Penal B 
    Control right above mean   Control right below mean 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
  △cash △cash △cash  △cash △cash △cash  △cash △cash △cash 
FC 0.0012 -0.0018 -0.0060     -0.0117* -0.0086 -0.0111  -0.0019 0.0007 -0.0176*   
 (0.27) (-0.29) (-0.94)     (-1.68) (-0.95) (-1.22)  (-0.33) (0.08) (-1.65)    
Equity financing 0.6719***                0.6761***    0.6693***               
 (32.53)                (19.18)    (26.67)               
FC*Equity financing 0.0024***                -0.0353    0.0050***               
 (2.77)                (-0.58)    (6.10)               
Debt financing  0.2347***                0.3128***    0.3219***              
  (5.05)                (4.35)    (4.52)              
FC*Debt financing  -0.0448                -0.0066    -0.1083              
  (-0.58)                (-0.07)    (-0.70)              
Borrowing   0.0341***    0.0407***    0.0551*** 
   (4.66)       (3.69)    (5.02)    
FC*Borrowing   0.0033       -0.0146    0.0265    
   (0.24)       (-0.96)    (0.86)    
Constant 0.5547*** 0.3406*** 0.2933***  -0.0540 -0.4211*** -0.1492**  0.3011*** 0.0596 0.0359    
 (8.96) (3.08) (5.40)     (-0.61) (-2.58) (-2.08)  (3.03) (0.31) (0.38)    
Controls yes yes yes  yes yes yes  yes yes yes 
Year fixed effect yes yes yes  yes yes yes  yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effect yes yes yes  yes yes yes  yes yes yes 
N 13856 9769 16468     6000 4018 7381  7847 5750 9081    
adj. R-sq 0.3198 0.0632 0.0759     0.2847 0.0744 0.0845  0.2907 0.0322 0.0358    
 
 
122 
Given that the change in net cash holdings is only sensitive to cash 
generated from financing activities, we further decomposed the 
financing cash flows into three components: cash received from 
equity issuance, cash received from debt issuance and cash 
borrowed from banks or other financial institutions. We re-estimate 
the model by using the components of financing cash flows. The 
results from re-estimating (4) are presented in Table 4.10. We note 
that among all three financing alternatives, the change in net cash is 
only sensitive to the cash generated from equity issuance. In our 
split sample analysis in Penal B, we obtain qualitatively similar 
result that such sensitivity is significant only for firms in which 
controlling shareholders own above sample average shares.  
Overall, these results confirm our pervious findings that firms facing 
more agency conflicts tend to hoard cash through extensively 
issuing equity after they have access to finance companies. 
4.5.6 Interbank market rate and firm cash policies 
A key assumption of our agency conflicts expatiation is that firms 
with finance company receive pressure from their controlling 
shareholders to deposit majority of their cash holdings in finance 
companies rather than other depository institutions. However, we do 
not have direct evidence for this assumption due to the lack of data 
availability in terms of the exact amount of deposit in finance 
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companies placed by firms. In fact, it is not mandatory for firms to 
disclose the amount of deposit they put in finance companies. To 
somehow testify the validity of this assumption, we turn to consider 
the relationship between interbank market rate and firms cash 
policies. Because we believe that the controlling shareholders were 
incentivized by the regulatory arbitrage opportunity from the 
imparity of the two interest systems, which in turn constitute the 
largest portion of finance companies’ profits that belong to the 
controlling shareholders. If the assumption is not valid, which 
indicates that firms only deposit a small fraction of their cash 
holdings in finance companies, we would expect that the cash 
holdings of firms with finance companies should not react positively 
to the regulatory arbitrage opportunity in interbank market. To 
capture this arbitrage opportunity, we introduce a measure of the 
Shanghai interbank offered rate (SHIBOR), which also measures the 
overall availability of liquidity and credit in the economy. This 
measure is increasingly prevalent in recent studies on shadow 
banking in China (Acharya et al, 2016; Allen et al, 2017). We 
include all SHIBOR rates of eight maturities as well as the interest 
rate spread defined as difference between overnight SHIBOR rate 
and PBOC demand deposit interest rate. Notably, SHIBOR changes 
over time but remains way above the PBOC deposit rate during our 
sample period, implying that a positive arbitrage profit is always 
available to finance companies, or in other words, the higher 
SHIBOR measures are, the greater arbitrage profits that a finance 
company could enjoy.   
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Accordingly, if firms only deposit a small portion of their cash 
holdings in finance companies, we hypothesize that the level of 
firms’ cash holdings should be negative related to SHIBOR rates 
because a higher SHIBOR rate represents a tight liquidity market 
driven by deposit shortfalls and hence a reduction in firms’ cash 
holdings. A parallel hypothesis is that the level of firms’ cash 
holdings should be insensitive to SHIBOR rates. To test these 
hypotheses, we estimate the following model. 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿(𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡) +
𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (9) 
Where Dependenti,t is the four variables of interest (Cashi,t, △cashi,t, 
Excashi,t and Equity financingi,t). RATESi,t include interest rate 
spread defined as difference between overnight SHIBOR rate and 
PBOC demand deposit interest rate, as well as all SHIBOR rates 
with eight maturities: overnight, 1-week, 2-week, 1-month, 3-month, 
6-month, 9-month and 1-year. Our focus is the coefficient of 𝛿 , 
which capture the differential cash holding response of treated firms 
versus control firms to the arbitrage opportunity in interbank 
markets. 
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Table 4.11: Rate-sensitivity analysis: Coefficients Matrix for interaction terms 
This table reports the results of the relationship between interbank market rate and firms cash policies during the sample period of 1998 to 2014. We only report the coefficients matrix for interaction 
terms to save space. Panel A reports the coefficients of interest rate spread on all three cash proxies. Spread is calculated as Shibor rate minus demand risk-free rate. Penal B reports the coefficients of 
Shibor rates on all three cash proxies. We consider all Shibor rates with eight maturities: overnight (O/N), 1-week(1W), 2-week(2W), 1-month(1M), 3-month (3M), 6-month(6M), 9-month(9M) and 1-
year(1Y). Penal C reports the coefficients of risk-free rate on all three cash proxies. We consider Risk-free rates with three maturities: 3-month (3M), 6-month(6M) and 1-year(1Y). The dependent 
variable Cash is cash and cash equivalents scaled by noncash total assets. The dependent variable △cash is net change in cash ratio scaled by noncash total assets. The dependent variable Excash is 
difference between individual firm's cash level and average cash in the same industry scaled by noncash total assets. The dependent variable Equity financing refers to the cash flow from equity 
financing. FC is an indicator variable which equals to one if a firm has affiliated with a FC. We control the same variables as in baseline regression. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 
99% level. In all columns, firm-fixed and year-fixed effects are further controlled. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are shown in parentheses, *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  Penal A: Spread   Penal B: Shibor rate   Penal C: Risk-free rate 
Dependents FC*spread  FC*O/N FC*1W FC*2W FC*1M FC*3M FC*6M FC*9M FC*1Y  FC*3M FC*6M FC*1Y 
Cash 0.0162***  0.0151*** 0.0134*** 0.0124*** 0.0105*** 0.0102*** 0.0105*** 0.0111*** 0.0118***  0.0122* 0.0083 0.0051 
 (2.74)  (2.66) (2.84) (2.96) (2.92) (2.95) (2.83) (2.88) (2.90)     (1.79) (1.32) (0.85) 
△cash 0.0094**  0.0092** 0.0075** 0.0062* 0.0046 0.0039 0.0046 0.0051 0.0056     0.0107 0.0089 0.0073 
 (2.18)  (2.02) (2.01) (1.87) (1.61) (1.35) (1.44) (1.56) (1.64)     (1.46) (1.27) (1.09) 
Excash 0.0173***  0.0162*** 0.0145*** 0.0135*** 0.0115*** 0.0115*** 0.0119*** 0.0126*** 0.0134***  0.0145** 0.0105* 0.0072 
 (2.95)  (2.88) (3.11) (3.26) (3.19) (3.33) (3.23) (3.29) (3.32)     (2.15) (1.69) (1.21) 
Equity financing 0.0168***  0.0148*** 0.0123*** 0.0106*** 0.0083*** 0.0068** 0.0081** 0.0090** 0.0097***  0.0107 0.0052 0.0012    
  (3.70)   (3.08) (3.13) (2.98) (2.75) (2.22) (2.38) (2.55) (2.63)      (1.41) (0.73) (0.18)    
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The results of these estimations are presented in Panels A to C in 
Table 4.11. For parsimony of presentation we only present the key 
interaction in the format of matrix while noting all the control 
variables in Equation (1) are included. In Penal A, with Cashi,t as 
dependent variable, the coefficient estimates for FC*spread in Row 
1 is 0.0163 (t-statistic = 2.74, significant at the 1% level), 
suggesting that firms with finance companies increase their cash 
holdings when arbitrage profits are higher proxied by spread. 
Similar results are obtained from Row 2 and 4 in Penal A when we 
use △cashi,t, Excashi,t and Equity financingi,t as alternative 
dependent variables of cash holdings. Moving to the coefficient 
estimates for FC*spread presented in Penal B, coefficient estimates 
on the interaction between FC and all eight SHIBOR rates are 
statistically significant for cash, industry-adjusted cash, and cash 
generated from equity issuance. An interesting finding is that the 
change in cash of firms with finance companies is only sensitive to 
short-term SHIBOR rates with maturities shorter than two-week and 
this sensitivity is decreasing as the maturity increases. This is 
probably because that the short-term SHIBOR rates are more of a 
concern for finance companies in cash management. In principle, 
finance company, as an internal bank in a business group, not only 
deals with the member firms’ demands of daily settlement but also 
relies on the profits generated from lending or investment activities 
to compensate the depositors. Therefore, short-term liquidity 
management should be the primary focus for finance companies.  
To summarize, these findings are inconsistent with the hypothesis 
based on the assumption that firms deposit majority of their cash 
holdings not in finance companies but in other depository 
institutions. In fact, the positive responses of firms with finance 
companies to interbank market rates yields evidence in support of 
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our tunneling inference with regard to the effect of the presence of 
finance companies on firms’ cash policies. 
4.5.7 Sensitivity to alternative explanations 
We consider two alternative explanations for our main results that 
attribute the increase in cash holdings to controlling shareholders’ 
intention on improving efficiency of capital allocation and weaker 
external monitoring by banks after access finance companies. The 
first alternative explanation posits that the incentives for the parent 
company to give member firms access to finance companies is to 
improve the efficiency of capital allocation. The parent firms will 
want to reallocate cash across firms, requiring firms with lower 
capital efficiency to deposit more cash generated from inefficient 
capital expenditure (e.g. overinvestment in negative NPV projects or 
outright stealing by entrenched managers) in finance companies and 
lend it out to firms with good investment opportunity and hence 
large cash needs. 
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Table 4.12: Alternative explanation: FC encourages capital efficiency 
This table reports the variation of ownership in the effects of the presence of finance companies on cash holdings 
during the sample period of 1998 to 2014. The dependent variable Cash is cash and cash equivalents scaled by 
noncash total assets. The dependent variable △cash is net change in cash ratio scaled by noncash total assets. The 
dependent variable Excash is difference between individual firm's cash level and average cash in the same 
industry scaled by noncash total assets. FC is an indicator variable which equals to one if a firm has affiliated with 
a FC. The dependent variable Equity financing refers to the cash flow from equity financing. Ownership is the 
indicator variable that equals 1 if controlling shareholders is a government agency and 0 for otherwise. All other 
variables are defined in Table 2. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. In all columns, 
firm-fixed and year-fixed effects are further controlled. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are 
shown in parentheses, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Cash holding △cash Excash Equity financing 
FC 0.0481* 0.0071 0.0486* 0.0371*** 
 (1.74) (0.57) (1.81) (2.91)    
FC*ownership -0.0421 0.0008 -0.0390 -0.0181    
 (-1.48) (0.06) (-1.41) (-1.32)    
Log (total assets) -0.0434*** -0.0124*** -0.0413*** -0.0170*** 
 (-6.87) (-3.74) (-6.60) (-4.69)    
Market to book -0.0028*** -0.0008 -0.0026** -0.0028*** 
 (-2.65) (-1.30) (-2.53) (-4.65)    
Leverage 0.3981*** 0.2319*** 0.3939*** 0.0490*** 
 (15.90) (16.68) (15.78) (2.91)    
Operating cashflow 0.4451*** 0.4614*** 0.4430*** 0.0330    
 (17.65) (23.16) (17.78) (1.48)    
CAPEX on fixed assets 0.0520 -0.1522*** 0.0393 0.3375*** 
 (1.56) (-5.83) (1.18) (9.31)    
CAPEX on investment 0.0844*** -0.0879*** 0.0795*** 0.0257    
 (3.14) (-5.13) (3.04) (1.21)    
AGE -0.0001 -0.0038*** -0.0071*** -0.0105*** 
 (-0.06) (-6.58) (-7.95) (-11.30)    
Net working capital -0.0211 0.0595*** -0.0209 0.0955*** 
 (-1.02) (5.20) (-1.01) (6.04)    
SOE -0.0170 -0.0088 -0.0202* -0.0113    
 (-1.35) (-1.39) (-1.67) (-1.20)    
Finance expense   -5.9684*** -0.8745*** -5.9626*** 0.6106*** 
 (-18.13) (-5.02) (-18.26) (2.74)    
Control right -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002    
 (-0.27) (-1.04) (-0.59) (-0.77)    
Dividend 0.0341*** 0.0268*** 0.0328*** 0.0314*** 
 (8.83) (9.06) (8.40) (8.32)    
MVSD 0.0000** -0.0000 0.0000* -0.0000    
 (2.03) (-0.10) (1.89) (-0.41)    
Constant 0.9497*** 0.2039*** 0.7968*** 0.5303*** 
 (7.50) (3.11) (6.37) (7.27)    
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
N 17800 17798 17800 14668    
adj. R-sq 0.2364 0.1463 0.2353 0.1276    
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We test the first alternative explanation by comparing responses in 
cash holdings after accessing FCs across state-owned firms and non-
state-owned firms. Empirical study shows that state-owned firms 
facing with soft budget constraints tend to be more profligate at 
capital efficiency in contrast to non-state-owned firms. The 
intention on improving capital efficiency would contaminate our 
tunneling explanation if we find state-owned firms increase more 
cash holdings after having access to FCs. Table 4.12 shows that 
when the controlling shareholders are state-owned enterprises, the 
reduction in cash holdings associated with the FC access is modest 
and insignificant at conventional levels. This result is inconsistent 
with alternative explanation since state-owned firms adopt cash 
policy indifferently from non-state-owned firms after FC is 
accessible, which rules out the capital efficiency hypothesis. 
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Table 4.13: Alternative explanation: FC addresses managerial agency problem 
This table reports the variation of bank-dependence in the effects of the presence of finance 
companies on cash holdings during the sample period of 1998 to 2014. The dependent variable 
Cash is cash and cash equivalents scaled by noncash total assets. The dependent variable △cash 
is net change in cash ratio scaled by noncash total assets. The dependent variable Excash is 
difference between individual firm's cash level and average cash in the same industry scaled by 
noncash total assets. The dependent variable Equity financing refers to the cash flow from 
equity financing. FC is an indicator variable which equals to one if a firm has affiliated with a 
FC. Dependence is average borrowings from banks in pre-access to FC years scaled by noncash 
total assets. All other variables are defined in Table 2. All continuous variables are winsorized at 
the 1% and 99% level. In all columns, firm-fixed and year-fixed effects are further controlled. 
The standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are shown in parentheses, *, ** and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Cash holding △cash Excash 
Equity 
financing 
FC 0.0150 0.0007 0.0134 -0.0006    
 (0.55) (0.07) (0.50) (-0.05)    
FC*dependence -0.0183 0.0251 -0.0010 0.0815**  
 (-0.20) (0.80) (-0.01) (2.21)    
Log (total assets) -0.0402*** -0.0123*** -0.0381*** -0.0166*** 
 (-6.47) (-3.81) (-6.22) (-4.44)    
Market to book -0.0025** -0.0008 -0.0024** -0.0029*** 
 (-2.38) (-1.39) (-2.31) (-4.82)    
Leverage 0.3853*** 0.2301*** 0.3805*** 0.0498*** 
 (15.19) (16.07) (15.03) (2.88)    
Operating cashflow 0.4461*** 0.4531*** 0.4435*** 0.0331    
 (16.96) (22.13) (17.08) (1.44)    
CAPEX on fixed assets 0.0471 -0.1606*** 0.0344 0.3290*** 
 (1.36) (-5.97) (1.00) (8.83)    
CAPEX on investment 0.0792*** -0.0913*** 0.0741*** 0.0236    
 (2.84) (-5.24) (2.73) (1.09)    
AGE 0.0001 -0.0038*** -0.0070*** -0.0109*** 
 (0.08) (-6.36) (-7.46) (-11.12)    
Net working capital -0.0171 0.0616*** -0.0175 0.0987*** 
 (-0.80) (5.29) (-0.82) (6.18)    
SOE -0.0207 -0.0106* -0.0230* -0.0141    
 (-1.59) (-1.68) (-1.85) (-1.49)    
Finance expense   -5.8757*** -0.8788*** -5.8737*** 0.6610*** 
 (-17.60) (-4.79) (-17.72) (2.82)    
Control right -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001    
 (-0.08) (-0.85) (-0.44) (-0.41)    
Dividend 0.0332*** 0.0269*** 0.0323*** 0.0307*** 
 (8.21) (8.79) (7.92) (7.95)    
Constant 0.8848*** 0.2053*** 0.7344*** 0.5276*** 
 (7.15) (3.26) (6.03) (7.13)    
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
N 16580 16578 16580 13676    
adj. R-sq 0.2243 0.1439 0.2229 0.1309    
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The second alternative explanation lies in that accessing FC possible 
provides management an avoidance of external monitoring by 
creditors and hence increases the agency cost of managerial 
discretion. With firms’ dependence on external banks reduces given 
that FC acts as a substitution of financing, the monitoring stress 
from external banks reduces. Accordingly, the increase in cash 
holdings in the aftermath of accessing FC may be the result of 
management having more flexibility to serve their own interests. In 
this respect, one would expect that management in more bank-
dependent firms would hold more cash because they are less 
disciplined by external creditors after they gain access to FC credit. 
To test this hypothesis, we examine whether more bank-dependent 
firms pre-accessing FCs period would hold more cash after they get 
access to FCs. We determine the dependence on external bank credit 
by using average borrowings from banks pre-FC years scaled by 
total non-cash asset because we assume that firms’ dependence on 
banks before accessing FC credits is time invariant. Column 1 to 3 
in Table 4.13 show that there is no statistical change in cash 
holdings for bank-dependent firms after they get access to FC credit 
(the t-statistic for FC*dependence on cash holdings is -0.20) 
although we find some substitution effect between bank financing 
and equity financing after they access FCs (the t-statistic for 
FC*dependence on equity issuance is 2.21). This substitution 
cannot undermine our tunneling explanation because it can only 
represent the change in financing choice in the absence of 
significant increase in cash holdings. This evidence does not suggest 
that the increase in cash holdings after firm gain access to FCs is 
due to managerial agency problem induced by weaker monitoring 
from external banks associated with FC being a replacement of 
external bank creditors. 
 
 
132 
4.5.8 The effects of the presence of finance companies on 
performance, investment decisions, dividend policy and market 
reaction 
Our evidence that firms increase their cash holdings after they have 
access to finance companies are consistent with the view that the 
presence of finance companies enhance the tunneling incentives of 
controlling shareholders through the channel of agency conflicts. 
We have not, however, investigated the effect the presence of 
finance companies on firms’ performance, investment decisions and 
market value of their cash holdings. In this section, we conduct two 
formal tests to evaluate whether agency channel provides a 
systematic explanation for the increasing cash holdings of firms 
with access to the finance companies. 
First, we pay attention to the effect of the presence of finance 
companies on firms’ performance and investment decisions. The 
agency conflict channel implies that having access to finance 
companies increases tunneling incentives of controlling 
shareholders, we would expect a decrease in profitability and little 
or no change in investments. We estimate the following model.  
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (10) 
Where Yi,t refers to either profitability as measured by return on 
asset (ROAi,t) and return on equity (ROEi,t), investment decision as 
measured by capital expenditure on fixed assets (CAPEX on fixed 
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assetsi,t) or capital expenditure on financial investment (CAPEX on 
investmenti,t). Xi,t is the vector of control variables including a proxy 
for logarithm of total assets (Log (total assets)i,t), market value to 
book value of equity (Market to booki,t), ratio of total liabilities to 
total noncash assets (Leveragei,t) and net change in cash holdings 
(△cashi,t). Both firm and year fixed effects are included. All 
standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
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Table 4.14: Accounting performance, investments and dividends 
This table reports the accounting profitability and investments after firms gain access to FCs during the sample period of 1998 to 2014. The dependent variables 
are ROA (Net profit scaled by noncash total assets) in Colum (1), ROE (Net profit scaled by total shareholders' equity) in Colum (2). CAPEX on fixed assets 
(Capital expenditures scaled by noncash total assets) in Colum (3) and CAPEX on investment (Equity investments and debt investments, scaled by noncash total 
assets) in Colum (4). Payout ratio (Dividend payments scaled by earnings) in Colum (5). FC is an indicator variable which equals to one if a firm has affiliated 
with a FC. All other variables are defined in Table 2. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. In all columns, firm-fixed and year-fixed 
effects are further controlled. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are shown in parentheses, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)    
 ROA ROE CAPEX on fixed assets CAPEX on investment Payout ratio 
FC -0.0102*** -0.0221*** -0.0000 -0.0119* -0.0223    
 (-2.98) (-2.81) (-0.01) (-1.80) (-0.98)    
Log (total assets) 0.0126*** -0.0168*** 0.0035*** -0.0108*** 0.1237*** 
 (6.93) (-3.43) (2.65) (-3.92) (14.25)    
Market to book 0.0008* -0.0230*** 0.0004** -0.0002 -0.0047*** 
 (1.89) (-14.59) (1.96) (-0.43) (-4.38)    
Leverage -0.1356*** -0.0455*** -0.0213*** -0.0572*** -0.2921*** 
 (-21.24) (-3.26) (-5.72) (-6.85) (-11.59)    
Net cash 0.1230*** 0.0964*** -0.0033 -0.0290*** 0.2341*** 
 (30.01) (12.62) (-0.93) (-3.95) (13.85)    
Constant -0.1414*** 0.5254*** 0.0237 0.3300*** -1.9944*** 
 (-3.80) (5.24) (0.85) (5.75) (-11.00)    
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes 
N 21250 21250 21199 18291 20575    
adj. R-sq 0.1822 0.1082 0.0507 0.0578 0.0805    
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Table 4.14 reports the results from estimating (10). In Column (1) 
and (2), the coefficients on FC dummy for ROA (ROE) is -0.0102 (-
0.0221) and statistically significant at 1%, suggesting that firms 
experienced a significant profitability decline after they have access 
to the finance companies. In Column (3) reports the coefficients for 
CAPEX_fix. As we predicted, we find no statistically reliable 
difference in capital expenditure on fixed assets after treated firms 
access finance companies. Column (4) reveals that treat firms 
reduced investment on financial assets significantly in post-access 
period. Column (5) shows that the dividend ratio weakly reduced; 
the coefficient estimate for FC is -0.0223, significant at over 10% 
level, suggesting the indifference on dividend payout. These 
findings imply that firms are more likely to hoard cash after they 
have access to finance companies for agency incentives other than 
for operational or investing purpose, which partially explains the 
significant decline in firm performance.  
Second, we examine the market value of cash holdings over time. 
We borrow insights from a number of papers focusing on how firm 
value is related to the changes in cash holdings (Bates et al, 2009; 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2007;Kalcheva and Lins,2007; Pinkowitz 
et al, 2006). To test the degree to which agency cost of cash can 
explain the impact of the presence of finance companies on firm 
value, we follow the approach akin to Pinkowitz, Stulz and 
Williamson (2006), who designed a regression to evaluate the cash 
holdings based on the model in Fama and French (1998). Consistent 
with our agency explanation on cash holdings, we expect that firms 
with finance companies are more likely to experience agency 
conflicts, which thus leads to lower increase in firm value 
corresponding to an incremental increase in cash holdings compared 
to firms with no access to finance companies. We employ the 
following regression specification. 
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𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑑𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑑𝐸𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝛽4𝑑𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽5𝑑𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝛽6𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡+𝛽7𝑑𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑑𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡+1 +
𝛽9𝐼&𝐷𝑖,𝑡+𝛽10𝑑𝐼&𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑑𝐼&𝐷𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝛽12𝑑𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑖,𝑡+1 +
𝛽13𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝛽14𝑑𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽15(𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡) +
𝛽16𝑑𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝜀𝑖,𝑡 （11） 
Where Xi,t is the level of variable X in year t scaled by total assets 
mins cash holdings. dXi,t indicates a change in variable X from time 
t-1 to t (Xt-Xt-1) and, dXi,t+1 refers to a change in variable X from 
time t to t+1 (Xt+1-Xt). TobinQ is the proxy for market value of firm 
calculated as sum of market value of equity plus book value of 
liabilities. E refers to net income. NA is the total assets minus cash 
holdings. R&D is the R&D expenses and we set it equal to zero if 
missing. I&D is the sum of interest expenses and dividends. We also 
replace the lead and lag of cash changes with the level of cash to 
address the concern in equation (11) that increase in cash may 
change expectations about future growth as suggested in Pinkowitz, 
Stulz and Williamson (2006). We also use the following robust 
model. 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑑𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑑𝐸𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝛽4𝑑𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽5𝑑𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝛽6𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡+𝛽7𝑑𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑑𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡+1 +
𝛽9𝐼&𝐷𝑖,𝑡+𝛽10𝑑𝐼&𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑑𝐼&𝐷𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝛽12𝑑𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑖,𝑡+1 +
𝛽13𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝛽14𝑑𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽15(𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝐿𝑖,𝑡) +
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (12) 
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Where L proxies for two cash measures including the level of cash 
holdings and industry-adjust cash. 
We focus on firms with finance companies because our hypotheses 
concern the impact of the presence of finance companies on the 
value of cash holdings. The coefficient of 𝛽15  captures the 
difference in sensitivity of firm value to an incremental increase in 
cash holdings between firms with and without finance companies. 
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Table 4.15: Cross-sectional analysis: Cash-firm value 
This table shows the panel regression results of the market value of cash holdings using Fama and MacBeth 
(1973) approach. The dependent variable TobinQ is the proxy for market value of firm calculated as sum of 
market value of equity plus book value of liabilities. ROA refers to net profit scaled by noncash total assets. 
NA is the total assets mins cash holdings. R&D is the R&D expenses and we set it equal to zero if missing. 
I&D is the sum of interest expenses and dividends. The suffix lag represents a change in variable X from 
time t-1 to t (Xt-Xt-1). The suffix lead represents a change in variable X from time t to t+1 (Xt+1-Xt). All 
other variables are defined in Table 2. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. In 
all columns, firm-fixed and year-fixed effects are further controlled. The standard errors are clustered at the 
firm level and are shown in parentheses, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    
  Tobin Q Tobin Q Tobin Q Tobin Q Tobin Q Tobin Q 
FC   -0.0788   0.0809   -0.1383    
    (-0.90)   (0.97)   (-1.58)    
Cash_lag 1.8028*** 1.8740***                    
  (18.37) (17.89)                    
FC*Cash_lag   0.6466***                    
    (-3.00)                    
Cash     2.6032*** 2.7121***                
      (21.34) (21.80)                
FC*Cash       0.8673***                
        (-2.92)                
Excash         2.5738*** 2.6673*** 
          (21.49) (21.83)    
FC* Excash           -0.7230**  
            (-2.54)    
Cash_lead 0.1653 0.1748*                    
  (1.64) (1.73)                    
ROA 5.3581*** 5.3485*** 4.1929*** 4.2111*** 4.2522*** 4.2702*** 
  (10.88) (10.84) (8.93) (8.96) (9.05) (9.07)    
ROA_lag 0.4274*** 0.4220*** -0.2618* -0.2569* -0.2610* -0.2572*   
  (-2.82) (-2.79) (-1.72) (-1.70) (-1.71) (-1.69)    
ROA_lead 3.5416*** 3.5403*** 3.3449*** 3.3553*** 3.3600*** 3.3695*** 
  (14.21) (14.17) (13.98) (14.01) (14.00) (14.01)    
NA_lag -0.0331** -0.0327** 0.0396*** 0.0384*** 0.0415*** 0.0404*** 
  (-2.56) (-2.53) (-3.34) (-3.26) (-3.47) (-3.40)    
NA_lead 0.7608*** 0.7602*** 0.6311*** 0.6306*** 0.6394*** 0.6391*** 
  (18.20) (18.21) (15.55) (15.69) (15.69) (15.82)    
R&D 6.3564 6.3594 11.2810 11.5183 10.2873 10.3823    
  (0.78) (0.78) (1.33) (1.36) (1.22) (1.24)    
R&D_lag -12.9705* -13.0565* 17.8610** 17.8025** 18.2295** 18.0695**  
  (-1.74) (-1.74) (-2.38) (-2.35) (-2.43) (-2.40)    
R&D_lead 8.3275 9.0783 7.8988 8.7590 7.5559 8.3074    
  (1.20) (1.31) (1.20) (1.37) (1.16) (1.30)    
Interest&dividend 7.2967*** 7.2871*** 1.8478 1.8147 1.7132 1.6872    
  (4.83) (4.82) (1.27) (1.25) (1.17) (1.16)    
Interest&dividend_lag 0.2332 0.2355 0.6917 0.6894 0.7205 0.7155    
  (0.41) (0.42) (1.31) (1.32) (1.36) (1.35)    
Interest&dividend_lead 2.4368*** 2.4328*** 1.2434 1.2131 1.2331 1.2091    
  (3.18) (3.18) (1.64) (1.61) (1.62) (1.60)    
Tobin Q_lead 0.2891*** 0.2898*** 0.2560*** 0.2566*** 0.2587*** 0.2593*** 
  (-15.24) (-15.33) (-14.73) (-14.85) (-14.85) (-14.96)    
Constant 2.5162*** 2.5192*** 2.4833*** 2.4715*** 2.8584*** 2.8664*** 
  (13.55) (13.58) (14.09) (14.10) (16.40) (16.51)    
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effect yes yes yes yse yse yse 
N 19504 19504 19506 19506 19506 19506    
adj. R-sq 0.4452 0.4457 0.4905 0.4919 0.4891 0.4901    
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Table 4.15 shows the results of estimating (11) and (12). In Column 
(2), (4) and (6), we find that firms with finance companies 
significantly decrease the value of cash holdings given that the 
coefficient on the interaction variable between all measures of cash 
and FC indicator is consistently negative and significant. Take result 
in Column (4) for example, 1 dollar increase in cash is valued at 
2.71 by outside investors of firms, unless firms are controlled by 
shareholders who own finance companies, in which case that an 
incremental increase in cash is discounted to 1.84.  
Taken together, we find that firms are more likely to hoard cash for 
controlling shareholders’ needs and wishes other than for 
operational and investment purposes after they have access to 
finance companies. The outside investors realized the potential 
agency conflicts led by the presence of finance companies and 
hence decrease their valuation of cash holdings for compensation. 
These results provide strong evidence supporting our tunneling 
explanation.   
4.6 Robustness check 
4.6.1 Cash holdings and changes in controlling shareholders 
As we discuss above, affiliated firms gain access to a finance 
company through either their business parent establishing a new 
finance company or being acquired by a business group that already 
has a finance company. Our evidence shows that firms on average 
increase the level of cash holdings after they gain access to finance 
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companies. We infer that the increasing cash holdings of firms with 
finance companies serve their controlling shareholders’ interest on 
expropriation rather than operational and investment purposes. To 
test the plausibility of our inference, we provide an alternative 
control sample analysis by looking at firms that gain access through 
acquisition only. The idea is to compare the cash holdings of treated 
firms acquired into business groups with existing finance companies 
with the average cash holdings of controlled firms acquired by 
business groups that has no connection with finance companies 
during our sample period. We assume that whether the business 
group that acquirers belong to owning finance companies has a 
dominant impact on firms’ cash policies.  
We retrieve all acquisition deals information from Thomson ONE 
database. We double check this database with the ownership 
database to ensure that the acquirers are the new controlling 
shareholders with no less than 20% of the ownership of the firms 
after the acquisition completed. Moreover, we only consider firms 
that changed their controlling shareholders only once during our 
sample period. Our final MA sample consists of 373 acquisitions. 
Of these, the targets firms of 63 acquisitions were consolidated into 
business groups with existing finance companies.  
The assumption under which the econometrician can attribute the 
increase in cash holdings of target firms after the acquisition to the 
presence of finance companies is that the target firms less likely 
self-select the acquirers according to whether the acquirers are 
associated with finance companies. Therefore, we assume that the 
presence of finance companies in acquirers’ group is relatively 
exogenous to targets firms’ cash policies. To test this assumption by 
estimating the following equation. 
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𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿(𝐹𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (13) 
Where Dependenti,t is the four variables of interest (Cashi,t, △cashi,t, 
Excashi,t t and Equity financingi,t). FCMAi,t equals to 1 if the target 
firms were acquired into business groups with existing finance 
companies, otherwise it equals to 0. Post MAi,t represents the after 
acquisition period. We would expect the estimate of the interaction 
term of 𝛿 to be significantly positive. 
 
 
 
142 
Table 4.16: Cash holdings and M&A 
This table reports the results of changes in controlling shareholders in the effect the presence of finance 
companies on cash holdings during the sample period of 1998 to 2014. We consider firms that gain access to 
FCs through acquisition only due to changes of their controlling shareholders. We employ an alternative 
M&A sample that consists of 373 acquisitions. Of these, the targets firms of 63 acquisitions were 
consolidated into business groups with existing FCs. The dependent variable Cash is cash and cash 
equivalents scaled by noncash total assets. The dependent variable △cash is net change in cash ratio scaled 
by noncash total assets. The dependent variable Excash is difference between individual firm's cash level and 
average cash in the same industry scaled by noncash total assets. The dependent variable Equity financing 
refers to the cash flow from equity financing. FCMA equals 1 if the target firms were acquired by business 
groups with FCs, and otherwise 0. Post MA represents the period after acquisition. All other variables are 
defined in Table 2. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. In all columns, firm-
fixed and year-fixed effects are further controlled. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are 
shown in parentheses, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Cash holding △cash Excash 
Equity 
financing 
Treat*post MA 0.0582* 0.0208** 0.0686** 0.0623*** 
 (1.77) (2.05) (2.04) (4.43)    
Log (total assets) -0.0258* -0.0047 -0.0288* -0.0040    
 (-1.95) (-0.71) (-1.89) (-0.65)    
Market to book -0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0011**  
 (-0.03) (-0.52) (-0.05) (-2.20)    
Leverage 0.1972*** 0.1239*** 0.2174*** -0.0057    
 (3.99) (4.27) (3.60) (-0.23)    
Operating cashflow 0.3754*** 0.4422*** 0.3864*** -0.0100    
 (7.81) (10.50) (6.81) (-0.22)    
CAPEX on fixed assets 0.1037 -0.1791*** 0.0367 0.3840*** 
 (1.44) (-3.17) (0.47) (5.69)    
CAPEX on investment 0.0599 -0.0716** 0.0638 0.0433    
 (1.21) (-2.26) (1.48) (1.56)    
AGE 0.0036* -0.0021* -0.0125*** -0.0103*** 
 (1.92) (-1.71) (-5.17) (-5.21)    
Net working capital -0.0904** 0.0139 -0.0983** 0.0207    
 (-2.27) (0.77) (-2.12) (0.98)    
SOE -0.0291 -0.0106 -0.0480** -0.0006    
 (-1.46) (-1.34) (-2.31) (-0.05)    
Finance expense   -5.1972*** -1.2947*** -5.7145*** 0.0060    
 (-8.67) (-4.54) (-8.31) (0.02)    
Control right 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0003    
 (0.38) (0.51) (-0.11) (0.82)    
Dividend 0.0325*** 0.0227*** 0.0254** 0.0244*** 
 (3.77) (3.63) (2.57) (3.37)    
Constant 0.6106** 0.0747 0.6574** 0.2658**  
 (2.36) (0.61) (2.17) (2.28)    
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
N 3364 3364 3364 2628    
adj. R-sq 0.2414 0.1690 0.2083 0.1350    
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Table 4.16 shows the results from estimating (13). Constituent with 
our prediction, the coefficient estimates of the interaction terms for 
all dependent variables of our interest are statistically significant 
and positive, suggesting that firms that gained access to finance 
companies through the controlling shareholders change increase 
their cash holdings. This result adds value to our interference that 
the presence of finance companies matters in explaining firms’ cash 
hoarding behaviors. 
4.6.2 Cash holdings of FC firms versus matched non-FC firms 
As another robustness check, we also employ a propensity score 
matching technique to estimate the differences in the level of cash 
holdings between FC-related firms and non-FC-related firms. We 
match our treatment firms (that have relation with finance 
companies by the end of our sample period) with control firms (that 
have never been associated with finance companies during our 
sample period) based on the same set of explanatory variables in our 
baseline regression. The matching procedure adopts a one-to-one 
nearest-neighbor matching with replacement (Heckman et al, 1997). 
For each FC-related firm-year observation, we select a non-FC-
related firm observation with the closest propensity score in the 
same year. The matching estimation yields a sample of 10398 firm-
year observation including 458 unique FC-related firms and 944 
unique non-FC-related firms for the period 1998-2014. 
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Table 4.17: Summary statistics of propensity score matching analysis 
This table presents the summary statistics of the sample before and after propensity score matching estimation. We match our treatment firms with 
control firms based on the same set of explanatory variables in our baseline regression. Penal A shows the summary statistics of the pre-match the 
sample. Penal B shows the summary statistics of the post-match the sample. Cash is cash and cash equivalents scaled by noncash total assets. The 
dependent variable △cash is net change in cash ratio scaled by noncash total assets. Excash is difference between individual firm's cash level and 
average cash in the same industry scaled by noncash total assets. Equity financing refers to the cash flow from equity financing. Log (total assets) 
is Logarithm of total asset. Market to book is market value of equity to book value of equity. Leverage is total liabilities divided by total noncash 
assets. Operating cashflow refers to the cash flow from operating activities. CAPEX on fixed assets is the capital expenditures scaled by noncash 
total assets. CAPEX on investment is equity investments and debt investments, scaled by noncash total assets. AGE is the number of years since 
the firm's incorporation. Net working capital is the difference between current noncash assets and current liabilities, scaled by noncash total assets. 
Finance expense is the ratio of finance expense to total noncash assets. Control right is the total shares as a percentage of total shares outstanding 
held by controlling shareholders. Dividend is the indicator variable that equals one if firm i paid cash dividends in year t. 
 Penal A: Pre-match   Penal B: Post-match 
 FC-firms non-FC-firms 
MeanDiff 
 FC-firms 
non-FC-
firms(matched) MeanDiff 
Variable N mean N mean   N mean N mean 
Cash 6324 0.2467 15131 0.3512 -0.1045  5199 0.2517 5199 0.226 0.0257** 
△cash 6315 0.0446 15106 -0.0222 0.0668  5199 0.0431 5198 0.0356 0.0075 
Excash 6324 -0.0292 15131 0.0122 -0.0414  5199 0.0083 5199 -0.0193 0.0275** 
Equity financing 4680 0.0722 11416 0.0782 -0.006  4204 0.0671 4239 0.0608 0.0063 
Log (total assets) 6324 22.0906 15134 21.3736 0.7171***  5199 22.1831 5199 22.1739 0.0092 
Market to book 6287 3.3546 14971 3.964 -0.6094  5199 3.24 5199 3.2601 -0.0201 
Leverage 6324 0.6791 15131 0.8539 -0.1748  5199 0.6599 5199 0.636 0.0239 
Operating cashflow 6315 0.0752 15108 -0.1 0.1752  5199 0.0709 5199 0.0694 0.0015 
CAPEX on fixed assets 6304 0.0773 15065 0.0701 0.0072***  5199 0.0755 5199 0.0733 0.0022 
CAPEX on investment 5408 0.0434 13052 0.0643 0.0209***  5128 0.0439 5132 0.0489 -0.005 
AGE 6104 11.5937 14706 12.334 0.7403***  5199 12.156 5199 12.0727 0.0833 
Net working capital 6324 -0.1185 15131 -0.2762 0.1577  5199 -0.1028 5199 -0.0947 -0.0081 
SOE 6324 0.9009 15134 0.6421 0.2588***  5199 0.9002 5199 0.904 -0.0038 
Finance expense   6323 0.0131 15130 0.0237 -0.0107  5199 0.0128 5199 0.0124 0.0004 
Control right 6324 44.5388 15134 39.1591 5.3796***  5199 43.4801 5199 43.3593 0.1209 
Dividend 6088 0.6199 14689 0.5532 0.0667***   5199 0.6422 5199 0.6565 -0.0142 
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Table 4.17 provides summary statistics for our match estimation. 
The matching estimation seems to be efficient since the two-sample 
t-test indicates no significant difference in a set of firms’ 
characteristics between treatment group and new control group, 
however, with an exception that cash ratio and industry-adjusted 
cash ratio of treatment firm are higher than their identical sample at 
5% significance level. 
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Table 4.18: Propensity score matching analysis: FC firms vs. non-FC firms 
This table reports panel regression results of re-estimation of the baseline regression using 
propensity score match sample. The dependent variable Cash is cash and cash equivalents scaled 
by noncash total assets. The dependent variable △cash is net change in cash ratio scaled by noncash 
total assets. The dependent variable Excash is difference between individual firm's cash level and 
average cash in the same industry scaled by noncash total assets. The dependent variable Equity 
financing refers to the cash flow from equity financing. FC is an indicator variable which equals to 
one if a firm has affiliated with a FC. All other variables are defined in Table 2. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. In all columns, firm-fixed and year-fixed effects 
are further controlled. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are shown in 
parentheses, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Cash holding △cash Excash 
Equity 
financing 
FC 0.0183* 0.0133*** 0.0229** 0.0264*** 
 (1.68) (2.65) (2.10) (3.62)    
Log (total assets) -0.0453*** -0.0150*** -0.0428*** -0.0150*** 
 (-5.19) (-4.09) (-4.91) (-2.83)    
Market to book -0.0060*** -0.0033*** -0.0052*** -0.0027**  
 (-3.89) (-3.32) (-3.42) (-2.17)    
Leverage 0.4260*** 0.2367*** 0.4226*** 0.0508**  
 (12.07) (13.46) (11.96) (2.23)    
Operating cashflow 0.5284*** 0.5008*** 0.5247*** 0.0681**  
 (14.32) (17.28) (14.50) (2.07)    
CAPEX on fixed 
assets 
-0.0209 -0.1654*** -0.0206 0.2555*** 
 (-0.45) (-4.72) (-0.44) (5.11)    
CAPEX on 
investment 
0.1433*** -0.0581** 0.1452*** 0.1709*** 
 (3.51) (-1.98) (3.56) (3.90)    
AGE -0.0007 -0.0046*** -0.0079*** -0.0117*** 
 (-0.52) (-5.55) (-6.28) (-7.83)    
Net working capital -0.0360 0.0444*** -0.0436 0.0631*** 
 (-1.25) (3.03) (-1.51) (3.39)    
SOE -0.0210 0.0091 -0.0207 0.0142    
 (-0.80) (0.80) (-0.84) (0.86)    
Finance expense   -6.4630*** -1.4599*** -6.5543*** -0.2092    
 (-13.70) (-6.38) (-13.80) (-0.72)    
Control right -0.0005 -0.0004** -0.0005 -0.0008**  
 (-1.21) (-2.22) (-1.20) (-2.56)    
Dividend 0.0263*** 0.0189*** 0.0247*** 0.0174*** 
 (4.97) (5.08) (4.54) (3.50)    
Constant 1.0392*** 0.2793*** 0.8631*** 0.5297*** 
 (5.52) (3.70) (4.63) (4.87)    
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
N 10260 10259 10260 8407    
adj. R-sq 0.2835 0.1948 0.3055 0.1712    
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We then revisit our baseline regression by using our matched 
sample. The results presented in table 4.18 again confirm the 
univariate findings from table 4.17 as well as the robustness of our 
prior findings. The coefficient estimates on FC indicators for all 
cash-related proxies are significant positive, which indicates that 
firms increase their cash holdings in conjunction with the access to 
finance companies. 
4.7 Conclusion 
In this study, we examine the role that finance companies play in 
determining group member firms’ cash policies. Surprisingly, we 
find that firms hold high levels of cash after they gain access to 
finance companies and the increasing cash holdings of firms with 
finance companies serves no operational and investment purposes. 
We show that this effect is more pronounced for firms with more 
agency conflicts. These findings are contrary to Chinese reformers’ 
intention of designing such a group-specific bank from which one 
could expect an improvement in the efficiency of cash management 
and hence a reduction in financial constraints of group member 
firms. We interpret these results as consistent with controlling 
shareholders extracting rents from firms by encouraging firms to 
accumulate large cash holdings and to deposit these cash holdings in 
their wholly owned finance companies. Because by doing so, the 
controlling shareholders could reap all the benefits from lending 
these cash in interbank markets through their finance companies. 
Our finding that firms that had access to finance companies 
rebalancing their cash holdings sensitively to the arbitrage benefits 
available in interbank market confirms this prediction. 
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These results are robust to several specifications that address 
concerns about endogeneity and concomitant effects. Precisely, by 
introducing two exogenous regulations to firms’ cash policies as 
natural experiments, we first find that firms with finance companies 
substantially increased more cash holdings after finance companies 
were allowed to access interbank activities where arbitrage 
opportunity were available. In addition, we find greater reduction in 
cash holdings in firms after regulator placed restriction on 
depositing their cash in finance companies. These results provide 
strong evidence in support of finance companies being the 
mechanism by which controlling shareholders extract rents from 
firms.  
We also investigate how this rent exaction behavior by controlling 
shareholders via finance companies affects firm profitability, 
dividend policy and firms’ valuation. Our analyses show that firms 
experience a reduction in profitability after they access finance 
companies. Moreover, outsider investor value one dollar of cash 
substantially less if a firm belongs to a business group with a 
finance company. Again, these results imply that although the close 
ties between finance and industry within a business group may have 
helped firms to gain access to financial advantages, such access may 
not be costless. What is even worse, the cost of such access may 
outweigh its benefits. In the absence of efficient capital markets, it is 
possible that the controlling shareholders of business groups would 
take advantage of the existence of such finance-industry ties to 
siphon resources for their own interests. Overall, our findings 
provide the first evidence that the presence of finance companies 
inhibit rather than encourage the growth of Chinese firms. Our study 
has important implications that policy makers need to pay close 
attention to the role of finance companies in the evolution of 
 
 
149 
business groups, especially on the cost side of such group-specific 
bank. 
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Chapter 5 
Finance Company and Earnings Management 
5.1 Abstract 
The abuse of finance companies may result in rent exaction 
behavior by controlling shareholders given fewer effective corporate 
governance mechanisms are in place to protect minority 
shareholders. If controlling shareholders intend to tunnel the firm 
value, they have incentives to mask true firm performance and 
conceal their private control benefits from outside investors. This 
insight suggests that earnings management is inherently associated 
with tunneling after firms access the finance companies in the 
context of poor corporate governance practice, where private control 
benefits are higher and the likelihood of these benefits being 
detected is lower. This study investigates the impact of firms’ 
accessing finance companies (group-specific bank-like firms) on 
earnings management decision in Chinese business groups. Based 
on Chinese firm-level data from 2007 to 2014, we find systematic 
differences in earnings management after firms gain access to 
finance companies. We empirically document that firms with access 
to finance companies are more likely to be engaged in earnings 
management through increasing the use of discretionary accruals. 
We also find that their earnings management behavior is in parallel 
with an extensive equity financing. These evidences support the 
hypothesis that firms with access to finance companies 
opportunistically manage earnings in an effort to serve the tunneling 
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motives of their controlling shareholders. We identify evidences that 
exclude the other explanations that firms with finance companies 
opportunistically manage earnings to credibly signal positive 
investment opportunities to the market, to maximize managerial 
compensation or to pursue political promotion. Moreover, we take 
advantage of No.37 Memorandum of Disclosure Regulation on 
Related Transaction between Finance Companies and Listed Firms 
issued by Shenzhen stock exchange in 2011 as an exogenous shock 
on firms’ earning management decision to alleviate endogeneity 
problem, and document that a more transparent transaction 
information between financial companies and affiliated firms can 
reduce finance companies-induce tunneling problem, and 
consequently reduces the incentives to manage earnings. 
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5.2 Introduction 
Chinese business groups have been involved in an experiment with 
the formation of finance company-a specialized bank-like financial 
institution that collected and redistributed funds. Due to the 
underdevelopment of the formal financial system, finance company 
has becoming an important constituent of informal financial system 
providing substitutions for the existing formal system. Hence, 
finance company may provide member firms of business groups 
with predominance in reducing financial constraints and improving 
efficiency of capital management because finance company 
represents an effective corporate governance mechanism (Keister, 
1998). 
However, such specialized firm is fully controlled by the parent 
company of the business group with a pyramidal structure. A rising 
concern regarding this pyramidal organization form in literature is 
the possibilities that the controlling shareholders may expropriate 
private benefits from the minority shareholders due to the 
divergence between ownership and control (e.g. La Porta et al, 1999; 
La Porta et al, 2000). This agency conflict between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders is described as “tunneling” 
by Johnson et al (2000). Stuides show that tunneling is particularly 
serious in emerging markets, where poorer corporate governance 
and weak investor protection leaves firms vulnerable to controlling 
shareholders tunneling activities (Claessens et al, 2000; Bertrand et 
al, 2002; Bae et al, 2002; Firedman et al, 2003; Liu and Lu, 2007). 
In this respect, finance companies can be abused by controlling 
shareholders as a mechanism facilitating their tunneling activities. 
Yet, no systematic research has provided evidence examining the 
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real impact of having a finance company on member firms’ 
behaviors in a business group. 
In this study, we aim to set up a link between the presence of 
finance companies and their affiliated firms’ earnings management 
decision. Studying the difference in the magnitude of earnings 
management before and after firms accessing the finance companies 
and to what extent the difference is attributable to the emergence 
and functioning of finance company allows us to achieve a better 
understanding to the role of finance companies plays in the business 
groups. To do so, we use hand-collected data of all 196 finance 
companies’ information with respect to the date of incorporation and 
the ownership structure from CBRC’s official announcements by 
2014. We match the finance company data with Chinese firm-level 
data derived from CSMAR in the period between 2007 and 2014 if 
they share the same ultimate controlling shareholder.  
We propose two contrary economic mechanisms through which 
finance company affects firm to engage in earnings management: 
corporate governance and agency conflict of tunneling. Precisely, if 
the corporate governance mechanism of finance company works, we 
would expect less earnings management behavior after firms 
accessing the finance company. However, if finance company 
facilitates controlling shareholder of firms with privilege to siphon 
resources out of firms to increase their own wealth, they have 
incentives to window dress true firm performance to obfuscate the 
market. This insight suggests that earnings management is 
inherently associated with finance company-induce tunneling 
especially in a weak institutional context because poor corporate 
governance prevents such earnings manipulation from easily being 
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detected and the benefits of this misbehavior are higher (Leuz et al, 
2003).  
Our empirical findings are in support of the tunneling mechanism of 
finance company. We find that firms are more likely to be engaged 
in earnings management through increasing the use of discretionary 
accruals after having access to finance company. We also find that 
their earnings management behavior is in parallel with an extensive 
equity financing. Our tunneling explanation lies on that due to that 
finance company can bring substantial private benefits to controlling 
shareholders (also the parent of business group and the wholly 
owner of finance company) if large amount of cash holdings is 
deposited in finance company, controlling shareholders are 
incentivized to manage earnings to raise more capital from equity 
issuance and require firms to deposit the raised capital in finance 
company. By doing so, the controlling shareholders can reap most, 
if not all, the profits from finance company. In short, finance 
company enhances the tunneling motives of controlling shareholders, 
which consequently result in more earning management behaviors. 
We also conduct two cross-sectional analysis to provide more direct 
evidence supportive of our tunneling explanation. We use the 
difference between Shibor rate (Interbank-market rate) and firms’ 
last year profitability, and the controlling shareholders total share 
holdings to capture the tunneling incentive of firms with access to 
finance company behind their earnings management behavior. First, 
we find that larger difference indicating larger tunneling benefits 
that finance company could supply is associated with greater level 
of earnings management for firms with access to finance company. 
Second, the positive relationship between the presence of finance 
company and earnings management is stronger if controlling 
shareholders exercise full control while holding a relatively smaller 
portion of cash flow rights. Besides, we also use a direct measure of 
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tunneling (related party transaction between subsidiary and parent 
company) to reflect the extent of entrenchment of the controlling 
shareholders and find that earnings management is more 
pronounced at firms controlled by more entrenched shareholders 
after they access the finance company.  
Because firms may increase reported earnings to achieve various 
incentives other than tunneling incentives. We attempt to rule out 
three alternative explanations for our results. First, it is believed that 
managerial compensation could be the key driver to an increasing 
earnings management after having access to finance company 
(Cheng and Warfield, 2005). It is possible that compensation of 
CEO becomes more dependent on the performance of the firms after 
firms access to finance company. Finance company might be 
endowed to have responsibility for managing the member firms’ 
budget on behave of the parent company of the group. Therefore, a 
more marketized compensation scheme based on the performance 
could be adopted. Our results show that this alternation explanation 
does not hold since we find that variation of CEO compensation 
including salary and option has no significant influence on the 
relationship between the presence of finance company and the level 
of earnings management. Second, accessing to finance company 
may bring stronger financing capacity and greater investment 
opportunities to affiliated member firms. Finance company’s 
primary function of funds reallocation within groups may promote 
the liquidity of the member firms, which results in that firms are 
more sensitive to investment opportunities. Managers may use 
discretionary accruals to credibly signal positive prospects to the 
market, enabling it to raise more capital to support the optimal 
investment projects (Linck et al, 2013). In line with this view, we 
would expect that positive effect of finance company on earnings 
management is stronger at firms with great investment opportunities. 
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However, we provide evidence against this hypothesis. Third, we 
consider that political issue may both affect firms’ decision to 
access to finance company and earnings management decision. Liu 
et al (2018) find that political connections matter in deciding firms’ 
earnings management. One may argue that firms manage earnings to 
meet objectives set by government agency for quick political 
promotion. Thus, we would expect that state-owned firms should 
responses differently from non-state-owned firms in terms of the 
engagement of earnings management after accessing to finance 
company. Our results fail to support this hypothesis.  
Our evidences show that the presence of finance company has a 
strong positive effect on earnings management, which reduces the 
quality of a firm's accounting information. Other unobservable 
factors other than tunneling incentives of controlling shareholders 
that determine whether to access to finance company may also be 
the key drivers of earnings management, which leaves our empirical 
findings vulnerable to concerns about endogeneity. To mitigate the 
endogeneity concerns, we use No.37 Memorandum Disclosure 
Regulation on Related Transaction between Finance Companies 
and Listed Firms issued by Shenzhen stock exchange in 2011 as an 
exogenous shock on firms’ earning management decision. This 
regulation indicating a more transparent accounting information on 
the transaction between finance companies and affiliated firms 
supposedly reduced the abuse of finance company in tunneling 
activities by controlling shareholders. As expected, we find that 
earnings management of firms with access to finance company 
significantly reduced in the aftermath of the regulation adoption, 
confirming that a firm’s tunneling rationale to hide information on 
earnings management once they gain the helps from finance 
company. Our results also imply that improving accounting quality 
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may help to reduce earning managements, which is consistent with 
argument proposed by Biddle et al (2009). 
Our study makes important contributions literature and policy. First, 
to the best knowledge of us, we are the first empirical research 
linking the presence of finance company to earnings management 
and provide systematic evidence of tunneling motive behind 
earnings management behavior of firms with finance company in 
China. Our study offers a more comprehensive understanding of the 
role of finance company in business groups. Although that it is 
undeniable that allowing business groups to have finance companies 
may bring some economic benefits to firms, more attention should 
be put on how controlling abuse finance company as a tunneling 
vehicle to satisfy their own interest at the expense of the minority 
shareholders especially when accounting information and existing 
regulation is too poor to detect the tunneling activities. As a result, 
the cost of capital is expected to increase due to information 
asymmetry led by greater agency conflicts between the controlling 
shareholders and the minority shareholders. We argue that not only 
the minority shareholders, but also entire market will suffer if no 
further action is taken.  
Our study belongs to a substantial body of research that has studied 
the motivation behind earnings manipulation by the management. 
According to previous literatures, firms are motivated to use 
earnings management to influence the contractual outcomes for the 
purpose of avoiding earnings losses and decreases (Burgstahler and 
Dichev, 1997), meeting analyst expectations (Gunny, 2010), helping 
firms move toward their expected credit ratings (Alissa et al, 2013), 
maximizing managerial compensation (Cheng and Warfield, 2005, 
Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006), boosting stock price prior to 
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equity issuance (Teoh et al, 1998a, Teoh et al, 1998b), matching 
peer performance (Du and Shen, 2018), meeting certain regulatory 
requirements (Chen and Yuan, 2004), signaling favorable private 
information to the market around stock splits (Louis and Robinson, 
2005), signaling investment opportunities (Linck et al, 2013). The 
closest to our study is Liu and lu (2007), who argue that tunneling, 
although not being able to completely exclude other incentives, may 
be the key driver of the earnings management in the Chinese listed 
firms. Our study contributes to the literature by highlighting that it 
might be the privilege offered by finance company that drives 
Chinese listed firms to manage reported earnings to serve their own 
interests. 
This study is related to a voluminous literature on tunneling in 
business group. Our study adds to these literatures by discovering a 
new vehicle of tunneling: finance company. Bertrand et al (2002) 
argue that the ultimate shareholders of the pyramids have strong 
incentives to siphon resources from firms low down to the ones high 
up in the Indian pyramid. Bae et al (2002) show that the controlling 
shareholders of Korean chaebol firms benefit from making 
acquisitions, but minority shareholders of these firms suffer 
acquisitions, which is consistent with the tunneling hypothesis. 
Similarly, Baek et al (2006) claim that private securities offerings 
are used as a tunneling mechanism by controlling shareholders of 
Korean chaebol. A growing stream of empirical literature has shown 
tunneling evidence in China. Chen et al (2012) confirm the 
existence of tunneling in Chinese listed firms and argue that the 
non-tradeable reform can help to mitigate this agency conflicts 
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. A 
group of studies show evidence that controlling shareholders of 
Chinese listed firms use related-party transaction to conduct 
tunneling activities (Jiang et al, 2010, Jian and Wong 2010, Peng et 
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al, 2011). Jiang et al (2015) investigates the Non-Operational Fund 
Occupancy (or NOFO) behavior of controlling shareholders, 
providing evidence that such behavior comes from their tunneling 
motives. Our study extends the literature and discovers an on-going 
phenomenon that the owners of business groups with finance 
company use income-increasing discretionary-accruals to raise 
capital through equity issuance. The raised capital serves no 
investment purposes but was required to be deposited in finance 
companies which offers substantial private benefits to meet the 
tunneling motives of controlling shareholders. 
The remainder of the study proceeds as follows: Section 5.3 briefly 
introduce the institutional background. In Section 5.4 is our data, 
sample and measure description. Section 5.5 provides the main 
results and our endogeneity analysis. We conclude in Section 5.6. 
5.3 Institutional background 
5.3.1 Definition of business group 
Several attempts by academic practitioners have been made to the 
definition of a business group23 , however, it remains ambiguous 
since the concept of ‘business group’ inclines to an intuition notion 
rather than a judicial organizational form (Khanna and Rivkin 2001). 
To better account for the China’s institutional context, we employ 
the official definition in the Registration of Business Groups 
 
23 See Granovetter (1985); Keister (1998); He et al (2013); Khanna and Rivkin 
(2001); Khanna and Yafeh (2007); Almeida et al (2015) 
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Regulation by State Administration for Industry & Commerce of the 
People’s Republic of China (SAIC) in 198824. A business group is a 
federation of legally independent firms, which are bound together 
by ownership ties, operating under the control of a single parent, or 
core firm. 
Despite the ubiquity of business group in emerging markets and in 
many developed countries, the heterogeneity in the organizational 
forms of business group differs considerably from country to 
country, which could be attributable to different institutional and 
economic context. For example, American conglomerates are 
commonly referred as multi-segment firms that diverse in a set of 
distinct industries. Similarly, South Korean chaebols are broadly 
conceived as diversified firms dominated by wealth family, which 
are pyramidal in nature (Bae et al, 2002; Chang, 2003; Ferris et al, 
2003). Japanese keiretsus tie corporations in multiple industries, 
which enable affiliates to enjoy the privileged access to capital 
under a “main bank” system (Morck and Nakamura, 1999, 
Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 2002). Not surprisingly, business groups in 
China are also relatively large and well-diversified but have 
maintained a unique structural characteristic, namely, a state-
dominated rather than family-dominated structure (Keister, 1998). 
Hence, to fully capture the contextual difference across countries, it 
is arguably believed that research on the role of business group 
should be confined within a country-specific economic context 
(Greif, 2006). Further, the effect of business group may be time 
dependent as institutional context changes on an ongoing basis 
(Khanna and Palepu, 2000). 
 
24  The Registration of Business Groups Regulation specifies the quantitative 
requirements for registration of business group: 1) the aggregated registered 
capital of the core and other affiliated companies should be over 100 million yuan; 
2) All members of group are legally independent; 3) The parent, or core company 
should have the registered capital of over 50 million yuan and at least 5 affiliated 
companies. Moreover, business group is not recognized as a juridical person with 
legal rights and obligations. 
 
 
161 
5.3.2 Finance company in China 
Finance company in china is a legally independent non-banking 
financial institution supervised by China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC). According to the Amendment Business Group 
Financial Company Regulation25, Finance company is defined as a 
non-banking financial institution that is affiliated with a business 
group which operates domestically, facilitating the members of the 
business group with financial management services with an attempt 
to strengthen the centralized management of business group funds 
and therefore enhance the utilization efficiency of funds. Unlike a 
bank, FCs are generally not allowed to take deposits from or 
originate loans for the public. Instead, Finance company can only 
collect deposits from and provide credits to the members of the 
business group for commercial use. Besides, a finance company 
may be competent to enter the interbank bond market and lending 
market where surplus fund is invested and short-term fund is 
raised26. 
5.3.3 No.37 Memorandum of Disclosure Regulation in 2011 
 
25 The Business Group Financial Company Regulation was initially issued by 
People’s Bank of China (PBOC) on July 13, 2000. In December of 2006, China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) issued the Amendment of Business 
Group Financial Company Regulation. 
26 The Interbank Bond Market and Lending Market are the most important money 
markets in China established in 1996. It was not until the Finance Company Entry 
Regulation of the Interbank Bond Market and Lending Market Regulation 
released by PBOC in 2000 that a finance company, as an independent legal 
treasure entity affiliated with a business group, were eligible to apply for the 
membership of the Interbank Markets three years after its incorporation. The 
Finance Company Entry Regulation 2000 enables a qualified finance company to 
access interbank borrowing with the maximum maturity of 7 days. Meanwhile, 
The Finance Company Entry Regulation 2000 also allows a finance company to 
engage in bond trading in the interbank bond market. 
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In 2011, the Shenzhen stock exchange issued No.37 Memorandum 
of Disclosure Regulation on Related Transaction between Finance 
Companies and Listed Firms (hereafter, No.37 Memorandum). The 
No.37 Memorandum specifically applies to firms: 1) Listed in 
Shenzhen stock exchange. 2) Belong to a business group that has 
access to finance company. The No.37 Memorandum specifies the 
disclosure requirements for related transactions between listed firms 
and finance companies. Firms are required to disclose detailed 
transactions information if the maximum daily monetary funds they 
deposit in the affiliated finance company exceeds RMB 3 million or 
0.5% of the latest audited net assets in the latest period. Moreover, 
approvals from general meeting of all shareholders of the firm and 
timely disclosure is required if the maximum daily monetary funds 
they deposit in the affiliated finance company exceeds 30 million or 
5% of the latest audited net assets in the latest period. More 
importantly, the No.37 Memorandum prohibit the raised funds 
through security issuance to be deposited in the affiliated finance 
company. 
5.4 Data and sample 
5.4.1 Sample construction 
We construct our sample by selecting all non-financial firms listed 
in the Shanghai or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. We obtain stock 
price, ownership and accounting data from CSMAR. Our sample 
covers the period from 2007 to 2014. We hand-collect the 196 
finance company ownership data from the CBRC’s official 
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announcements27 by 2014. Following the study by Faccio and Lang 
(2002), we trace the ownership of listed firms and finance 
companies of any length via the National Enterprise Credit 
Information Publicity System28 until we find an owner whose legal 
registered name contains “Group”, “Holding” or “State Asset 
Management” alone the chain. Next, we identify whether a firm is 
affiliated with a finance company based on whether they share the 
same owner. Our final sample consists of 11,836 firm-year 
observations representing 1721 unique firms. Of these, 449 unique 
firms were associated with 180 finance companies29 during 2007 to 
2014. 
5.4.2 Earnings management measures 
This study focuses on discretionary accruals management. We 
follow the literature by Dechow et al (1995) and adopt the modified 
Jones model to estimate abnormal discretionary accruals as our 
earnings management measures. We also adjust for past 
performance based on the method employed by Kothari et al (2005) 
and Linck et al (2013). Specifically, we computer the following 
regression for all firms in our sample. 
 
27 Business groups need to submit application of intention to incorporate a finance 
company to CBRC. If the application for the incorporation of finance company is 
approved, the CBRC will post an announcement for approval on its official 
website which discloses the information in terms of ownership, management 
committee, the amount of capital stock and authorized line of business. 
28 See http://www.gsxt.gov.cn/index.html 
29 The rest 16 finance companies were either affiliated with business groups that 
do not have listed subsidiaries or owned by foreign business groups such as 
Hitachi, Panasonic and GE etc. 
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𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼(∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡) +
𝛽𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
Where 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 indicates total accrual of firm i in year t, which 
is calculated using the following equation. 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = (∆𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡) −
(∆𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡) − 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (2) 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡(𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡) = 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 − ?̂?(∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 −
∆𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡) − ?̂?𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 (3) 
In equation (2), 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 equals to change in current assets minus 
change in cash and cash equivalents minus the change in current 
liabilities excluding change in debt minus depreciation. Thus, we 
calculate the discretionary accruals (DA) based on equation (3), 
which is the 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 in equation (1). All variables in equation (1), (2) 
and (3) are scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year. We 
winsorize all variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to control for 
outliers. 
Following Linck et al (2013), we adjust discretionary accruals for 
past accounting performance. Precisely, in each year we divided 
firms within the same industry into ROA quartiles. We calculated 
the average discretionary accruals of firms excluding firm i in each 
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ROA quartile as the industry-benchmark discretionary accruals. We 
then calculated the abnormal discretionary accruals (AD_DA) as the 
firm’s discretionary accruals minus the industry_benchmark 
discretionary accruals as described in the following equation: 
𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡(𝐴𝐷_𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡) =
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 −
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 (4) 
Finally, we take the absolute value our discretionary accruals 
(AB_DA) to evaluate the magnitude of firm’s earnings management. 
 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡(𝐴𝐵_𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡) =
| 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡| (5) 
5.4.3 Descriptive statistics of sample 
Table 5.1 presents all the variables used in this study. Table 5.2 
reports descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study. 
AB_DA, DA and AD_DA are the three earnings management 
variables of interest. The mean (median) for AB_DA, DA and 
AD_DA are 11.66% (7.27%), 0.84% (-0.72%) and 0% (-1.20%), 
respectively. Table 5.3 presents the evolution of AB_DA, DA and 
AD_DA across years from 2007 to 2014. The mean (median) of 
AB_DA shows a decreasing trend during the sample period, 
suggesting that the overall magnitude of earnings management 
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declines over years. However, there are some fluctuations in the 
mean (median) of DA, which indicates the use of discretionary 
accruals may differ over time. 
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Table 5.1: Definition of variables 
Variable Definition 
Penal A: Earnings management measures 
AB_DA Absolute value of modified Jones discretionary accruals 
DA Modified Jones discretionary accruals 
AD_DA Performance-adjusted abnormal discretionary accruals 
Penal B: Firm Characteristics (Firm-Year Variation) 
Log (total assets) Logarithm of beginning of year total assets 
TobinQ Market value of equity plus book value of total liabilities, scaled by book value of total assets 
Leverage Ratio of total liabilities to total assets 
Cashflow Ratio of operating cash flow scaled by beginning of year total assets 
Cash Cash and cash equivalents scaled by beginning of year total assets 
Dividend Dividend payments scaled by beginning of year earnings 
Salegrowth The percentage change in sales from year t-1 to year t  
SOE Indicator variable that equals one if controlling shareholders is a government agency 
Control right Total shares as a percentage of total shares outstanding held by controlling shareholders 
CAPEX Capital expenditures on fixed assets scaled by beginning of year total assets 
ROA Net profit scaled by beginning of year total assets 
SHIBOR Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate with maturity of 1 year 
Equity issuance Cash flow proceeds from equity issuance scaled by beginning of year earnings 
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Table 5.2: Summary statistics of all variables 
This table presents descriptive statistics for all firm-level variables used in this study during the period of 2007 to 2014. 
AB_DA, DA and AD_DA are the earnings management proxies of interest in this study. AB_DA is the absolute value of 
modified Jones discretionary accruals. DA is the modified Jones discretionary accruals. AD_DA is the Performance-
adjusted abnormal discretionary accruals. The rest of variables are control variables used in regressions in this study. Log 
(total assets) is calculated as the logarithm of beginning of year total asset. TobinQ is the market value of equity plus 
book value of total liabilities, scaled by book value of total assets. Leverage is computed as total liabilities divided by 
total assets. Cashflow is the operating cash flow scaled by beginning of year total assets. Cash refers to cash and cash 
equivalents scaled by beginning of year total assets. Salegrowth is the percentage change in sales from year t-1 to year t. 
Dividend is the dividend payments scaled by beginning of year earnings. SOE is a dummy that equals one if controlling 
shareholders is a government agency. Control right is the total shares as a percentage of total shares outstanding held by 
controlling shareholders. All variables are calculated for each firm-year. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 
1% and 99% level. 
Variable N mean 5% 25% 50% 75% 90% sd 
AB_DA 11187 0.1166 0.0066 0.032 0.0727 0.1433 0.2546 0.149 
DA 11187 0.0084 -0.2305 -0.0758 -0.0072 0.0695 0.1744 0.189 
AD_DA 11187 0 -0.2413 -0.0844 -0.012 0.0641 0.1666 0.1864 
Log (total 
assets) 
11332 21.8705 20.0096 20.9815 21.745 22.6393 23.6048 1.2811 
TobinQ 11690 2.2669 1.0016 1.3665 1.8282 2.6373 3.9042 1.4143 
Leverage 11835 0.5126 0.1484 0.3524 0.515 0.6662 0.7763 0.2196 
Cashflow 11328 0.0521 -0.1057 0.0015 0.048 0.102 0.1644 0.1367 
Cash 11332 0.1977 0.0271 0.0867 0.1512 0.2587 0.4105 0.1631 
Salegrowth 11327 0.1077 -0.2046 -0.0142 0.0575 0.1678 0.3504 0.2751 
Dividend 11676 0.2204 0 0 0.1425 0.3235 0.536 0.2926 
SOE 11835 0.6619 0 0 1 1 1 0.4731 
Control right 11835 38.2875 15.11 25.54 36.98 50.03 60.1 15.7138 
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Table 5.3: Summary statistics of earnings management measures by year 
This table presents descriptive statistics for AB_DA, DA and AD_DA used in this study across sample years from 2007 to 2014. AB_DA is 
the absolute value of modified Jones discretionary accruals. DA is the modified Jones discretionary accruals. AD_DA is the Performance-
adjusted abnormal discretionary accruals. All variables are calculated for each firm-year.  
    AB_DA DA AD_DA 
year N mean median sd mean median sd mean median sd 
2007 1185 0.1335 0.086 0.1632 0.0032 -0.0135 0.2108 0 -0.0125 0.2069 
2008 1268 0.1289 0.0806 0.1668 -0.0006 -0.023 0.2108 0 -0.0164 0.2015 
2009 1296 0.1294 0.0796 0.1632 0.0085 -0.0079 0.2081 0 -0.0123 0.2045 
2010 1345 0.1254 0.0763 0.1612 0.0166 -0.0078 0.2036 0 -0.0161 0.2009 
2011 1450 0.1184 0.0753 0.15 0.0138 0.0074 0.1906 0 -0.0031 0.1928 
2012 1516 0.0992 0.0614 0.1295 0.0009 -0.0121 0.1632 0 -0.0119 0.1666 
2013 1560 0.1032 0.0622 0.1378 0.0233 0.0031 0.1706 0 -0.016 0.1685 
2014 1567 0.1044 0.0707 0.1202 -0.0001 -0.0087 0.1593 0 -0.0069 0.156 
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5.5 Empirical results 
5.5.1 Baseline regression 
In this section, we investigate the overall effect of accessing finance 
company on firms’ earnings management decision.  
Hypothesis (1). Firms are more likely to engage in earnings 
management through increasing discretionary accruals after they 
access to finance company. 
We suggest a tunneling story that accessing finance company 
facilities controlling shareholders’ tunnelling incentives by requiring 
their member firms to raise funds and deposit the raised funds in 
finance company where controlling shareholders can reap all the 
profits. To reduce the misspecification problem, we follow literature 
by Campello and Graham (2013) and Linck et al (2013) and control 
for other possible determinants of earnings management including 
firm size, Tobin’s Q, leverage, dividend ratio, cash flows, cash 
holdings, and sales growth. Previous studies suggest growth firms 
(high Tobin’s Q sales growth) have stronger incentives to manage 
earnings (McNichols, 2002; Skinner and Sloan, 2002). Dechow 
(1994) discovered a negative relationship between operating cash 
flow and earnings management. Leveraged firms may be more 
conservative in financial reporting because they maybe confront 
with more scrutiny from debtholders (Khan and Watts, 2009). We 
also control for firm size due to that larger firms relative to smaller 
firms are less likely to managing earnings because earnings 
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management behaviour of larger firms is more likely to be detected 
due to their higher political sensitivity (Zmijewski and Hagerman, 
1981). In addition, we also control for ownership structure to take 
the differences in state ownership V.S. private ownership and 
concentrated V.S. dispersed ownership in account, which may affect 
earnings management as suggested by Jo and Kim (2007) and Liu 
and lu (2007). We estimate the following regression: 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (6) 
Where dependent variables are absolute value of discretionary 
accruals ( 𝐴𝐵_𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡 ), discretionary accruals ( 𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡 ) and 
performance-adjusted abnormal discretionary accruals (𝐴𝐷_𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡). 
𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡  is an indicator variable which equals to one if firm i has 
affiliated with a finance company by year t. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡  control for a 
number of firm-specific characteristics that presumably affect the 
level of earnings management, including 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 (logarithm of 
beginning of year total asset), 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑖,𝑡  (Market value of equity 
plus book value of total liabilities, scaled by book value of total 
assets), 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡  (ratio of total liabilities to beginning of year 
total assets), 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 (net cash flow from operating activities 
scaled by beginning of year total asset), 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡  (cash and cash 
equivalents divided by beginning of year total asset),  𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡  (an 
indicator variable that equals one if controlling shareholders is a 
government agency), 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡  (dividend payments scaled by 
earnings), 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖,𝑡 (shares held by controlling shareholders 
as a percentage of total shares outstanding). In addition, year fixed 
effects and firm fixed effects are included in the regression. We 
cluster all standard errors at firm level. Our tunnelling story expects 
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a positive coefficient of 𝛽  for 𝐴𝐵_𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡 . Because earnings 
manipulation involves both positive and negative values of accruals, 
we expect a positive coefficient of 𝛽  for 𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡  and 𝐴𝐷_𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡 
because we believe that an increasing discretionary accrual helps 
firms attract more funds from the market. 
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Table 5.4: Correlation matrix 
This table presents correlation matrix for all firm-level variables used in this study during the period of 2007 to 2014. AB_DA, DA and AD_DA are the earnings management proxies of 
interest in this paper. AB_DA is the absolute value of modified Jones discretionary accruals. DA is the modified Jones discretionary accruals. AD_DA is the Performance-adjusted abnormal 
discretionary accruals. The rest of variables are control variables used in regressions in this paper. Log (total assets) is calculated as the logarithm of beginning of year total asset. TobinQ is 
the market value of equity plus book value of total liabilities, scaled by book value of total assets. Leverage is computed as total liabilities divided by total assets. Cashflow is the operating 
cash flow scaled by beginning of year total assets. Cash refers to cash and cash equivalents scaled by beginning of year total assets. Salegrowth is the percentage change in sales from year t-1 
to year t. Dividend is the dividend payments scaled by beginning of year earnings. SOE is a dummy that equals one if controlling shareholders is a government agency. Control right is the 
total shares as a percentage of total shares outstanding held by controlling shareholders. All variables are calculated for each firm-year. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 
99% level. 
  
AB_DA DA AD_DA 
Log(total 
asset) 
TobinQ Leverage Cashflow Cash Salegrowth Dividend SOE 
Control 
right 
AB_DA 1            
DA 0.4185 1           
AD_DA 0.3943 0.971 1          
Log(total asset) -0.1222 -0.0315 -0.0547 1         
TobinQ 0.057 -0.0133 -0.0092 -0.5413 1        
Leverage 0.1967 -0.0244 -0.01 0.2621 -0.1866 1       
Cashflow -0.0439 -0.3222 -0.3239 0.0102 0.0425 -0.1304 1      
Cash 0.1759 0.0843 0.0527 -0.1445 0.0979 -0.2692 0.2044 1     
Salegrowth 0.2764 0.0991 0.0778 -0.0369 0.0024 0.0462 0.1913 0.303 1    
Dividend -0.0887 0.0039 -0.0082 0.1119 -0.0852 -0.1948 0.0727 0.0973 -0.005 1   
SOE -0.0542 -0.0599 -0.0475 0.231 -0.1524 0.1164 0.038 -0.0728 -0.006 -0.0057 1  
Control right 0.0274 0.0427 0.0215 0.2553 -0.1113 -0.0209 0.0827 0.0655 0.0961 0.1399 0.1159 1 
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Table 5.5: The results of baseline regressions 
This table reports panel regression results of the overall impact of the presence of finance company on firm earnings management in the sample period 2007 to 2014. AB_DA, DA and AD_DA 
are the dependent variables. AB_DA is the absolute value of modified Jones discretionary accruals. DA is the modified Jones discretionary accruals. AD_DA is the Performance-adjusted 
abnormal discretionary accruals. FC is an indicator variable which equals to one if a firm has affiliated with a finance company. Log (total assets) is calculated as the logarithm of beginning of 
year total asset. TobinQ is the market value of equity plus book value of total liabilities, scaled by book value of total assets. Leverage is computed as total liabilities divided by total assets. 
Cashflow is the operating cash flow scaled by beginning of year total assets. Cash refers to cash and cash equivalents scaled by beginning of year total assets. Salegrowth is the percentage 
change in sales from year t-1 to year t. Dividend is the dividend payments scaled by beginning of year earnings. SOE is a dummy that equals one if controlling shareholders is a government 
agency. Control right is the total shares as a percentage of total shares outstanding held by controlling shareholders. Column (2), (5) and (7) controls for firm-fixed effects. In other columns 
except column (2), (5) and (7), firm-fixed and year-fixed effects are further controlled. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are shown in parentheses, *, ** and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  AB_DA DA AD_DA 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
FC 0.0381*** 0.0442*** 0.0305*** 0.0348*** 0.0448*** 0.0296*** 0.0335*** 0.0440*** 0.0302*** 
 (4.25) (5.93) (4.08) (3.03) (4.02) (2.65) (2.88) (3.88) (2.69)    
Log (total assets) -0.1024*** -0.0608*** -0.0776*** -0.0770*** -0.0554*** -0.0762*** -0.0684*** -0.0590*** -0.0768*** 
 (-16.07) (-13.36) (-13.58) (-8.56) (-8.26) (-8.36) (-7.66) (-8.83) (-8.41)    
TobinQ  -0.0126*** -0.0116***  -0.0155*** -0.0147***  -0.0185*** -0.0170*** 
  (-4.16) (-3.68)  (-3.78) (-3.44)  (-4.60) (-4.06)    
Leverage  0.1764*** 0.1829***  -0.1269*** -0.1239***  -0.0867*** -0.0823*** 
  (10.07) (10.49)  (-5.05) (-4.79)  (-3.45) (-3.19)    
Cashflow  -0.1007*** -0.1044***  -0.5816*** -0.5851***  -0.5803*** -0.5865*** 
  (-3.36) (-3.54)  (-13.26) (-13.41)  (-13.28) (-13.49)    
Cash  0.2635*** 0.2571***  0.1610*** 0.1417***  0.1363*** 0.1245*** 
  (13.00) (12.46)  (5.89) (5.11)  (5.02) (4.51)    
Salegrowth  0.1063*** 0.1084***  0.0764*** 0.0783***  0.0616*** 0.0653*** 
  (12.19) (12.33)  (5.71) (5.79)  (4.60) (4.82)    
Dividend  -0.0020 -0.0026  0.0028 0.0021  0.0034 0.0024    
  (-0.40) (-0.51)  (0.40) (0.30)  (0.47) (0.33)    
SOE  -0.0239 -0.0128  -0.0394* -0.0270  -0.0337 -0.0220    
  (-1.38) (-0.73)  (-1.68) (-1.13)  (-1.44) (-0.93)    
Control right  0.0014*** 0.0017***  0.0026*** 0.0028***  0.0022*** 0.0025*** 
  (3.75) (4.36)  (4.36) (4.70)  (3.70) (4.03)    
Constant 2.3135*** 1.2776*** 1.6008*** 1.6480*** 1.2310*** 1.6370*** 1.4597*** 1.3058*** 1.6465*** 
 (16.99) (12.45) (12.99) (8.56) (8.24) (8.42) (7.64) (8.74) (8.44)    
Year fixed effect yes no yes yes yes no yes no yes 
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Firm fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
N 11187 10975 10975 11187 10975 10975 11187 10975 10975    
adj. R-sq 0.0975 0.2242 0.2333 0.0298 0.1767 0.1844 0.0214 0.1660 0.1712    
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Table 5.5 tabulates results from estimating (6). We find strong 
evidence that firms increase the involvement of earnings 
management after they access to finance company given the 
coefficients on FC indictors for all earnings management measures 
are positive and significant in all specifications. For example, in 
Column (3), the coefficient for the reform indicator variable is 3.05% 
(t-statistic=4.08, significant at better than the 1% level), suggesting 
the prevalence of earnings management in the aftermath of 
accessing finance company. Column (6) and (9) show that the 
coefficients on FC are 2.96% (t-statistic=2.65) and 3.02% (t-
statistic=2.69), which show evidence that finance company affiliated 
firms manipulate earnings upward. These results are consistent with 
our tunnelling conjunction of impact of the presence of finance 
company on firms’ earnings management. Our evidence is 
consistent with the work conducted by Liu and Lu (2007). 
5.5.2 Endogeneity tests: difference-in-differences approach 
Our research design suffers the concerns that both the decision to 
access finance company and to frequently manage earnings using 
increasing accruals can be endogenous responses to forces in firms’ 
operating environments that are unobservable to us. To alleviate this 
endogeneity concern caused by reverse causality or omitted 
variables, we use the experiment introduced by the No.37 
Memorandum of Disclosure Regulation to examine effect of 
improving transparency in the transaction between finance company 
and affiliated firms on firms’ earnings management decision. In 
general, increased transparency reduces information asymmetry and 
help investors recognize tunnelling by controlling shareholders, 
which results in less earnings management led by tunnelling 
incentives (Jo and Kim, 2007). Therefore, the experiment is well 
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suited for our research question, as it facilitates difference-in-
differences comparisons of treated firms (firms with access to 
finance company and listed in Shenzhen stock exchange) V.S. 
control firms (all firms except treated firms in our sample) before 
and after the adoption the No.37 Memorandum of Disclosure 
Regulation. If finance company represents a tunnelling mechanism 
through which firms opportunistically manage earnings, we would 
expect a weakened effect of the presence of finance company on 
earnings management for treated firms. Our difference-in-
differences model is specified as follows: 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜃𝐹𝐶_𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2011𝑖,𝑡+𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 +
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (7) 
Where 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡  is the three earnings management proxies of 
this study’s interest. We only consider firms with constant status of 
having access to finance company or no access at all throughout the 
whole sample period. We modified our FC indicator by cleaning all 
pre-access firm observations to make it time-invariant across our 
sample period, as proxied by 𝐹𝐶_𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 . 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2011𝑖,𝑡  is the 
time dummy which is equal to 1 in the years after 2011 and 0 
otherwise. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡  represents a set of firm-specific earnings 
management determinants as controlled in our baseline regression. 
A significantly negative coefficient on the interaction term of 
𝐹𝐶_𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2011𝑖,𝑡  would provide evidence in support 
of our tunneling prediction. 
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Table 5.6: The results of difference-in-differences analysis 
This table reports panel regression results of the impact of 2011 No.37 Memorandum of Disclosure Regulation as 
an exogenous shock on firms’ earnings management by using a difference-in-differences approach. AB_DA, DA 
and AD_DA are the dependent variables. AB_DA is the absolute value of modified Jones discretionary accruals. 
DA is the modified Jones discretionary accruals. AD_DA is the Performance-adjusted abnormal discretionary 
accruals. FC_modified is a time-invariant indicator variable which equals to one if a firm has affiliated with a 
finance company. Post2011 is is the time dummy which is equal to 1 in the years after 2011 and 0 otherwise. Log 
(total assets) is calculated as the logarithm of beginning of year total asset. TobinQ is the market value of equity 
plus book value of total liabilities, scaled by book value of total assets. Leverage is computed as total liabilities 
divided by total assets. Cashflow is the operating cash flow scaled by beginning of year total assets. Cash refers to 
cash and cash equivalents scaled by beginning of year total assets. Salegrowth is the percentage change in sales 
from year t-1 to year t. Dividend is the dividend payments scaled by beginning of year earnings. SOE is a dummy 
that equals one if controlling shareholders is a government agency. Control right is the total shares as a 
percentage of total shares outstanding held by controlling shareholders. In all columns, firm-fixed and year-fixed 
effects are further controlled. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are shown in parentheses, *, ** 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  AB_DA DA AD_DA 
FC_modified*Post2011 -0.0249** -0.0286** -0.0338*** 
 (-2.40) (-2.22) (-2.66)    
Log (total assets) -0.0658*** -0.0740*** -0.0726*** 
 (-12.94) (-8.51) (-8.50)    
TobinQ -0.0099*** -0.0122*** -0.0138*** 
 (-3.49) (-3.12) (-3.70)    
Leverage 0.1692*** -0.1122*** -0.0734*** 
 (10.17) (-4.76) (-3.13)    
Cashflow -0.0897*** -0.5426*** -0.5419*** 
 (-3.76) (-14.87) (-15.11)    
Cash 0.2206*** 0.1041*** 0.0850*** 
 (12.58) (4.34) (3.65)    
Salegrowth 0.0943*** 0.0775*** 0.0621*** 
 (12.05) (6.33) (5.20)    
Dividend -0.0042 -0.0012 -0.0013    
 (-0.93) (-0.18) (-0.19)    
SOE -0.0050 -0.0173 -0.0086    
 (-0.32) (-0.92) (-0.48)    
Control right 0.0013*** 0.0028*** 0.0024*** 
 (3.69) (5.40) (4.59)    
Constant 1.3766*** 1.5821*** 1.5512*** 
 (12.50) (8.46) (8.41)    
Year fixed effect yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effect yes yes yes 
N 10003 10003 10003    
adj. R-sq 0.2147 0.1933 0.1787    
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We present the results of our difference-in-differences in columns (1) 
to (3) of Table 5.6. In all columns, the coefficients of interaction 
term are negative and significant at the 5% level or above, 
suggesting that the impact of the presence of finance company on 
earnings management is decreased and implying the disclosure 
requirement specific to firms with access to finance company 
reduced tunnelling induced earnings management behaviours by 
their controlling shareholders. 
5.6 Direct evidence of tunnelling mechanism 
5.6.1 Does higher profitability of finance company motivate 
firms to manage earnings? 
We perform analyses to provide direct evidence on the mechanisms 
through which the presence of finance company affects firms’ 
earnings management. In this section, we consider whether higher 
profitability of finance company could enhance controlling 
shareholders’ tunnelling incentives and thus increase the earnings 
management behaviours. Because almost half of total assets of 
finance companies is interbank deposit (the amount of funds placed 
by finance companies on other banks or financial institutions)30, the 
interbank deposits provide a substantial amount of profits for 
finance companies. Our intuition lies on that if the interbank 
deposits can produce a higher profit margin than firms’ operational 
investments, controlling shareholders would have higher incentives 
 
30 According to statistics from China National Association of Finance Companies 
(CNAFC) The amount of interbank deposit as a percentage of total assets for the 
all finance companies in China accounts for 37.38% (2014), 43.05% (2015), 44.33% 
(2016), 39.44% (2017) and 38.40% (2018), respectively. Data source: 
http://www.cnafc.org/ 
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to divert firms’ funds to finance company and lend the funds to 
interbank market instead of investing these funds to projects with 
lower returns. In line with this view, we hypothesize that higher rate 
of return on interbank deposits than firms’ investments is associated 
with higher tunnelling incentives and hence more earnings 
management behaviours. We estimate the following equation to test 
this hypothesis. 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿(𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (8) 
Where 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡  is the three variables of interest. 
𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡  is proxied as the difference between 1-year 
interbank Shibor rate and firm i’s ROA in n-1 year. Our focus is the 
coefficient of δ, which captures that to what extent the impact of the 
presence of finance company is dependent on the excess return. We 
expect a positive coefficient on the interaction term. 
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Table 5.7: Direct evidence: Relative profitability of finance company 
This table reports the variation of relative profitability of finance company in the effects of the presence of finance 
company on earnings management during the sample period of 2007 to 2014. AB_DA, DA and AD_DA are the 
dependent variables. AB_DA is the absolute value of modified Jones discretionary accruals. DA is the modified 
Jones discretionary accruals. AD_DA is the Performance-adjusted abnormal discretionary accruals. Excess return 
is proxied as the difference between 1-year interbank Shibor rate and firm i’s ROA in n-1 year, which captures the 
relative profitability of finance company. Log (total assets) is calculated as the logarithm of beginning of year 
total asset. TobinQ is the market value of equity plus book value of total liabilities, scaled by book value of total 
assets. Leverage is computed as total liabilities divided by total assets. Cashflow is the operating cash flow scaled 
by beginning of year total assets. Cash refers to cash and cash equivalents scaled by beginning of year total assets. 
Salegrowth is the percentage change in sales from year t-1 to year t. Dividend is the dividend payments scaled by 
beginning of year earnings. SOE is a dummy that equals one if controlling shareholders is a government agency. 
Control right is the total shares as a percentage of total shares outstanding held by controlling shareholders. In all 
columns, firm-fixed and year-fixed effects are further controlled. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level 
and are shown in parentheses, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  AB_DA DA AD_DA 
FC 0.0081 -0.0091 -0.0078    
 (1.50) (-1.15) (-0.97)    
Excess return -0.0459* -0.2403*** -0.2277*** 
 (-1.70) (-4.59) (-4.46)    
FC*Excess return 0.0890** 0.2094** 0.1947**  
 (2.11) (2.31) (2.12)    
Log (total assets) -0.0497*** -0.0374*** -0.0360*** 
 (-17.11) (-6.58) (-6.29)    
TobinQ -0.0077*** -0.0066* -0.0081**  
 (-4.36) (-1.95) (-2.43)    
Leverage 0.1232*** -0.1385*** -0.1055*** 
 (9.80) (-6.68) (-5.09)    
Cashflow -0.0354** -0.7191*** -0.7329*** 
 (-2.14) (-17.18) (-17.02)    
Cash 0.0678*** -0.1055*** -0.1301*** 
 (4.29) (-4.06) (-4.97)    
Salegrowth 0.0000*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
 (6.77) (5.89) (5.26)    
Dividend -0.0012 0.0050 0.0042    
 (-0.33) (0.84) (0.73)    
SOE 0.0009 -0.0208 -0.0140    
 (0.07) (-1.48) (-1.02)    
Control right 0.0010*** 0.0018*** 0.0013*** 
 (4.16) (4.98) (3.61)    
Constant 1.0888*** 0.8875*** 0.8582*** 
 (17.09) (7.15) (6.87)    
Year fixed effect yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effect yes yes yes 
N 10975 10975 10975    
adj. R-sq 0.0687 0.1819 0.1811    
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Table 5.7 presents the regression results. We find that the 
coefficients of the interaction term are significantly positive for all 
of our earnings management measures. In general, the results 
support our hypothesis that the larger excess return on interbank 
deposit over firm last year’s ROA representing higher tunnelling 
benefits would result in an increase in the level of earnings 
management. 
5.6.2 The effect of widen divergence of cash-flow right and 
control on the relationship between the presence of finance 
company and earnings management? 
Fan and Wong (2002) found that the informativeness of accounting 
earnings is positively associated with controlling shareholders’ 
divergence of cash-flow right and control right in a pyramidal 
structure. They inferred that a pyramid structure or cross-
shareholding allows the controlling shareholders to obtain control 
rights with lower equity investments, which causes a separation in 
control (voting rights) and ownership (cash flow rights). In this 
situation, controlling shareholders are more inclined to extract 
wealth from the firms using earnings management but only bear a 
fraction of the cost. We incorporate their inference into our finance 
company setting and argue that finance company exacerbates the 
entrenchment problem of controlling shareholders if finance 
company does offer supports to their tunneling activities. Based on 
the above, we hypothesize that controlling shareholders’ divergence 
of cash-flow right and control right would increase their 
participation in earnings management after having access to finance 
company. We test this hypothesis using the following estimation. 
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𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿(𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (9) 
We use shares held by controlling shareholders as a percentage of 
total shares outstanding (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ) to reflect the level of 
divergence between control and cash flow right. A significantly 
negative coefficient of 𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖,𝑡 would lend support 
to our hypothesis. 
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Table 5.8: Direct evidence: Divergence of cash-flow right and control right 
This table reports the variation of divergence of cash-flow right and control of controlling shareholders in the 
effects of the presence of finance company on earnings management during the sample period of 2007 to 2014. 
AB_DA, DA and AD_DA are the dependent variables. AB_DA is the absolute value of modified Jones 
discretionary accruals. DA is the modified Jones discretionary accruals. AD_DA is the Performance-adjusted 
abnormal discretionary accruals. Control right is the total shares as a percentage of total shares outstanding held 
by controlling shareholders, which captures the divergence of cash-flow right and control of controlling 
shareholders. Log (total assets) is calculated as the logarithm of beginning of year total asset. TobinQ is the 
market value of equity plus book value of total liabilities, scaled by book value of total assets. Leverage is 
computed as total liabilities divided by total assets. Cashflow is the operating cash flow scaled by beginning of 
year total assets. Cash refers to cash and cash equivalents scaled by beginning of year total assets. Salegrowth is 
the percentage change in sales from year t-1 to year t. Dividend is the dividend payments scaled by beginning of 
year earnings. SOE is a dummy that equals one if controlling shareholders is a government agency. In all columns, 
firm-fixed and year-fixed effects are further controlled. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are 
shown in parentheses, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3)    
 AB_DA DA AD_DA 
FC 0.0682*** 0.0679*** 0.0381**  
 (3.45) (2.65) (2.25)    
FC*Control right -0.0010** -0.0012* -0.0007*   
 (-2.25) (-1.94) (-1.83)    
Log (total assets) -0.1026*** -0.0686*** -0.0239*** 
 (-19.46) (-8.59) (-5.58)    
TobinQ -0.0193*** -0.0145*** -0.0055**  
 (-6.11) (-3.31) (-2.24)    
Leverage 0.1654*** -0.1556*** -0.1186*** 
 (9.07) (-6.31) (-7.65)    
Cashflow -0.1038*** -0.8113*** -0.6408*** 
 (-3.61) (-16.42) (-17.47)    
Cash 0.1116*** -0.0968*** -0.1094*** 
 (4.83) (-3.14) (-5.20)    
Salegrowth 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0001*** 
 (6.38) (6.98) (8.11)    
Dividend 0.0005 0.0076 0.0059    
 (0.12) (1.18) (1.19)    
SOE -0.0099 -0.0365* -0.0115    
 (-0.53) (-1.77) (-1.02)    
Control right 0.0025*** 0.0029*** 0.0012*** 
 (6.17) (5.36) (4.14)    
Constant 2.1833*** 1.5587*** 0.5871*** 
 (19.06) (8.99) (6.29)    
Year fixed effect yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effect yes yes yes 
N 10975 10975 10975    
adj. R-sq 0.1345 0.1963 0.1872    
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Table 5.8 presents regression results. The coefficients for 
FC∗Control right on the three earnings management measures are 
6.82% (t-value 3.45), 6.79% (t-value 3.65) and 3.81% (t-value 2.25) 
respectively. This indicates that finance company to inhibit earnings 
management is enhanced when control is evidently separate from 
cash-flow right. Henceforth, our hypothesis is supported. 
5.6.3 Do more entrenched controlling shareholders conduct 
more earnings management after accessing finance company? 
In this section, following Khanna and Yafeh (2005) and Jian and 
Wong (2010), we use related transactions between subsidiaries and 
parents to capture the magnitude of the controlling shareholders’ 
entrenchment. We argue that controlling shareholders using related 
transactions to prop up resources are essentially more entrenched. 
This entrenchment effect reflected in their earnings management 
decision will be stronger once they access to finance company. We 
rely on the following estimation to test this hypothesis. 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛿(𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 +
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (10) 
Where 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 , 𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡  and 𝑋𝑖,𝑡  remain the same as in our 
baseline regression. We obtain related party transaction from 
CSMAR database. We only consider transactions between listed 
firm and the parent firm (or its affiliates) and scaled the amount of 
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the transactions by beginning of the year total assets. 𝛿 captures how 
the differential earnings management response to the presence of 
finance company is dependent on the severity of controlling 
shareholders’ entrenchment. 
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Table 5.9: Direct evidence: Entrenchment of controlling shareholders 
This table reports the variation of entrenchment of controlling shareholders in the effects of the presence of finance 
company on earnings management during the sample period of 2007 to 2014. AB_DA, DA and AD_DA are the 
dependent variables. AB_DA is the absolute value of modified Jones discretionary accruals. DA is the modified 
Jones discretionary accruals. AD_DA is the Performance-adjusted abnormal discretionary accruals. Related 
transaction is the aggregated amount of transactions between listed firm and the parent firm (or its affiliates) 
scaled by beginning of the year total assets. which proxies the magnitude of entrenchment of controlling 
shareholders’ propping. Log (total assets) is calculated as the logarithm of beginning of year total asset. TobinQ 
is the market value of equity plus book value of total liabilities, scaled by book value of total assets. Leverage is 
computed as total liabilities divided by total assets. Cashflow is the operating cash flow scaled by beginning of 
year total assets. Cash refers to cash and cash equivalents scaled by beginning of year total assets. Salegrowth is 
the percentage change in sales from year t-1 to year t. Dividend is the dividend payments scaled by beginning of 
year earnings. SOE is a dummy that equals one if controlling shareholders is a government agency. Control right 
is the total shares as a percentage of total shares outstanding held by controlling shareholders. In all columns, firm-
fixed and year-fixed effects are further controlled. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are shown 
in parentheses, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3)    
  AB_DA DA AD_DA 
FC 0.0242*** 0.0170* 0.0168*   
 (3.28) (1.83) (1.84)    
Related transaction 0.0009** 0.0007** 0.0007**  
 (2.53) (2.03) (2.02)    
FC*Related transaction 0.0720*** 0.1146*** 0.1142*** 
 (5.48) (3.55) (3.44)    
Log (total assets) -0.1010*** -0.0670*** -0.0594*** 
 (-19.18) (-8.63) (-7.95)    
TobinQ -0.0187*** -0.0105** -0.0104**  
 (-5.81) (-2.45) (-2.56)    
Leverage 0.1651*** -0.1528*** -0.1191*** 
 (8.98) (-6.10) (-4.90)    
Cashflow -0.1079*** -0.9866*** -0.9988*** 
 (-3.87) (-30.83) (-32.46)    
Cash 0.1132*** -0.0668** -0.0920*** 
 (4.89) (-2.24) (-3.20)    
Salegrowth 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
 (7.20) (8.65) (8.21)    
Dividend 0.0008 0.0080 0.0077    
 (0.17) (1.25) (1.24)    
SOE -0.0093 -0.0335* -0.0259    
 (-0.50) (-1.65) (-1.38)    
Control right 0.0023*** 0.0026*** 0.0020*** 
 (5.75) (4.97) (3.98)    
Constant 2.1570*** 1.5221*** 1.3599*** 
 (18.77) (9.00) (8.36)    
Year fixed effect yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effect yes yes yes 
N 10975 10975 10975    
adj. R-sq 0.1338 0.2078 0.2036    
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Results are shown in Table 5.9 in Column (1) to (3). As expected, 
for all earnings management measures, we generate a positive 
coefficient for FC∗Related transaction with a significance level of 
1%. We interpret the results supporting our prediction that accessing 
finance company results in less creditability of accounting 
information reported by firms controlled more entrenched 
controlling shareholders. 
5.6.4 The impact of finance company on external financing and 
investment 
Our evidences so far suggest that the presence of finance company 
inhibit firms’ earnings management behaviors. Our inference lies on 
that controlling shareholders have strong incentives to require their 
subsidiaries to raise external financing through equity issuance and 
to deposit the raised funds in finance company for tunneling purpose 
instead of investment purpose. The use of discretionary accruals can 
raise the stock price and reduce the cost of equity for firms, enabling 
firms to generate more funds from equity issuance. To test the 
validity of this argument, we examine firms’ financing behaviors 
and investment decision after having access to finance company. 
We re-visit our baseline model using cash flow generated from 
equity issuance and capital expenditure as dependent variables. 
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Table 5.10: Finance company, external financing and investments 
This table reports panel regression results of the impact of accessing finance company on external financing and 
investment. The dependent variable in Column (1) is Equity issuance, which is the cash flow proceeds from 
equity issuance scaled by beginning of year earnings. The dependent variable in Column (2) is CAPEX, which is 
Capital expenditures on fixed assets scaled by beginning of year total assets. Log (total assets) is calculated as the 
logarithm of beginning of year total asset. TobinQ is the market value of equity plus book value of total liabilities, 
scaled by book value of total assets. Leverage is computed as total liabilities divided by total assets. Cashflow is 
the operating cash flow scaled by beginning of year total assets. Cash refers to cash and cash equivalents scaled by 
beginning of year total assets. Salegrowth is the percentage change in sales from year t-1 to year t. Dividend is the 
dividend payments scaled by beginning of year earnings. SOE is a dummy that equals one if controlling 
shareholders is a government agency. Control right is the total shares as a percentage of total shares outstanding 
held by controlling shareholders. In all columns, firm-fixed and year-fixed effects are further controlled. The 
standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are shown in parentheses, *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2)    
 Equity issuance CAPEX   
FC 0.0115** 0.0010    
 (2.32) (0.20)    
Log (total assets) -0.0415*** -0.0311*** 
 (-9.14) (-10.77)    
TobinQ -0.0172*** -0.0085*** 
 (-9.73) (-6.16)    
Leverage -0.1759*** -0.0087    
 (-12.56) (-0.97)    
Cashflow -0.0495*** 0.0485*** 
 (-2.88) (4.75)    
Cash 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 
 (10.88) (5.05)    
Salegrowth 0.0330*** 0.0411*** 
 (5.74) (10.30)    
Dividend 0.0097** 0.0030    
 (2.43) (1.16)    
SOE -0.0001 -0.0034    
 (-0.01) (-0.41)    
Control right -0.0009*** 0.0008*** 
 (-3.14) (3.94)    
Constant 1.0893*** 0.7328*** 
 (10.62) (11.75)    
Year fixed effect yes yes 
Firm fixed effect yes yes 
N 11107 11107    
adj. R-sq 0.1070 0.1411    
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Table 5.10 Column (1) and (2) report the results of regressions. The 
coefficient for the FC indicator in Column (1) is 1.15 with a t-value 
of 2.32, suggesting that having access to finance companies results 
in greater external financing via equity issuance. In Column (2) 
reports the coefficients for CAPEX. We find no statistically reliable 
difference in capital expenditure before and after firms access 
finance company, indicating that the raised funds serve no 
investment purpose as we predicted. 
5.7 Sensitivity to alternation explanations 
5.7.1 Are our results driven by changes in managerial 
compensation? 
It is believed that managerial compensation could be the key driver 
to an increasing earnings management (Cheng and Warfield, 2005). 
Managers could use discretionary accrual to manipulate reported 
earnings upward if their compensation is stickily tied to firms’ 
performance (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). Finance company 
could be not only an intra-group bank but also an independent 
financial department of the group. Therefore, it could be case that 
compensation of CEO becomes more dependent on the performance 
of the firms after firms access to finance company because finance 
company might be endowed to have responsibility for managing the 
member firms’ budget (including managerial compensation) on 
behave of the parent company. The adoption of a more marketized 
compensation scheme based on the performance after accessing 
finance company could invalid our tunnelling explanation. We test 
this hypothesis by incorporating proxies (CEOs’ remuneration and 
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option holdings) that capture the cross-sectional variation in 
managerial compensation. 
Table 5.11 show that managerial compensation including CEOs’ 
remuneration and option holdings has no significant influence on 
changes in earnings management after firms access to finance 
company, thus providing evidence against the hypothesis that the 
increasing earning managements after access to finance companies 
stems from managerial compensation maximization motivation.  
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Table 5.11: Alternative explanation: Managerial compensation maximization 
This table reports the variation of CEOs’ compensation in the effects of the presence of finance company on 
earnings management during the sample period of 2007 to 2014. AB_DA, DA and AD_DA are the dependent 
variables. AB_DA is the absolute value of modified Jones discretionary accruals. DA is the modified Jones 
discretionary accruals. AD_DA is the Performance-adjusted abnormal discretionary accruals. Salary in Penal A is 
the reported CEOs’ annual salary scaled by the beginning of year earnings. Option in Penal B refers to the option 
holdings held by CEOs as a percentage of firm’s total share outstanding. Log (total assets) is calculated as the 
logarithm of beginning of year total asset. TobinQ is the market value of equity plus book value of total liabilities, 
scaled by book value of total assets. Leverage is computed as total liabilities divided by total assets. Cashflow is 
the operating cash flow scaled by beginning of year total assets. Cash refers to cash and cash equivalents scaled by 
beginning of year total assets. Salegrowth is the percentage change in sales from year t-1 to year t. Dividend is the 
dividend payments scaled by beginning of year earnings. SOE is a dummy that equals one if controlling 
shareholders is a government agency. Control right is the total shares as a percentage of total shares outstanding 
held by controlling shareholders. In all columns, firm-fixed and year-fixed effects are further controlled. The 
standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are shown in parentheses, *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  Penal A: Remuneration Penal B: Option holdings 
 (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6) 
  AB_DA DA AD_DA AB_DA DA AD_DA 
FC 0.0279* 0.0379** 0.0436**  0.0258 0.0364** 0.0437**  
 (1.75) (2.22) (2.54)    (1.53) (2.10) (2.48)    
Salary -0.0371*** -0.0146 -0.0101       
 (-2.69) (-0.66) (-0.50)       
FC*salary -0.0280 -0.0536 -0.0063       
 (-0.51) (-0.49) (-0.06)       
Option    0.0035* 0.0004 -0.0012    
    (1.83) (0.18) (-0.56)    
FC*Option    0.4858 0.0920 -0.0842    
    (1.09) (0.21) (-0.17)    
Log (total assets) -0.1209*** -0.0908*** -0.0795*** -0.1208*** -0.0905*** -0.0792*** 
 (-9.08) (-4.78) (-4.30)    (-9.07) (-4.75) (-4.27)    
TobinQ -0.0167*** 0.0004 -0.0009    -0.0166*** 0.0004 -0.0009    
 (-3.03) (0.06) (-0.15)    (-2.98) (0.07) (-0.15)    
Leverage 0.1569*** -0.1545*** -0.1144*** 0.1563*** -0.1561*** -0.1157*** 
 (3.75) (-3.52) (-2.59)    (3.72) (-3.55) (-2.60)    
Cashflow -0.1647** -1.0713*** -1.0824*** -0.1599** -1.0691*** -1.0828*** 
 (-2.40) (-12.93) (-12.65)    (-2.35) (-12.83) (-12.60)    
Cash 0.0298 -0.2232*** -0.2350*** 0.0249 -0.2246*** -0.2344*** 
 (0.58) (-3.04) (-3.26)    (0.48) (-3.05) (-3.24)    
Salegrowth 0.0063*** 0.0098*** 0.0089*** 0.0064*** 0.0098*** 0.0089*** 
 (3.03) (5.64) (4.82)    (3.06) (5.59) (4.80)    
Dividend 0.0026 -0.0045 -0.0105    -0.0016 -0.0070 -0.0116    
 (0.24) (-0.27) (-0.66)    (-0.15) (-0.44) (-0.74)    
SOE 0.0504* 0.0333 0.0287    0.0506* 0.0332 0.0287    
 (1.83) (1.26) (1.13)    (1.82) (1.26) (1.13)    
Control right 0.0018* 0.0012 0.0011    0.0018* 0.0012 0.0011    
 (1.76) (1.12) (0.92)    (1.75) (1.10) (0.91)    
Constant 2.6245*** 2.0852*** 1.8232*** 2.6213*** 2.0809*** 1.8194*** 
 (8.85) (4.98) (4.47)    (8.83) (4.96) (4.45)    
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
N 1908 1908 1908    1908 1908 1908    
adj. R-sq 0.2282 0.2846 0.2803    0.2279 0.2844 0.2804    
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5.7.2 Are our results driven by greater sensitivity to investment 
opportunities? 
Finance company is initially designed to promote the liquidity of the 
member firms through funds reallocation within groups, enabling 
firms to be more sensitive to investment opportunities. The greater 
sensitivity to investment opportunities resulted from accessing 
finance company may induce firm’s strategic accrual reporting. 
Linck et al (2013) argue that managers may use discretionary 
accruals to credibly signal positive prospects to the market, enabling 
it to raise more capital to support the optimal investment projects. In 
this respect, one would expect that the use of discretionary accruals 
is strategic response to firm’s growth opportunities after having 
access to finance company, which challenges our tunnelling 
speculation on the relationship between the presence of finance 
company and firms’ earnings management. 
However, our results in Table 5.12 fail to support this alternative 
explanation. The coefficients of interaction terms between the FC 
indicator and proxies of investment opportunities (TobinQ and 
Salegrowth) are insignificantly different from zero, suggesting no 
evidence of strategic accrual reporting due to greater sensitivity to 
investment opportunities after they access to finance company. 
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Table 5.12: Alternative explanation: Signaling investment opportunities 
This table reports the variation of investment opportunities in the effects of the presence of finance company on 
earnings management during the sample period of 2007 to 2014. AB_DA, DA and AD_DA are the dependent 
variables. AB_DA is the absolute value of modified Jones discretionary accruals. DA is the modified Jones 
discretionary accruals. AD_DA is the Performance-adjusted abnormal discretionary accruals. Log (total assets) is 
calculated as the logarithm of beginning of year total asset. We use TobinQ and Salegrowth to capture the 
investment opportunities. TobinQ is the market value of equity plus book value of total liabilities, scaled by book 
value of total assets. Salegrowth is the percentage change in sales from year t-1 to year t. Leverage is computed as 
total liabilities divided by total assets. Cashflow is the operating cash flow scaled by beginning of year total assets. 
Cash refers to cash and cash equivalents scaled by beginning of year total assets. Dividend is the dividend 
payments scaled by beginning of year earnings. SOE is a dummy that equals one if controlling shareholders is a 
government agency. Control right is the total shares as a percentage of total shares outstanding held by 
controlling shareholders. In all columns, firm-fixed and year-fixed effects are further controlled. The standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level and are shown in parentheses, *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
   Penal A: TobinQ  Penal B: Salegrowth 
 (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6) 
  AB_DA DA AD_DA AB_DA DA AD_DA 
FC 0.0156 0.0259* 0.0236* 0.0259*** 0.0167* 0.0163*   
 (1.41) (1.87) (1.75) (3.77) (1.86) (1.84)    
FC*TobinQ 0.0068 -0.0027 -0.0017                
 (1.43) (-0.47) (-0.30)                
FC*Salegrowth    0.0147 0.0343 0.0336    
    (0.85) (1.20) (1.23)    
Log (total assets) -0.0783*** -0.0579*** -0.0543*** -0.0782*** -0.0581*** -0.0545*** 
 (-16.29) (-7.94) (-7.72) (-16.27) (-7.96) (-7.74)    
TobinQ -0.0137*** -0.0074* -0.0084** -0.0126*** -0.0077* -0.0086**  
 (-4.65) (-1.71) (-2.04) (-4.38) (-1.92) (-2.25)    
Leverage 0.1499*** -0.1623*** -0.1261*** 0.1489*** -0.1627*** -0.1265*** 
 (9.11) (-6.68) (-5.28) (9.05) (-6.70) (-5.30)    
Cashflow -0.1433*** -1.0033*** -1.0102*** -0.1424*** -1.0040*** -1.0107*** 
 (-5.19) (-31.54) (-32.89) (-5.16) (-31.60) (-32.94)    
Cash 0.1114*** -0.0686** -0.0932*** 0.1102*** -0.0689** -0.0937*** 
 (5.02) (-2.32) (-3.27) (4.97) (-2.33) (-3.27)    
Salegrowth 0.1166*** 0.0604*** 0.0418*** 0.1132*** 0.0520*** 0.0337**  
 (14.59) (4.92) (3.53) (12.22) (3.69) (2.47)    
Dividend 0.0002 0.0078 0.0075 0.0003 0.0074 0.0072    
 (0.04) (1.22) (1.21) (0.06) (1.15) (1.14)    
SOE -0.0076 -0.0302 -0.0227 -0.0075 -0.0307 -0.0232    
 (-0.47) (-1.56) (-1.24) (-0.46) (-1.58) (-1.27)    
Control right 0.0017*** 0.0023*** 0.0018*** 0.0017*** 0.0024*** 0.0019*** 
 (4.87) (4.72) (3.81) (4.89) (4.77) (3.86)    
Constant 1.6650*** 1.3212*** 1.2466*** 1.6627*** 1.3270*** 1.2517*** 
 (15.98) (8.34) (8.13) (15.95) (8.39) (8.18)    
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
N 10975 10975 10975 10975 10975 10975    
adj. R-sq 0.1828 0.2111 0.2033 0.1826 0.2115 0.2038    
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5.7.3 Are our results driven by political reasons? 
Political reasons could be another confounding factor. Liu et al 
(2018) find that political connection matters in deciding firms’ 
earnings management. It is also plausible that political connection 
plays a crucial role in determining whether a business group is 
eligible to establish a finance company since the formation of the 
finance company needs approval from the government (CBRC). An 
alternative explanation based on this view is that managers of firms 
with access to finance company are those have close ties with the 
government whose incentives to manage earnings is to meet 
objectives set by government agency for quick political promotion. 
If this alternative explanation holds, we would expect a differential 
earnings management response of state-owned firms to the access to 
finance company compared to non-state-owned firms. 
Our results in Table 5.13 provide evidence against this alternative 
explanation that state-owned firms are indistinguishable from non-
state-owned firms in terms of the level of earnings management 
after accessing the finance company. 
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Table 5.13: Alternative explanation: Political context  
This table reports the how political concerns influence the effects of the presence of finance company on earnings 
management during the sample period of 2007 to 2014. AB_DA, DA and AD_DA are the dependent variables. 
AB_DA is the absolute value of modified Jones discretionary accruals. DA is the modified Jones discretionary 
accruals. AD_DA is the Performance-adjusted abnormal discretionary accruals. SOE is a dummy that equals one if 
controlling shareholders is a government agency. We assume that SOEs have difference political environment 
from non-SOEs. Log (total assets) is calculated as the logarithm of beginning of year total asset. We use TobinQ 
and Salegrowth to capture the investment opportunities. TobinQ is the market value of equity plus book value of 
total liabilities, scaled by book value of total assets. Leverage is computed as total liabilities divided by total 
assets. Cashflow is the operating cash flow scaled by beginning of year total assets. Cash refers to cash and cash 
equivalents scaled by beginning of year total assets. Salegrowth is the percentage change in sales from year t-1 to 
year t. Dividend is the dividend payments scaled by beginning of year earnings. Control right is the total shares 
as a percentage of total shares outstanding held by controlling shareholders. In all columns, firm-fixed and year-
fixed effects are further controlled. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are shown in parentheses, 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3)    
  AB_DA DA AD_DA 
FC 0.0522 0.0069 -0.0066    
 (1.29) (0.11) (-0.09)    
FC*SOE -0.0229 0.0114 0.0414    
 (-0.55) (0.18) (0.58)    
Log (total assets) -0.1314*** -0.1544*** -0.1442*** 
 (-11.85) (-10.69) (-8.64)    
TobinQ -0.0207*** -0.0413*** -0.0336*** 
 (-3.98) (-6.17) (-4.52)    
Leverage 0.1633*** -0.1392*** -0.1714*** 
 (4.38) (-3.34) (-3.66)    
Cashflow 0.1463*** -0.9799*** -0.9366*** 
 (3.14) (-19.86) (-15.74)    
Cash 0.2084*** -0.4011*** -0.4293*** 
 (4.96) (-9.27) (-8.30)    
Salegrowth 0.4119*** -0.4699*** -0.4685*** 
 (19.83) (-19.37) (-16.13)    
Dividend -0.0012 0.0018 0.0034    
 (-0.14) (0.19) (0.29)    
SOE 0.0067 -0.0484 -0.0690    
 (0.24) (-1.27) (-1.58)    
Control right 0.0031*** 0.0037*** 0.0034*** 
 (4.75) (4.00) (3.38)    
Constant 2.8333*** 3.5192*** 3.3659*** 
 (11.97) (11.32) (9.43)    
Year fixed effect yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effect yes yes yes 
N 10975 10975 10975    
adj. R-sq 0.2933 0.2998 0.2117    
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5.8 Conclusion 
This study investigates the relationship between the presence of 
finance company and firm's earnings management behaviour across 
China's listed companies in business groups from 2007 to 2014. 
Given the importance of finance company in China’s economy, little 
attention has been drawn by empirical research to the role of finance 
company in corporates decision. This study fills this gap by 
providing empirical evidence on the impact of finance company on 
firms’ earnings management decision from a tunnelling perspective. 
Specifically, we show that accessing finance company leads to 
higher earnings management using increasing discretionary accruals. 
We also find that their earnings management behavior is in parallel 
with an extensive equity financing. Our results are consistent with 
the view that the presence of finance company facilities controlling 
shareholders’ tunneling incentives, which consequently results in 
more earning management behaviors. Additionally, we find that 
after the adoption of No.37 Memorandum of Disclosure Regulation, 
the difficulty of tunnelling by controlling shareholders of treated 
firms increased because a more transparent transaction information 
between firms and finance company is required, leading a 
significantly weaker effect of finance company on earnings 
management. This result further adds value to our tunnelling 
prediction to the relation between the presence of finance company 
and earnings management.  
Our analyses also show higher profitability of finance company, 
more divergence of cash-flow right and control, and more 
entrenchment controlling shareholders are associated with more 
earnings management in the aftermath of accessing finance 
company. Moreover, we find evidence against alternative 
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explanations of our results driven by managerial compensation 
maximization, strategic signals of greater investment opportunities 
to the market and managers’ political pursuing.  
Taken together, our study highlights the earnings management costs 
imposed by the presence of finance company in China. Our study 
has an implication for policymakers as we suggest that improving 
transparency of the transactions between finance companies and 
listed firms could help increase the informativeness of firms’ 
reporting. More efforts can be made by future research on a better 
understanding of the role of finance company in shaping group 
member firms’ investment and financial decisions. 
 
 
199 
Chapter 6  
Conclusion 
China’s being one of the fastest growing economies in the world 
leaves many puzzles as it is against the traditional wisdom in the 
finance and growth literature that growth of economies is based on 
well-developed legal and financial systems (Allen, 2005). One 
possible explanation for this phenomenon is that informal financial 
system has been playing an important role in supporting the growth 
of economy as it serves a good substitute for the formal systems. 
This thesis focuses on one of the key representatives of the informal 
system-shadow banking system. We aim at providing a more 
comprehensive picture of the importance and role of shadow 
banking by examining its economic influences on firms’ operational 
and financial decisions.  
Chapter 2 studies several related strands of literature to this thesis 
including business groups, cash holdings, earnings management, 
shadow banking and tunneling. This thesis tries to reconcile these 
strands of literature by adding the influences of shadow banking 
activities into the rationale behind firms’ behaviors.  
Chapter 3 examines the effects of the shadow banking activities on 
firm investments in China. We use a mountain of WMPs issuance 
data and Chinese listed firms’ financial data spanning from 2009 to 
2014. We document that the prevalence of shadow banking 
activities has a significant positive impact on firms’ investment. We 
provide robust evidence suggesting financial constraints mechanism 
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through which shadow banking affects firms’ investment. We find 
that small and private firms subject to more information 
asymmetries benefit the most from shadow banking prevalence. 
Moreover, we find firms with more dependence on internal capital 
market and with better investment opportunities are more responsive 
to the prevalence of shadow banking. These findings suggest that 
shadow banking help mitigate firms’ financial constraints. Our 
research design successfully addressed the causal relationship 
between shadow banking prevalence and investment since our 
results survive in instrumental and difference-in-differences analysis.  
Our study contributes to bank lending, investment and shadow 
banking literature in two ways: First, we point out the shadow credit 
has become an important complement for formal bank lending 
markets. We argue that bank lending literature should take shadow 
credit into consideration before drawing any conclusions. Shocks to 
the shadow banking system may have equivalent consequence as 
what bank lending channel literature has suggested. Second, due to 
the existence of regulatory restriction of the 75% cap on banks’ 
loan-to-deposit ratio and tightly regulated interest rate system, 
shadow banking, as an alternative financing channel to firms, is 
influential in determining firms’ investment. Third, our study 
contributes to the shadow banking literature by introducing more 
bright sides rather than focusing merely on the risk side. 
Our results also add value to the implications of regulation on 
shadow banking industry. Specifically, we provide insights for the 
potential impact of the recent regulation of the New Asset 
Management Rules on real economy. Given the institutional context 
of China’s capital and credit markets, firms that depend more on 
shadow credit would have been more adversely affected by 
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protentional over-regulation on shadow banking activities. Any 
inappropriate regulation or overregulation could have negative 
economic effects if firms facing the withdrawal of the shadow 
banking financing cannot frictionlessly switch to an alternative 
financing source. Policy makers are suggested to be carefully in 
drawing conclusion about shadow banking to avoid unintended 
consequence in the implementation of the regulation since function 
and real impact of shadow banking can vary according different 
economic conditions. 
Chapter 4 turns the interest to the role that finance companies plays 
business groups Finance company is a non-banking financial 
institution affiliated with a business group, providing the member 
firms of the business groups with bank-like financial services such 
as deposit taking and loan originating. They are essentially shadow 
banks involving in maturity, credit, and liquidity transformation 
within groups. We are interested in the role of finance companies in 
shaping group member firms’ cash policy. We hand-collected 196 
finance companies’ information by 2014 and match this data with 
firm-level data through ownership. We find that firms hold higher 
levels of cash after they gain access to finance companies and the 
increasing cash holdings of firms with finance companies serves no 
operational and investment purposes. In addition, we show that this 
effect is more pronounced for firms with more agency conflicts. 
These findings are contrary to Chinese reformers’ intention of 
designing such a group-specific bank from which one could expect 
an improvement in the efficiency of cash management and hence a 
reduction in financial constraints of group member firms. We 
interpret these results as consistent with the tunneling hypothesis 
that controlling shareholders extracts rents from firms by 
encouraging firms to accumulate large cash holdings and to deposit 
these cash holdings in their wholly owned finance companies. 
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Because by doing so, the controlling shareholders could reap all the 
benefits from lending these cash in interbank markets through their 
finance companies. Our finding that firms that had access to finance 
companies rebalancing their cash holdings sensitively to the 
arbitrage benefits available in interbank market confirms this 
prediction. 
By introducing an exogenous regulation to firms’ cash policies as 
natural experiments, our design has successfully addressed the 
endogeneity problem in the relation between the presence of finance 
companies and firms’ cash holding. We find greater reduction in 
cash holdings in firms after regulator placed restriction on 
depositing their cash in finance companies. 
Four pieces of evidence provide robust support to our tunneling 
prediction. First, we find the increase in cash holdings is stronger 
when tunneling benefits are larger led larger profitability a finance 
company could earn. Second, a more of diverged controlling 
shareholder’s cash flow rights versus voting rights is associated with 
larger increase in cash holdings. Third, we find that firms save more 
cash out of cash flow from equity issuance than other debt financing 
as their main financing choice for each member firm to accumulate 
cash holdings. By diluting the controlling right while remain full 
control, the controlling shareholders could reap more private 
benefits from depositing the accumulated cash from equity issuance 
in their wholly controlled finance companies. And fourth, we find 
that cash holdings are more sensitive to the variation of interbank 
rate, namely the SHIBOR rate while insensitive to the variation of 
governmental constrained rate, suggesting that cash holdings flow 
from member firms to controlling shareholder owned finance 
companies to satisfy their tunneling motives. Further, we find a 
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larger discount in the value of cash for firms with finance companies, 
which again confirms our tunneling explanation. Our results cannot 
be explained by the alternative hypotheses that member firms hold 
more cash holdings as a result of reduced bank monitoring or the 
parent’s incentive to reallocate capital more efficiently 
Our study contributes to cash holdings literature by highlighting a 
novel facet of cash holding determinants for China’s group affiliates, 
namely the presence of finance companies, which goes beyond the 
existing literature. Our study extends the literature on the raising 
concerns of tunnelling effects found in Chinese listed firms. Besides, 
our study has important implications that policy makers need to pay 
close attention to the role of finance companies in the evolution of 
business groups, especially on the cost side of such group-specific 
bank. In general, a finance company within the business group will 
have positive impact on improving the efficiency of the internal 
capital market and reduce member firms’ financial constraints. 
However, if the regulation and supervision of finance companies are 
not adequate, tunnelling incentives may arise from the parent 
company, which is the sole owner of the finance companies, which, 
in turn, can have detrimental effects on member firms’ financial 
performance and investment. These effects can further have 
negative impact on the real economy in general. 
Chapter 5 investigates how firms reporting preferences evolve in 
parallel with the development of business groups and whether this 
evolution can be explained by the emergence and functioning of 
finance companies. Based on our finance company data and firm-
level data from 2007 to 2014, we document that firms are more 
likely to be engaged in earnings management through increasing the 
use of discretionary accruals after having access to finance company. 
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We also find that their earnings management behavior is in parallel 
with an extensive equity financing. We inferred this evidence 
standing on the tunneling mechanism of finance companies we 
demonstrate in the previous chapter that controlling shareholders are 
incentivized to manage earnings to raise more capital from equity 
issuance and require firms to deposit the raised capital in finance 
company for their own interest.  
Two cross-sectional analysis add value to the plausibility of our 
inference. First, we find that larger difference indicating larger 
tunneling benefits that finance company can provide is associated 
with greater level of earnings management for firms with access to 
finance company. Second, the positive relationship between the 
presence of finance company and earnings management is stronger 
if controlling shareholders exercise full control while holding a 
relatively smaller portion of cash flow rights. Besides, we also use a 
direct measure of tunneling (related party transaction between 
subsidiary and parent company) to reflect the extent of 
entrenchment of the controlling shareholders and find that earnings 
management is more pronounced at firms controlled by more 
entrenched shareholders after they access the finance company.  
To address the endogeneity concern, we conduct a difference-in-
differences test using exogenous disclosure shock on firms’ earning 
management decision. A weaker earnings management of firms with 
access to finance company is found, implying that improving 
accounting quality may help to reduce earning managements, which 
is consistent with argument proposed by Biddle et al (2009). 
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We attempt to rule out three alternative explanations for our results. 
First, our results are not driven by managerial compensation 
maximization after having access to finance company (Cheng and 
Warfield, 2005). Second, accessing to finance company may bring 
stronger financing capacity and greater investment opportunities to 
affiliated member firms. However, we find evidence against the 
hypothesis that managers may use discretionary accruals to credibly 
signal positive prospects to the market, enabling it to raise more 
capital to support the optimal investment projects (Linck et al, 2013). 
Further, we find no systematic difference in earnings management 
between state-owned firms and non-state-owned firms, which rules 
out that our results are driven by political reasons. 
Our study highlights the earnings management costs imposed by the 
presence of finance company in China. It contributes to the earnings 
management literature by identifying a possible key driver of 
Chinese listed firms’ earnings management behavior. The 
implication for policymakers lies in the calls for actions to improve 
the transparency of the transactions between finance companies and 
listed firms, which may help increase the informativeness of firms’ 
reporting. 
Taken together, this thesis enriches the shadow banking literature by 
providing empirical evidence of how and to what extent shadow 
banking activities impact firms’ behavior. Going forward, more 
efforts can be made by future research on a better understanding of 
the role of shadow banking in shaping Chinese economy. 
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